THE

MILITARY OPERATIONS AT CABUL,

WHICH ENDED IN THE

DESTRUCTION OF THE BRITISH ARMY, JANUARY, 1842:

WITH A

Journal of Imprisonment in Afghanistan.

BY LIEUT. VINCENT EYRE.

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WHICH ENDED IN THE

RETREAT AND DESTRUCTION OF THE BRITISH ARMY,

JANUARY 1842.

WITH A JOURNAL OF

IMPRISONMENT IN AFGHANISTAN.

BY

LIEUT. VINCENT EYRE,

BENGAL ARTILLERY, LATE DEPUTY COMMISSARY OF ORDNANCE AT CABUL.

PHILADELPHIA:
CAREY AND HART.
1848.
NOTES
OF
MILITARY OPERATIONS AT CABUL,
ETC.

NOTICE BY THE EDITOR.

The original manuscript of this Journal was sent by Lieutenant Eyre in parts, as it was finished, and as opportunity offered, to a military friend in India. Even when the last part reached his hands, the eventual liberation of the Cabul prisoners was a matter of painful uncertainty; and his judgment prompted him to transmit it entire, and without comment, to the Author's immediate relations in this country. There is a point connected with its publication now, which must not be thought to have been disregarded from any anxiety that this account should be the first:—it is, the question whether it should have been withheld until the result of the inquiry now pending in India should be known. It is considered that sufficient delay has been already incurred to insure this end, and that all such investigations will have been closed before a copy of this book can find its way to India. The Journal is therefore at once printed as it came, in concurrence with the writer's own idea that it cannot fail to interest the British public.

E. EYRE.

Athenaeum Club, Dec. 29, 1842.

NOTE BY THE EDITOR.—I have received information from very high authority, which makes it incumbent on me, in candour, to append this note to a second edition; and I am sorry it was not in time to appear also in the first. I flatter myself that the general tone of this work will prove sufficiently that any supposed misstatement therein will have been made most unintentionally, and on authority which must have appeared to the Author very sufficient. In his absence I cannot do less than append the following observations, which are furnished me to qualify the passages of the text alluded to:

P. 5. With reference to the alleged neglect to send a force against the Nijrow chiefs, I am assured that the Envoy pressed this measure upon the General, but he refused the troops.

P. 8. I am assured that Lord Auckland never knew, until after the insurrection, that the pay of the Giljyes had been stopped, and that the measure originated with the Envoy.

P. 10. Lastly, I am authorized to say that it is not correctly stated that Lord Auckland did not receive General Elphinstone's resignation as soon as the General joined the force in April; and in September, Lord Auckland received his medical certificate, and wrote to him by the first mail to beg of him to give up the command to the next in order, until a successor could be found.

While readily giving insertion to any counter-statements so conveyed to me as to guarantee their accuracy, I must be allowed, on my brother's part, to express an opinion that, being on terms of intimate friendship with General Elphinstone, he must have had no less authority than the General's information for making at least that statement last referred to: but I am sure he would regret to be the means of propagating any thing not strictly true, from whatever source derived.

E. EYRE.

PREFACE BY THE AUTHOR.

The following notes were penned to relieve the monotony of an Afghan prison, while yet the events which they record continued fresh in my memory. I now give them publicity in the belief that the information which they contain on the dreadful scenes lately enacted in Afghanistan, though clothed in a homely garb, will scarcely fail to be acceptable to many of my countrymen, both in India and England, who may be ignorant of the chief particulars. The time, from the 2d November, 1841, on which day the sudden popular outbreak at Cabul took place, to the 13th January, 1842, which witnessed the annihilation of the last small remnant of our unhappy force at Gundamuk, was one continued tragedy. The massacre of Sir
Alexander Burnes and his associates, the loss of our commissariat fort, the defeat of our troops under Brigadier Shelton at Bemarah, the treacherous assassination of Sir William Macnaghten, our envoy and minister, and lastly, the disastrous retreat and utter destruction of a force consisting of 5000 fighting men and upwards of 12,000 camp-followers, are events which will assuredly rouse the British Lion from his repose, and excite an indignant spirit of inquiry in every breast. Men will not be satisfied, in this case, with a bare statement of the facts, but they will doubtless require to be made acquainted with the causes which brought about such awful effects. We have lost six entire regiments of infantry, three companies of sappers, a troop of European horse artillery, half the mountain-train battery, nearly a whole regiment of regular cavalry, and four squadrons of irregular horse, besides a well-stocked magazine, which alone, taking into consideration the cost of transport up to Cabul, may be estimated at nearly a million sterling. From first to last, more than 100 British officers have fallen: their names will be found in the Appendix. I glanced but slightly at the political events of this period, not having been one of the initiated; and I do not pretend to enter into minute particulars with regard to even our military transactions, more especially those not immediately connected with the sad catastrophe which it has been my ill-fortune to witness, and whereof I now endeavour to portray the leading features. In these notes I have been careful to state only what I know to be undeniable facts. I have set down nothing on mere hearsay evidence, nor any thing which cannot be attested by living witnesses, or by existing documentary evidence. In treating of matters which occurred under my personal observation, it has been difficult to avoid altogether the occasional expression of my own individual opinion: but I hope it will be found that I have made no observations bearing hard on men or measures, that are either uncalled for, or will not stand the test of future investigation. To Major Pottinger, C. B., the well-known hero of Herat, whose subsequent acts have amply sustained the fame which he there acquired, I am much indebted for a great deal of interesting matter relative to the events at Charekar. To Captain Colin Mackenzie of the Madras army, political assistant at Peshawur, my obligations are greater than I can express, for his most valuable aid in the preparation of these notes, as well as for his excellent account of the attack on Brigadier Anquetil's fort, and the sad detail of the Envoy's cruel murder, and the circumstances therewith connected. To Captain Lawrence, late military Secretary to the Envoy, and to Captain Troup, late Brigade-Major to the Shah's force, I am likewise bound to offer my best acknowledgments for much important information.

The following list of words used in this volume, with their meanings, may be useful to the English reader.

*GLOSSARY.*

Akkuzye, or Atehakzye, the name of one of the great Afghan tribes.
Ameer, outoumander or chief; title assumed by Dost Mahomed Khan.
Atta, ground wheat.
Ayah, a nurse.
Bala Hisar, royal citadel, upper citadel.
Barukzye, name of one of the five great Durani or Dooreance tribes.
Bourge, tower.
Bunshal, a trader, generally in grain.
Cafila, a convoy.
Char Chouk, public bazar. Chaháá, or char, means house, the bazar being introduced at right angles in the centre.
Chouk, bazar.
Chupprassie, a servant bearing a badge or brass plate.
Chuppaa, a night surprise, or plundering attack.
Cossid, a messenger.
Debashee, Query whether this is an Indian or Kabul term. Bashe means principal, as Kaffila Bashe, the principal of the convoy, &c.
Dewan Daneh, hall of audience.
Doothie, palanquin for carrying sick.
Doorance, name of five great tribes, the Popul-zai, Barak-zai, Nür-zai, Barmi-zai, and Abkh-zai.
Ensofzyes, an Afghan tribe holding the territory north of Peshawur.
Feringhee, European.
Ghaese, champion of religion.
Giljye, name of a great Afghan tribe.
Goordun, storehouse.
Goorkha, a native of Nepál.
Hatilder, a sergeant.
Hazirbash means "Be present." Hurwah uncertain.
Janbaz, Afghan horse.
Jeergha, council.
Jemandar, a native officer.
Juzait, long rifle.
Juzailchee, rifleman.
Kafir, infidel.
Khan, nobleman: the title in Kabul is assumed by every one, even the lowest.
Kirkhee, a wicket, window.
Kuwair, a pannier carried on camels.
Kuzzibash, a descendant of the Persians, wearing a red cap.
Lascar, Indian term, an attendant on guns, magazines, &c.
Mound (of grain), 80th, weight.
Meerza, an appellation generally given to Mahomedan writers.
Meer Wyze (The) means a teacher; generally conferred on some one eminent for sanctity.
Mehmandar, a man of all work; one who has charge of receiving guests, visitors, &c.
Moollah, priest.
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

Internal state of Afghanistan in 1841. Dissatisfaction—especially in Kohistan, and military operations there. March of General Sale for Jellalabad, who has to fight his way. Earlier premonitory symptoms of disturbance.

When Major-Gen. Elphinstone assumed the command of the troops in Afghanistan in April, 1841, the country enjoyed a state of apparent tranquillity to which it had for many years been a stranger. This remark applies more particularly to those provinces which lie northeast of Ghuznee, comprehending Cabul proper, Kohistan; Jellalabad, and the neighbouring districts. The Giljye tribes, occupying a large portion of the country between Ghuznee and Candahar, had never been properly subdued, and the permanent occupation of Khetat-i-Giljye by our troops had so alarmed their jealous love of independence, as to cause, during the months of July and August, a partial rising of the tribes, which, however, thevalor of our Hindoostanee troops, under Colonel Wymer, at Huft-a-seeer, and of the 5th Bengal Cavalry under Col. Chambers at Mookoor, speedily suppressed. Some of the principal chiefs delivered themselves up as hostages, and quiet was restored. To the west of Candahar, a notorious freebooter, named Akter Khan, having collected about 7000 followers, horse and foot, was signally defeated near Girhisk, on the banks of the Heemund, in the month of July, by a detachment of the Shah's regular troops under Capt. Woodburn, consisting of only one infantry regiment, two H. A. guns, under Lieut. Cooper, besides two regiments of Jambaz, or Afghan horse: the latter, however, behaved ill, and can hardly be said to have shared in the glory of the unequal conflict. Capt. Griffin, with the Bengal 2d Native Infantry, was, a few days after, equally successful in an attack on the enemy in the same quarter. Akter Khan fled to the hills with a few followers, and the land again enjoyed repose.* Kohist

tan, whose wild and turbulent chiefs had sturdily maintained their independence against the late ruler, Dost Mahommed Khan, seemed at last to have settled down into a state of quiet, though unwilling, sujection to Shah Shoojah. The Nijrow chiefs formed an almost solitary exception to this show of outward submission; and Sir William Macnaghten had strongly urged upon Lord Auckland, at an early period of the year, the expediency of sending a force into that country as soon as practicable. Since our first occupation of Cabul, Nijrow had become a resort for all such restless and discontented characters as had rendered themselves obnoxious to the existing government. The fact of our having permitted them so long to brave us with impunity, had doubtless been regarded by the secret enemies of the new rule as a mark of conscious weakness, and may have encouraged them, in no slight degree, to hatch those treasonable designs against the state which were so suddenly developed in November, 1841, and which were for the time, unhappily, but too successful.*

Major Pottinger, having been appointed political agent in Kohistan, arrived from Calcutta in May, 1841, and was one of the first to prognosticate the coming storm. He lost no time in representing to the Envoy the insufficiency of our military force in Kohistan, consisting at that time of merely two six-pounder guns, and the Kohistanee regiment raised by Lieut. Maule of the Bengal Artillery; which excellent young officer was, on the first outbreak of the rebellion, cruelly butchered by his own men, or, which is the same thing, with their consent. This regiment was stationed at Charekar, a post of no strength, and ill adapted for making a protracted defence, as was afterwards proved. The Major was, however, considered in the light of an alarmist, and he only succeeded in procuring a few Hazirbash horsemen and a seventeen-pounder gun, with a small detachment of the Shah's artillery, and a very scanty supply of ammunition.

About the end of September, Major Pottinger came to Cabul for the purpose of impressing on the Envoy that, unless strong measures of prevention were speedily adopted, he considered a rise in Kohistan as in the highest degree probable. His apprehensions were considered by the Envoy as not altogether unfounded, and he was empowered to retain as hostages the sons of the leading chiefs, whose fidelity he suspected. The first interruption to the state of outward tranquillity, which I have described above, occurred early in September. Capt. Hay, in command of some Hazirbashes, and Lieut. Manle, with his Kohistanee regiment, (which had been relieved at Charekar by the Goorkah, or 4th regiment, the Shah's subsidized force officered from the line, under Capt. Codrington,) and two six-pounder guns, had been sent into the Zoormut valley to collect the annual revenue, with orders likewise to make an attempt to seize certain noted

* The reader is particularly referred to a Note by the Editor, on our first page.
plunderers, among whom were some of the murderers of Col. Herring, who had long infested the road between Ghuznee and Cabul. The revenue was in the course of being quietly paid, when Capt. Hay was mischievously informed by Moollah Momin, collector of revenue in Zoormut (who shortly after distinguished himself as one of our bitterest foes), that the men whom he wished to seize, were harboured in a certain neighbouring fort of no strength whatever, and that the inhabitants would doubtless give them up rather than risk a rupture with the government. Capt. Hay immediately proceeded thither, but found the place much stronger than he had been led to expect, and the people obstinately prepared to resist his demands. On approaching the fort, he was fired upon; and finding the six-pounder shot, of which he gave a few rounds in return, made no impression on the mud walls, he had no alternative but to retreat.

The Envoy, on receiving Capt. Hay's report, immediately despatched a sufficient force to punish the rebels. It consisted of 200 of H. M. 44th Inf., 5th N. I., 6th regt. S. S. F., 4 guns of Abbott's battery, 2 iron nine-pounders mountain train, 2 comp. Shah's Sappers, and 2 squadrons of Anderson's horse. These were under the command of Lieut.-Col. Oliver, and were accompanied by Capt. G. H. Macgregor, the political agent at Gundamuck, who happened to be then at Cabul on business. The force commenced its march on the 27th September, and reached the Zoormut valley without the slightest interruption. On the approach of our troops the rebels had fled to the hills in the greatest consternation, leaving their forts at our mercy. The principal strongholds were destroyed with powder, and the force prepared to return to Cabul.

Meanwhile the hydra of rebellion had reared its head in another far more formidable quarter. Early in October three Giljye chiefs of note suddenly quitte Cabul, after plundering a rich Cafla at Tezeen, and took up a strong position in the difficult defile of Khord-Cabul, about ten miles from the capital, thus blocking up the pass, and cutting off our communication with Hindostan. Intelligence had not very long previously been received that Mahomed Akber Khan, second son of the ex-ruler Dost Mahomed Khan, had arrived at Bameen from Khooloom for the supposed purpose of carrying on intrigues against the government. It is remarkable that he is nearly connected by marriage with Mahomed Shah Khan and Dost Mahomed Khan,* also Giljyes, who almost immediately joined the above-mentioned chiefs. Mahomed Akber had, since the deposition of his father, never ceased to foster feelings of intense hatred towards the English nation; and, though often urged by the fallen ruler to deliver himself up, had resolutely preferred the life of a houseless exile to one of mean dependence on the bounty of his enemies. It seems therefore in the highest degree probable that this hostile movement on the part of the Eastern Giljyes was the result of his influence over them, combined with other causes which will be hereafter mentioned. The march of Gen. Sale's brigade to their winter quarters at Jellalabad, and ultimately to India, had only been deferred until the return of the force from Zoormut, but was now hastened in consequence of this unwelcome news. On the 9th October the 35th regt. N. I. under Col. Monteath, C. B., 100 of the Shah's Sappers under Capt. G. Broadfoot, a squadron of the 5th cavalry under Capt. Oldfield, and two guns of Capt. Abbott's battery under Lieut. Dawes, were sent on in advance to the entrance of the pass at Bootkhak, where, on the following night, it was attacked by a large number of rebels, who taking advantage of the high ground and deep ravines in the neighbourhood of the camp, maintained a sharp fire upon it for several hours, by which 35 Sepoys were killed and wounded.

On the morning of the 11th, Gen. Sale marched from Cabul with H. M. 13th Lt. Inf. to join the camp at Bootkhak, and on the following morning the whole proceeded to force the pass. Intelligence had been received that the enemy, besides occupying the heights of this truly formidable defile, which in many places approach to within fifty yards of each other, rising up almost perpendicularly to an elevation of 500 or 600 feet, had erected a sunga, or stone breastwork, in the narrowest part of the gorge, flanked by a strong tower. The advance guard, consisting of the Shah's Sappers, a company of H. M. 13th foot, another of the 35th N. I., and 2 guns under Lieut. Dawes, was met about midway through the pass, which is nearly five miles long, by a sharp and continued discharge of juzzails from the strong posts of the enemy. This was returned by our men with precision and effect, notwithstanding the disadvantages of their situation; flanking parties gallantly struggled up the height to dislodge the enemy from thence, while the Sappers rushed on to destroy the above-mentioned breastwork : through this, however, the stream which flows down the middle of the defile had already forced a passage; and, as the enemy abandoned it, as well as the flanking tower, on the approach of our troops, Lieut. Dawes passed his guns through the interval at full speed, getting them under the shelter of a rock beyond the sustained and murderous fire of the enemy's juzzailchees, it being impossible to elevate the guns sufficiently to bear upon them. The flankers did their duty nobly, and the fight had lasted for about half an hour, during which the conduct of the Shah's Sappers under Capt. Broadfoot was creditable in the highest degree, when the approach of the main column under Gen. Sale, who had been already shot through the leg, enabled Capt. Seaton of the 35th regiment, who commanded the advance guard, to push on. This he did, running the gauntlet to the end of the pass, by which

* This chief must not be confounded with the ex-ruler of the same name.
time the enemy, fearful of being taken in rear, abandoned their position, and retired towards Kubburi-i-Jubbar, on the road to Tezeen. The 35th regiment, Shah's Sappers, Lieut. Dawes's guns, and a party of Hazirbash under Capt. Trevor, encamped at Khoord-Cabul, H. M.'s 13th Lt. Inf. returning to Bootkhak. During their return, parties who still lurked among the rocks fired upon the column, thereby doing some mischief.

In these positions the divided force remained encamped for several days, awaiting the return to Cabul of the troops from Zoormut. During this time several shub-khoons, or night attacks, were made on the two camps, that on the 35th regiment at Khoord-Cabul being peculiarly disastrous from the treachery of the Afghan horse, who admitted the enemy within their lines, by which our troops were exposed to a fire from the least suspected quarter: many of our gallant Sepoys and Lieut. Jenkins thus met their death.

On the 20th October, Gen. Sale moved with his force to Khoord-Cabul, having been previously joined by the 37th regiment under Major Griffiths, Capt. Abbott's guns, the mountain train under Capt. Backhouse, 100 of Anderson's irregular horse under Lieut. Mayne, and the remainder of the Shah's sappers and miners. About the 22d the whole force there assembled, with Capt. Macgregor, political agent, marched to Tezeen, encountering much determined opposition on the road.

By this time it was too evident that the whole of the Eastern Giljies had risen in one common league against us. Their governor, or viceroy, Humza Khan, had in the interval gone forth under pretence of bringing back the chiefs to their allegiance; on his return, however, which took place nearly at the time at which Gen. Sale marched from Khoord-Cabul, the treacherous nature of his proceedings had been discovered, and he was placed by the Shah in confinement: he was suspected, indeed, before. Gen. Sale remained at Tezeen until the 26th October.

It must be remarked that, for some time previous to these overt acts of rebellion, the always strong and ill-repressed personal dislike of the Afghans towards Europeans had been manifested in a more than usually open manner in and about Cabul. Officers had been insulted and attempts made to assassinate them. Two Europeans had been murdered, as also several camp followers; but these and other signs of the approaching storm had unfortunately been passed over as mere ebullitions of private angry feeling. This incredulity and apathy is the more to be lamented, as it was pretty well known that on the occasion of the shub-khoon, or first night attack on the 35th N. I. at Bootkhak, a large portion of our assailants consisted of the armed retainers of the different men of consequence in Cabul itself, large parties of whom had been seen proceeding from the city to the scene of action on the evening of the attack, and afterwards returning.

Although these men had to pass either through the heart or round the skirts of our camp at Seeha Sung, it was not deemed expedient even to question them, far less to detain them.

On the 26th October, Gen. Sale started in the direction of Gundamuck, Capt. Macgregor, political agent, having, during the halt at Tezeen, half frightened half cajoled the refractory Giljies chiefs into what the sequel proved to have been a most hollow truce; for the term treaty can scarcely be applied to any agreement made with men so proverbially treacherous, as the whole race of Afghans have proved themselves to be, from our first knowledge of their existence up to the present moment. Of the difficulties experienced by Gen. Sale during his march to Gundamuck, and of the necessity which induced him subsequently to push on to Jellalabad, the public are aware. On the day of his departure from Tezeen the 37th N. I., 3 companies of the Shah's sappers, under Capt. Walsh, and 3 guns of the mountain train, under Lieut. Green, retraced their steps towards Cabul, and encamped at Kubburi-i-Jubbar, to wait as an escort to the sick and convalescent. The sappers continued their march back to Cabul unopposed; the rest remained here un molested until the 1st November, when they broke ground for Khoord-Cabul. Here, in the afternoon of the 2d, Major Griffiths, who commanded the detachment, received a peremptory order from General Elphinstone to force his way without loss of time to Cabul, where the insurrection had already broken out in all its violence. While striking his camp he was attacked by the mountaineers, who now began to assemble on the neighbouring heights in great numbers; and his march through the pass from Bootkhak to Cabul was one continued conflict, nothing saving him from heavy loss but the steadiness and gallantry of his troops, and the excellence of his own dispositions. He arrived in cantonments before daybreak on the morning of the 3d November.

The two great leaders of the rebellion were Ameenoollah Khan, the chief of Logue, and Abdoolah Khan, Achukzeye, a chief of great influence, and possessing a large portion of the Pisheen valley.

Ameenoollah Khan had hitherto been considered one of the staunchest friends of the existing government; and such was the confidence placed in him by the wuzeeer, that he had selected him to take charge of Humza Khan, the lately superseded governor of the Giljies, as a prisoner to Ghuznee. This man now distinguished himself as one of our most inveterate enemies. To illustrate the character of his coadjutor, Abdoolah Khan it will be sufficient to relate the following anecdote. In order to get rid of his elder brother, who stood between him and the inheritance, he caused him to be seized and buried up to the chin in the earth. A rope was then fastened round his neck, and to the end of it was haltered a wild horse: the animal was then driven round in a circle, until the unhappy victim's head was twisted from his
shoulders. This same man is also mentioned in terms of just abhorrence by Capt. A. Conolly in his Travels.

But though the two above-named chiefs took a leading part in the rebellion, there can be little doubt that it had its origin in the deep offence given to the Giljyes by the ill-advised reduction of their annual stipends—a measure which had been forced upon Sir William Macnaghten by Lord Auckland.* This they considered, and with some show of justice, as a breach of faith on the part of our government: at all events, that was surely mistaken economy which raised into hostility men, whose determined spirit under a sense of wrong the following anecdote may illustrate. When oppressed by Nadir Shah, the Giljye tribes, rather than succumb to the tyrant's will, took refuge in the mountains amidst the snow, where with their families they fed for months on roots alone: of these they sent a handful to Nadir, with the message, that, so long as such roots could be procured, they would continue to resist his tyranny. Such were many of the men now leagued together by one common feeling of hatred against us.

A passage occurring in the posthumous memorandum by the Envoy, now in Lady Macnaghten's possession, requires insertion here:—

"The immediate cause of the outbreak in the capital was a seditious letter addressed by Abdoolallah Khan to several chiefs of influence at Cabul, stating that it was the design of the Envoy to seize and send them all to London! The principal rebels met on the previous night, and, relying on the inflammable feelings of the people of Cabul, they pretended that the king had issued an order to put all infidels to death; having previously forged an order from him for our destruction, by the common process of washing out the contents of a genuine paper, with the exception of the seal, and substituting their own wicked inventions."

Such at least is the generally received version of the story, though persons are not wanting who would rashly pronounce the king guilty of the design imputed to him.

But, however that may be, it is certain that the events, which I have already narrated, ought to have been enough to arouse the authorities from their blind security. It ought, however, to be stated that, alarmed by certain symptoms of disaffection in different parts of the country, and conscious of the inadequacy of the means then possessed to quell any determined and general insurrection, Sir William had, a few months previously, required the presence of several more regiments: he was however induced to cancel this wise precautionary measure. But, even had this additional force arrived, it is next to certain that the loss of British honour, subsequently sustained, could only have been deferred for a period. A fearfully severe lesson was necessary to remove the veil from the eyes of those, who, drawing their conclusions from their wishes, would consider Afghanistan as a settled country. It is but justice to Sir William Macnaghten to say that such recommendations from him as were incompatible with the entrenched system were not received at headquarters in a way encouraging to him as a public officer.

CHAPTER I.


November 2d, 1841.—At an early hour this morning, the startling intelligence was brought from the city, that a popular outbreak had taken place; that the shops were all closed; and that a general attack had been made on the houses of all British officers residing in Cabul. About 8 A. M. a hurried note was received by the Envoy in cantonments from Sir Alexander Burnes,* stating that the minds of the people had been strongly excited by some mischievous reports, but expressing a hope that he should succeed in quelling the commotion. About 9 A. M. however, a rumour was circulated, which afterwards proved but too well founded, that Sir Alexander had been murdered, and Capt. Johnson's treasury plundered. Flames were now seen to issue from that part of the city where they dwelt, and it was too apparent that the endeavour to appease the people by quiet measures had failed, and that it would be necessary to have recourse to stronger measures. The report of fire-arms was incessant, and seemed to extend through the town from end to end.

Sir William Macnaghten now called upon Gen. Elphinstone to act. An order was accordingly sent to Brigadier Shelton, then encamped at Seehah Sung, about a mile and a half distant from cantonments, to march forthwith to the Bala Hissar or royal citadel, where his Majesty Shah Shooja resided, commanding a large portion of the city, with the following troops; viz. one company of H. M. 44th foot; a wing of the 54th regiment N. I., under Major Ewart; the 6th regiment Shah's infantry, under Capt. Hopkins; and 4 horse artillery guns, under Capt. Nicholl; and on arrival there to act according to his own judgment, after consulting with the King.

The remainder of the troops encamped at Seehah Sung were at the same time ordered into cantonments; H. M. 44th foot under Lieut.-Col. Mackereil; 2 horse artillery guns under Lieut. Waller; and Anderson's irregular horse. A messenger was likewise despatched to recall the 37th N. I. from Khoord-Cabul without delay.

* The Envoy lived in the cantonment, and Sir A. Burnes in the City.

* The editor invites particular attention to the note on this subject on our first page.
The troops at this time in cantonments were as follows: viz. 5th regiment N. I., under Lieut.-Col. Oliver; a wing of 54th N. I.; 5 six-pounder field guns, with a detachment of the Shah's artillery, under Lieut. Warburton; the Envoy's body-guard; a troop of Skinner's horse, and another of local horse, under Lieut. Walker; three companies of the Shah's sappers, under Capt. Walsh; and about 20 men of the Company's sappers, attached to Capt. Paton, Assist.-Qu.-Mast.-Gen.

Widely spread and formidable as this insurrection proved to be afterwards, it was at first a mere insignificant exhibition of discontent on the part of a few desperate and restless men, which military energy and promptitude ought to have crushed in the bud. Its commencement was an attack by certainly not 300 men on the dwellings of Sir Alexander Burns and Capt. Johnson, paymaster to the Shah's force; and so little did Sir Alexander himself apprehend serious consequences, that he not only refused, on its first breaking out, to comply with the earnest entreaties of the wuzeez to accompany him to the Bala Hissar, but actually forbade his guard to fire on the assailants, attempting to check what he supposed to be a mere riot, by haranguing the attacking party from the gallery of his house. The result was fatal to himself; for, in spite of the devoted gallantry of the Sepoys, who composed his guard, and that of the paymaster's office and treasury on the opposite side of the street, who yielded their trust only with their latest breath, the latter were plundered, and his two companions, Lieut. William Broadfoot of the Bengal European regiment, and his brother Lieut. Burns of the Bombay army, were massacred, in common with every man, woman, and child found on the premises, by these bloodthirsty miscreants. Lieut. Broadfoot killed five or six men with his own hand, before he was shot down.

No man, surely, in a highly responsible public situation—especially in such a one as that held by the late Sir Alexander Burns—ought ever to indulge in a state of blind security, or to neglect salutary warnings, however small. It is indisputable that such warnings had been given to him; especially by a respectable Afghan named Taj-Malomed, on the very previous night, who went in person to Sir A. Burns to put him on his guard, but retired disgusted by the incredulity with which his assertions were received. It is not for me to comment on his public character. It is the property of the civilized portion of the world; but it is due to another, little known beyond the immediate sphere in which he moved, to say that, had this outbreak been productive of no effects beyond the death of Lieut. William Broadfoot, it could not be sufficiently deplored: in him was lost to the state not only one of its bravest and most intelligent officers, but a man who for honesty of purpose and soundness of judgment, I may boldly aver, could not be surpassed.

The King, who was in the Bala Hissar, being somewhat startled by the increasing number of the rioters, although not at the time aware, so far as we can judge, of the assassination of Sir A. Burns, despatched one of his sons with a number of his immediate Afghan retainers, and that corps of Hindoostanees commonly called Campbell's regiment, with two guns, to restore order: no support, however, was rendered to these by our troops, whose leaders appeared so thunderstruck by the intelligence of the outbreak, as to be incapable of adopting more than the most puerile defensive measures. Even Sir William Macnaghten seemed, from a note received at this time from him by Captain Trevor, to apprehend little danger, as he therein expressed his perfect confidence as to the speedy and complete success of Campbell's Hindoostanees in putting an end to the disturbance. Such, however, was not the case; for the enemy, encouraged by our inaction, increased rapidly in spirit and numbers, and drove back the King's guard with great slaughter, the guns being with difficulty saved.

It must be understood that Captain Trevor lived at this time with his family in a strong bourge, or tower, situated by the river side, near the Kuzzilbash quarter, which, on the west, is wholly distinct from the remainder of the city. Within musket shot, on the opposite side of the river, in the direction of the strong and populous village of Deh Afghan, is a fort of some size, then used as a godown, or storehouse, by the Shah's commissariat, part of it being occupied by Brigadier Anquetil, commanding the Shah's force. Close to this fort, divided by a narrow water-course, was the house of Capt. Troup, Brigade Major of the Shah's force, perfectly defensible against musketry. Both Brigadier Anquetil and Captain Troup had gone out on horseback early in the morning towards cantonments, and were unable to return; but the above fort and house contained the usual guard of Sepoys; and in a garden close at hand called the Yaboo-Khamen, or lines of the baggage-cattle, was a small detachment of the Shah's sappers and miners, and a party of Captain Ferris's jazilchees. Capt. Trevor's tower was capable of being made good against a much stronger force than the rebels at this present time could have collected; had it been properly garrisoned.

As it was, the Hazirbash, or King's lifeguards, were, under Capt. Trevor, congregated round their leader, to protect him and his family; which duty, it will be seen, they well performed under very trying circumstances. For what took place in this quarter I beg to refer to a communication made to me at my request by Captain Colin Mackenzie, Assistant Political Agent at Peshawur, who then occupied the godown portion of the fort above mentioned, which will be found hereafter.*

* I am sorry to say that this document has not reached me with the rest of the manuscript. I have not struck out the reference, because there is
I have already stated that Brigadier Shelton was early in the day directed to proceed with part of the Seeha Singh force to occupy the Bala Hissar, and, if requisite, to lead his troops against the insurgents. Capt. Lawrence, military secretary to the Envoy, was at the same time sent forward to prepare the King for that officer’s reception. Taking with him four troopers of the body-guard, he was galloping along the main road, when, shortly after crossing the river, he was suddenly attacked by an Afghan, who, rushing from behind a wall, made a desperate cut at him with a large two-handed knife. He dexterously avoided the blow by spurring his horse on one side; but, passing onwards, he was fired upon by about fifty men, who, having seen his approach, ran out from the Lahore gate of the city to intercept him. He reached the Bala Hissar safe, where he found the King apparently in a state of great agitation, he having witnessed the assault from the window of his palace. His Majesty expressed an eager desire to conform to the Envoy’s wishes in all respects in this emergency.

Capt. Lawrence was still conferring with the King, when Lieut. Sturt, our executive engineer, rushed into the palace, stabbed in three places about the face and neck. He had been sent by Brigadier Shelton to make arrangements for the accommodation of the troops, and had reached the gate of the Dewan Khan, or hall of audience, when the attempt at his life was made by some one who had concealed himself there for that purpose, and who immediately effected his escape. The wounds were fortunately not dangerous, and Lieut. Sturt was conveyed back to cantonments in the King’s own palanquin, under a strong escort. Soon after this, Brig. Shelton’s force arrived; but the day was suffered to pass without any thing being done demonstrative of British energy and power. The murder of our countrymen, and the spoliation of public and private property, were perpetrated with impunity within a mile of our cantonment, and under the very walls of the Bala Hissar.

Such an exhibition on our part taught the enemy their strength—confirmed against us those who, however disposed to join in the rebellion, had hitherto kept aloof from prudential motives, and ultimately encouraged the nation to unite as one man for our destruction.

It was, in fact, the crisis of all others calculated to test the qualities of a military commander. Whilst, however, it is impossible for an unprejudiced person to approve the military dispositions of this eventful period, it is equally our duty to discriminate. The most responsible party is not always the most culpable. It would be the height of injustice to a most amiable and gallant officer not to notice the long course of painful and wearing illness, which had materially affected the nerves, and probably even the intellect, of Gen. Elphinstone; cruelly incapacitating him, so far as he was personally concerned, from acting in this sudden emergency with the promptitude and vigour necessary for our preservation. Major-Gen. Elphinstone had some time before represented to Lord Auckland the shattered state of his health, stating plainly and honestly that it had unfitness him to continue in command, and requesting permission to resign. Lord Auckland at first pressed him to remain, but ultimately acceded to his wishes; and the General was on the point of returning to India, thence to embark for England, when the rebellion unhappily broke out. No one, who knew Gen. Elphinstone, could fail to esteem his many excellent qualities both in public and private life. To all under his command, not excepting the youngest subaltern, he was ever accessible, and in the highest degree courteous and considerate: nor did he ever exhibit, either in word or practice, the slightest partiality for officers of his own service over those of the Company. His professional knowledge was extensive; and, before disease had too much impaired his frame for active exertion, he had zealously applied himself to improve and stimulate every branch of the service. He had, indeed, but one unhappy fault as a general—the result, probably, of age and infirmity—and this was a want of confidence in his own judgment, leading him to prefer every body’s opinion to his own, until, amidst the conflicting views of a multitude of counsellors, he was at a loss which course to take. Hence much of that indecision, procrastination, and want of method, which paralyzed all our efforts, gradually demoralized the troops, and ultimately, not being redeemed by the qualities of his second in command, proved the ruin of us all. I might add that, during the siege, no one exposed his person more fearlessly or frequently to the enemy’s fire than Gen. Elphinstone: but his gallantry was never doubted. Unhappily, Sir William Macnaghten at first made light of the insurrection, and, by his representations as to the general feeling of the people towards us, not only deluded himself, but misled the General in council. The unwelcome truth was soon forced upon us, that in the whole Afghan nation we could not reckon on a single friend.

But though no active measures of aggression were taken, all necessary preparations were made to secure the cantonment against attack. It fell to my own lot to place every available gun in position round the works. Besides the guns already mentioned, we had in the magazine 6 nine-pounder iron guns, 3 twenty-four pounder howitzers, 1 twelve-pounder ditto, and 3 5½ inch mortars; but the detail of artillerymen fell very short of what was required to man all these efficiently, consisting of only 80
Punjabees belonging to the Shah, under Lieut. Warburton, very insufficiently instructed, and of doubtful fidelity.

To render our position intelligible, it is necessary to describe the cantonment, or fortified lines so called. It is uncertain whether, for the faults which I am about to describe, any blame justly attaches to Lieut. Sturt, the engineer, a talented and sensible officer, but who was often obliged to yield his better judgment to the spirit of false economy which characterized our Afghan policy. The credit, however, of having selected a site for the cantonments, or controlled the execution of its works, is not a distinction now likely to be claimed exclusively by any one. But it must always remain a wonder that any Government, or any officer or set of officers, who had either science or experience in the field, should, in a half-conquered country, fix their forces (already inadequate to the services to which they might be called) in so extraordinary and injudicious a military position. Every engineer officer who had been consulted, since the first occupation of Cabul by our troops, had pointed to the Bala Hissar as the only suitable place for a garrison which was to keep in subjection the city and the surrounding country; but, above all, it was surely the only proper site for the magazine, on which the army's efficiency depended. In defiance, however, of rule and precedent, the position eventually fixed upon for our magazine and cantonment was a piece of low swampy ground, commanded on all sides by hills or forts. It consisted of a low rampart and a narrow ditch in the form of a parallelogram, thrown up along the line of the Kohistan road, 1000 yards long, 600 broad, with round flanking bastions at each corner, every one of which was commanded by some fort or hill. To one end of this work was attached a space nearly half as large again, and surrounded by a simple wall. This was called the "Mission Compound:" half of it was appropriated for the residence of the Envoy, the other half being crowded with buildings, erected without any attempt at regularity, for the accommodation of the officers and assistants of the mission, and the Envoy's body-guard. This large space required in time of siege to be defended, and thus materially weakened the garrison; while its very existence rendered the whole face of the cantonment, to which it was annexed, nugatory for purposes of defence. Besides these disadvantages, the lines were a great deal too extended, so that the ramparts could not be properly manned without harassing the garrison. On the eastern side, about a quarter of a mile off, flowed the Cabul river in a direction parallel with the Kohistan road. Between the river and cantonments, about 150 yards from the latter, was a wide canal. Gen. Elphinstone, on his arrival in April, 1841, perceived at a glance the utter unfitness of the cantonment for purposes of protracted defence, and when a new fort was about to be built for the magazine on the south side, he liberally offered to purchase for the government, out of his own funds, a large portion of the land in the vicinity, with the view of removing some very objectionable inclosures and gardens, which offered shelter to our enemy within two hundred yards of our ramparts; but neither was his offer accepted, nor were his representations on the subject attended with any good result. He lost no time, however, in throwing a bridge over the river, in a direct line between the cantonments and the Seehah Sung camp, and in rendering the bridge over the canal passable for guns; which judicious measure shortened the distance for artillery and infantry by at least two miles, sparing too the necessity which existed previously of moving to and fro by the main road, which was commanded by three or four forts, as well as from the city walls. Moreover, the Cabul river being liable to sudden rises, and almost always unfordable during the rainy season (March and April), it will easily be understood that the erection of this bridge was a work of much importance. But the most unaccountable oversight of all, and that which may be said to have contributed most largely to our subsequent disasters, was that of having the commissariat stores detached from cantonments, in an old fort, which in an outbreak, would be almost indefensible. Capt. Skinner, the chief commissariat officer, at the time when this arrangement was made, earnestly solicited from the authorities a place within the cantonment for his stores, but received for answer that "no such place could be given him, as they were far too busy in erecting barracks for the men to think of commissariat stores." The Envoy himself pressed this point very urgently, but without avail. At the southwest angle of cantonments was the bazar village, surrounded by a low wall, and so crowded with mud huts as to form a perfect maze. Nearly opposite, with only the high road between, was the small fort of Mahomed Sheer, which perfectly commanded our southwest bastion. Attached to this fort was the Shah Bagh, or King's garden, surrounded by a high wall, and comprising a space of about half a square mile. About two hundred yards higher up the road towards the city, was the commissariat fort, the gate of which stood very nearly opposite the entrance of the Shah Bagh. There were various other forts at different points of our works, which will be mentioned in the course of events. On the east, at the distance of about a mile, was a range of low hills dividing us from the Seehah Sung camp; and on the west, about the same distance off, was another somewhat higher range, at the northeast flank of which, by the road-side, was the village of Beymaroo, commanding a great part of the Mission Compound. In fact we were so hemmed in on all sides, that when the rebellion became general, the troops could not move out a dozen paces from either gate, without being exposed to the fire of some neighbouring hostile fort, garrisoned too by marksmen who seldom missed
their aim. The country around us was likewise full of impediments to the movements of artillery and cavalry, being in many places flooded, and every where closely intersected by deep water-cuts.

I cannot help adding, in conclusion, that almost all the calamities that befell our ill-starred force may be traced more or less to the defects of our position; and that our cantonment at Cabul, whether we look to its situation or its construction, must ever be spoken of as a disgrace to our military skill and judgment.

CHAPTER II.


November 3d.—At 3 a.m. the alarm was sounded at the eastern gate of cantonments, in consequence of a brisk file-firing in the direction of Sseah Sung, which turned out to proceed from the 37th regiment N.I. on its return from Khoord-Cabul, having been closely followed up the whole way by a body of about 3000 Gilijes. The regiment managed, nevertheless, to save all its baggage excepting a few tents, which were left on the ground for want of carriage, and to bring in all the wounded safe.

A more orderly march was never made under such trying circumstances, and it reflects the highest credit on Major Griffiths and all concerned. This regiment was a valuable acquisition to our garrison, being deservedly esteemed one of the best in the service. Three guns of the mountain train under Lieut. Green accompanied them, and were of the greatest use in defending the rear on the line of march. In consequence of their arrival, a reinforcement was sent into the Bala Hisaar, consisting of the left wing 54th N.I., with Lieut. Green's guns, 1 iron nine-pounder, 1 twenty-four-pounder howitzer, 2 5½-inch mortars, and a supply of magazine stores. They all reached it in safety, though a few shots were fired at the rear-guard from some orchards near the city. Brigadier Shelton was ordered to maintain a sharp fire upon the city from the howitzers and guns, and to endeavour to fire the houses by means of shells and carcasses from the two mortars; should he also find it practicable to send a force into the city, he was to do so.

Early in the afternoon, a detachment under Major Swayne, consisting of two companies 5th N.I., one of H.M. 44th, and 2 H. A. guns under Lieut. Waller, proceeded out of the western gate towards the city, to effect, if possible, a junction at the Lahore gate with a part of Brigadier Shelton's force from the Bala Hisaar. They drove back and defeated a party of the enemy who occupied the road near the Shah Bagh, but had to encounter a sharp fire from the Kohistan gate of the city, and from the walls of various enclosures, behind which a number of marksmen had concealed themselves, as also from the fort of Mahmood Khan commanding the road along which they had to pass. Lieut. Waller and several Sepoys were wounded. Major Swayne, observing the whole line of road towards the Lahore gate strongly occupied by some Afghan horse and juzai-chees, and fearing that he would be unable to effect the object in view with so small a force unsupported by cavalry, retired into cantonments. Shortly after this, a large body of the rebels having issued from the fort of Mahmood Khan, 900 yards southeast of cantonments, extended themselves in a line along the bank of the river, displaying a flag; an iron nine-pounder was brought to bear on them from our southeast bastion, and a round or two of shrapnell caused them to seek shelter behind some neighbouring banks, whence, after some desultory firing on both sides, they retired.

Whatever hopes may have been entertained, up to this period, of a speedy termination to the insurrection, they began now to wax fainter every hour, and an order was despatched to the officer commanding at Candahar to lose no time in sending to our assistance the 16th and 43rd regiments N.I. (which were under orders for India,) together with a troop of horse artillery, and half a regiment of cavalry; an order was likewise sent off to recall Gen. Sale with his brigade from Gundamack. Capt. John Conolly, political assistant to the Envoy, went into the Bala Hisaar early this morning, to remain with the King, and to render every assistance in his power to Brigadier Shelton.

On this day Lieut. Richard Maule, commanding the Kohistanee regiment, which on its return from Zoormut had been stationed at Kadharrn in Kohistan, about twenty miles northwest of Cabul, with the object of keeping down disaffection in that quarter, being deserted by his men, was, together with local Lieut. Wheeler, his adjutant, barbarously murdered by a band of rebels. They defended themselves resolutely for several minutes; but at length fell under the fire of some juzails. Lieut. Maule had been previously informed of his danger by a friendly native, but chose rather to run the risk of being sacrificed than desert the post assigned him. Thus fell a noble-hearted soldier and a devout Christian.

November 4th.—The enemy having taken strong possession of the Shah Bagh, or King's Garden, and thrown a garrison into the fort of Mahomed Shereef, nearly opposite the bazar, effectually prevented any communication between the cantonment and commissariat fort, the gate of which latter was commanded by the gate of the Shah Bagh on the other side of the road.

Ensign Warren of the 5th N.I. at this time occupied the commissariat fort with 100 men, and having reported that he was very hard
pressed by the enemy, and in danger of being completely cut off, the General, either forgetful or unaware at the moment of the important fact that upon the possession of this fort we were entirely dependent for provisions, and anxious only to save the lives of men whom he believed to be in imminent peril, hastily gave directions that a party under the command of Capt. Swayne of H. M.'s 44th Regt. should proceed immediately to bring off Ensign Warren and his garrison to cantonments, abandoning the fort to the enemy. A few minutes previously an attempt to relieve him had been made by Ensign Gordon, with a company of the 37th N. I. and eleven camels laden with ammunition; but the party were driven back, and Ensign Gordon killed. Capt. Swayne now accordingly proceeded towards the spot with two companies of H. M.'s 44th; scarcely had they issued from cantonments ere a sharp and destructive fire was poured upon them from Mahomed Shereef's fort, which, as they proceeded, was taken up by the marksmen in the Shah Bagh, under whose deadly aim both officers and men suffered severely; Capts. Swayne and Robinson of the 44th being killed, and Lieuts. Hallahan, Evans, and Forty wounded, in this disastrous business. It now seemed to the officer, on whom the command had devolved, impracticable to bring off Ensign Warren's party, without risking the annihilation of his own, which had already sustained so rapid and severe a loss in officers; he therefore returned forthwith to cantonments. In the course of the evening, another attempt was made by a party of the 5th Lt. Cavalry; but they encountered so severe a fire from the neighbouring enclosures as to oblige them to return without effecting their desired object, with the loss of 8 troopers killed and 14 badly wounded. Capt. Boyd, the Assist.-Com.-Gen., having meanwhile been made acquainted with the General's intention to give up the fort, hastened to lay before him the disastrous consequences that would ensue from so doing. He stated that the place contained, besides large supplies of wheat and atta, all his stores of rum, medicine, clothing, &c., the value of which might be estimated at four lacs of rupees; that to abandon such valuable property would not only expose the force to the immediate want of the necessaries of life, but would infallibly inspire the enemy with tenfold courage. He added that we had not above two days' supply of provisions in cantonments, and that neither himself nor Capt. Johnson of the Shah's commissariat had any prospect of procuring them elsewhere under existing circumstances. In consequence of this strong representation on the part of Capt. Boyd, the General sent immediate orders to Ensign Warren to hold out the fort to the last extremity, (Ensign Warren, it must be remarked, denied having received this note.) Early in the night a letter was received from him to the effect that he believed the enemy were busily engaged in mining one of the towers, and that such was the alarm among the Sepoys that several of them had actually made their escape over the wall to cantonments; that the enemy were making preparations to burn down the gate; and that, considering the temper of his men, he did not expect to be able to hold out many hours longer, unless reinforced without delay. In reply to this he was informed that he would be reinforced by 2 A. M.

At about 9 o'clock p. m. there was an assembly of staff and other officers at the General's house, when the Envoy came in and expressed his serious conviction that, unless Mahomed Shereef's fort were taken that very night, we should lose the commissariat fort, or at all events be unable to bring out of it provisions for the troops. The disaster of the morning rendered the General extremely unwilling to expose his officers and men to any similar peril; but, on the other hand, it was argued that the darkness of the night would nullify the enemy's fire, who would also most likely be taken unawares, as it was not the custom of the Afghans to maintain a very strict watch at night. A man in Capt. Johnson's employ was accordingly sent out to reconnoitre the place; he returned in a few minutes with the intelligence that about twenty men were seated outside the fort near the gate, smoking and talking; and from what he overheard of their conversation, he judged the garrison to be very small, and unable to resist a sudden onset. The debate was now resumed, but another hour passed and the General could not make up his mind. A second spy was despatched, whose report tended to corroborate what the first had said. I was then sent to Lieut. Sturt, the engineer, who was nearly recovered from his wounds, for his opinion. He at first expressed himself in favour of an immediate attack, but, on hearing that some of the enemy were on the watch at the gate, he judged it prudent to defer the assault till an early hour in the morning: this decided the General, though not before several hours had slipped away in fruitless discussion.

Orders were at last given for a detachment to be in readiness at 4 A. M. at the Kohistan gate; and Capt. Bellew, Deputy Assist.-Quar.-Mast.-Gen., volunteered to blow open the gate; another party of H. M.'s 44th were at the same time to issue by a cut in the south face of the rampart, and march simultaneously towards the commissariat fort, to reinforce the garrison. Morning had, however, well dawned ere the men could be got under arms; and they were on the point of marching off, when it was reported that Ensign Warren had just arrived in cantonments with his garrison, having evacuated the fort. It seems that the enemy had actually set fire to the gate; and Ensign Warren, seeing no prospect of a reinforcement, and expecting the enemy every moment to rush in, led out his men by a hole which he had prepared in the wall. Being called upon in a public letter from the Assist.-Adj.-Gen. to state his reasons for abandoning his post, he replied that he was
that the gun ammunition was running short, and that the troops had failed to take advantage of the best opportunity for advancing, recalled us into cantonments; thus the enemy enjoyed their triumph undiminished; and great was the rage of the Sepoys of the 37th N. I., who had evinced the utmost eagerness to be led out, at this disappointment of their hopes. It must be acknowledged that the General was singularly unfortunate in many of the coadjutors about him, who with all the zeal and courage which distinguish British officers, were sadly lacking in that military judgment and quicksightedness which are essential to success in a critical moment. Let me here, however, pay a just tribute to the memory of two of his staff officers, now, alas! no more. Few men have ever combined all the excellent qualities which constitute the good soldier and the good man more remarkably than did Major Thain of H. M.'s 21st Fusiliers, A. D. C. to Gen. Elphinstone; while of Capt. Paton, deputy-quarter-master-general, it may be safely affirmed, that in solid practical sense and genuine singleness of heart he was never surpassed. Would that all, to whom the General was in the habit of deferring, had been equally wise to counsel and prompt to execute with the two above-named gallant men!

November 6th.—It was now determined to take the fort of Mahomed Shereef by regular breach and assault. At an early hour, 3 iron nine-pounder guns were brought to bear upon its northeastern bastion, and 2 howitzers upon the contiguous curtain. I took charge of the former, and Lieut. Warburton of the latter. In the space of about two hours a practicable breach was effected, during which time a hot fire was poured upon the artillerists from the enemy’s sharp-shooters, stationed in a couple of high towers which completely commanded the battery, whereby, as the embrasures crumbled away from the constant concussion, it became at length a difficult task to work the guns. A storming party, composed of 3 companies, viz. 1 comp. H. M. 44th, under Ensign Raban, 1 comp. 5th N. I. under Lieut. Deas, 1 comp. 37th under Lieut. Steer, the whole commanded by Major Griffiths, speedily carried the place. Poor Raban was shot through the heart, when conspicuously waving a flag on the summit of the breach.

As this fort adjoined the Shah Bagh, it was deemed advisable to dislodge the enemy from the latter, if possible. Learning that there was a large opening in the wall in the north side of the garden, I took a six-pounder gun thither, and fired several rounds of grape and shrapnel upon parties of the enemy assembled within under the trees, which speedily drove them out; and had a detachment of infantry taken advantage of the opportunity thus afforded to throw themselves into the building at the principal entrance by the road-side, the place might have been easily carried permanently, and immediate reposeossion could have been then taken of the commissariat fort opposite, which had not
yet been emptied of half its contents. While this was going on, a reconnoitring party under Major Thain, A. D. C., consisting of 1 H. A. gun, 1 troop 5th cavalry, and 2 comps. of infantry, scouried the plain to the west of cantonments; and having driven the enemy from several enclosures, were returning homeward, when large numbers of Afghan horse and foot were observed to proceed from the direction of the city towards the southwest extremity of a hill, which runs in a diagonal direction from northeast to southwest across the plain to the west of cantonments. A resallah of Anderson's horse had been stationed on the summit of this hill all the morning as a picket, whence they had just been recalled, when a large body of the enemy's horse reached the base, and proceeded to crown the summit. Major Thain's party, observing this, came to a halt; and a few minutes afterwards a reinforcement opportunely arrived, consisting of 1 resallah of irregular horse under Capt. Anderson, 1 troop of dragoons under Lieut. Walker, and 2 troops 5th cavalry under Capts. Collyer and Bott. I now considered it my duty to join the H. A. gun, which had no officer with it, and I accordingly left the six-pounder gun under the protection of Captain Mackenzie, who, with a few of his juzailchees, had now joined me, having been engaged in skirmishing across the plain towards the west end of the Shah Bagh, where, finding an opening, he had crept in with his men, and cleared that part of the garden, but, not being supported, had been obliged to retire with a loss of 15 killed out of 95.

I now advanced with the H. A. gun, supported by a troop of the 5th cavalry, to the foot of the hill, and opened fire upon the enemy, while the rest of the cavalry, headed by Anderson's horse, rode briskly up the slope to force them off. The officers gallantly headed their men, and encountered about an equal number of the enemy, who advanced to meet them. A hand to hand encounter now took place, which ended in the Afghan horse retreating to the plain, leaving the hill in our possession. In this affair Capt. Anderson personally engaged, and slew the brother-in-law of Abdollah Khan. Meanwhile the enemy began to muster strong on the plain to the west of the Shah Bagh, whence they appeared to be gradually extending themselves towards the cantonments, as if to intercept our return; it was therefore deemed prudent to recall the cavalry from the height, and show front in the plain, where they could act with more effect. A reinforcement of two companies of infantry and one H. A. gun was sent out, and the whole force was drawn up in order of battle, anticipating an attack, with one gun on either flank. In this position a distant fire was kept up by the enemy's juzailchees, which was answered principally by discharges of shrapnell and round shot from the guns; the heights, too, were again crowned by the Afghan horse, but no disposition was manifested by them to encounter us in open fight, and, as the night gradually closed in, they slowly retired to the city. On this occasion about 100 of the enemy fell on the hill, while the loss on our side was 8 troopers killed, and 14 wounded.

It will be remembered that I left a six-pounder gun at the opening in the wall of the Shah Bagh. After my departure, large numbers of the enemy's infantry had filled the west end of the Shah Bagh, and, stealing up among the trees, and close to the high wall, towards the gun, kept up so hot and precise a fire as to render its removal absolutely necessary. Capt. Mackenzie had been joined by a party of H. M.'s 44th; with whom, and with a few of his own men, he endeavoured to cover the operation, which was extremely difficult, it being necessary to drag the gun by hand over bad ground. Several of the Shah's gunners were killed, and many of the covering party knocked over, the gun being barely saved. I may here add, that from this time forward the juzailchees, under the able direction of Capt. Mackenzie, who volunteered to lead them, were forward to distinguish themselves on all occasions, and continued to the very last a most useful part of our force.

November 8th.—An attempt was made by the enemy to mine one of the towers of the fort we captured on the 6th, which could not have happened had we taken possession of the gate of the Shah Bagh at the same time. Our chief cause of anxiety now was the empty state of our granary. Even with high bribes and liberal payment, the Envoy could only procure a scanty supply, insufficient for daily consumption, from the village of Beyamaroo, about half a mile down the Kohistan road, to the north. The object of the enemy undoubtedly was to starve us out; to effect which the chiefs exerted their whole influence to prevent our being supplied from any of the neighbouring forts. Their game was a sure one; and, so long as they held firmly together, it could not fail to be sooner or later successful. During the short interval of quiet, which ensued after our capture of the fort, the rebels managed to rig out a couple of guns which they procured from the workyard of Lieut. Warburton (in charge of the Shah's guns), situated, unfortunately, in the city. These they placed in a position near Mahmud Khan's fort, opposite the southeast bastion of cantonments. All this time a cannonade was daily kept up on the town by Capt. Nicholl of the Horse Artillery in the Bala Hissar; but, though considerable damage was thereby done, and many of the enemy killed, it required a much more powerful battery than he possessed to ruin a place of such extent. On the morning of the 2d, when the rebellion commenced, the two guns, which were sent with Campbell's Hindoostanees into the city, had been left outside the gate of the Bala Hissar in the confusion and hurry of retreat, where they had ever since remained. So jealous a watch was kept over these by the enemy from the houses of the Shah Bazar, that it was found impossible
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to get them back into the fort; and it was necessary for our troops to maintain an equally strict watch to prevent their being removed by the enemy, who made several desperate efforts to obtain them. An attempt of this kind took place to-day, when the rebels were driven back into the city with considerable loss.

November 9th.—The General’s weak state of health rendering the presence of a cadet under absolutely necessary, to relieve him from the command of the garrison, Brigadier Shelton, the second in command, was, at the earnest request of the Envoy, summoned in from the Bala Hissar, in the hope that, by heartily cooperating with the Envoy and General, he would strengthen their hands and rouse the sinking confidence of the troops. He entered cantonments this morning, bringing with him 1 H. A. gun, 1 mountain train ditto, 1 company H. M. 44th, the Shah’s 6th infantry, and a small supply of atta.

CHAPTER III.


November 10th.—Henceforward Brigadier Shelton bore a conspicuous part in the drama upon the issue of which so much depended. He had, however, from the very first, seemed to despair of the force being able to hold out the winter at Cabul, and strenuously advocated an immediate retreat to Jellalabad.

This sort of despondency proved, unhappily, very infectious. It soon spread its baneful influence among the officers, and was by them communicated to the soldiery. The number of croakers in garrison became perfectly frightful, lugubrious looks and dismal prophecies being encountered every where. The severe losses sustained by H. M.’s 44th under Capt. Swayne, on the 4th instant, had very much discouraged the men of that regiment; and it is a lamentable fact that some of those European soldiers, who were naturally expected to exhibit to their native brethren in arms an example of endurance and fortitude, were among the first to lose confidence and give vent to feelings of discontent at the duties imposed on them. The civil seed, once sprung up, became more and more difficult to eradicate, showing daily more and more how completely demonizing to the British soldier is the very idea of a retreat.

Sir William Macnaghten and his suite were altogether opposed to Brigadier Shelton in this matter, it being in his (the Envoy’s) estimation a duty we owed the Government to retain our post, at whatsoever risk. This difference of opinion, on a question of such vital importance, was attended with unhappy results, inasmuch as it deprived the General, in his hour of need, of the strength which unanimity imparts, and produced an uncommunicative and disheartening reserve in an emergency which demanded the freest interchange of counsel and ideas.

But I am digressing.—About 9 A. M. on the 10th the enemy crowned the heights to the west in great force, and almost simultaneously a large body of horse and foot, supposed to be Giljyes, who had just arrived, made their appearance on the Sseah Sung hills to the east, and, after firing a feu de joie, set up a loud shout, which was answered in a similar way by those on the opposite side of us. This was supposed to be a preconcerted signal for a joint attack on the cantonments. No movement was however made on the western side to molest us, but on the eastern quarter parties of the enemy, moving down into the plain, took possession of all the forts in that direction. One of these, called the Rika-bashee fort, was situated directly opposite the Mission Compound, at the northeast angle of cantonments, within musket-shot of our works, into which the enemy soon began to pour a very annoying fire; a party of sharp-shooters at the same time, concealing themselves among the ruins of a house immediately opposite the northeast bastion, took deadly aim at the European artillerists who were working the guns, one poor fellow being shot through the temple in the act of sponging. From 2 howitzers and a 54-inch mortar, a discharge of shells into the fort was kept up for two hours.

At this time not above two days’ supply of provisions remained in garrison, and it was very clear that, unless the enemy were quickly driven out from their new possession, we should soon be completely hemmed in on all sides. At the Envoy’s urgent desire, he taking the entire responsibility on himself, the General ordered a force to hold themselves in readiness under Brigadier Shelton to storm the Rika-bashee fort. About 12 A. M. the following troops assembled at the eastern gate:—2 H. A. guns, 1 mountain train gun, Walker’s horse, H. M.’s 44th foot under Col. Mackerrell, 37th N. I. under Major Griffiths, 6th regiment of Shah’s force under Capt. Hopkins. The whole issued from cantonments, a storming party consisting of two companies from each regiment taking the lead, preceded by Capt. Bellow, who hurried forward to blow open the gate. Missing the gate, however, he blew open a wicket of such small dimensions as to render it impossible for more than two or three men to enter abreast, and these in a stooping posture. This, it will be seen, was one cause of disappointment in the first instance: for the hearts of the men failed them when they saw their foremost comrades struck down, endeavouring to force an entrance under such disadvantageous circumstances, without being able to help them. The signal, however, was given for the storming party, headed by Col. Mackerrell. On nearing the wicket, the detachment encountered an exces-
It is generally a sharp fire from the walls, and the small passage, through which they endeavoured to rush in, merely served to expose the bravest to almost certain death from the hot fire of the defenders. Col. Mackerell, however, and Lieut. Bird of Shah's 6th infantry, accompanied by a handful of Europeans and a few Sepoys, forced their way in; Capt. Westmacott of the 37th being shot down outside, and Capt. M'Crabbed in the entrance. The garrison, supposing that these few gallant men were backed by the whole attacking party, fled in consternation out of the gate, which was on the opposite side of the fort, and which ought to have been the point assailed. Unfortunately, at this instant a number of the Afghan cavalry charged round the corner of the fort near the wicket: the cry of "Cavalry!" was raised, a cry which too often, during our operations, paralyzed the arms of those, whose muskets and bayonets we have been accustomed to consider as more than a match for a desultory charge of irregular horsemen; the Europeans gave way simultaneously with the Sepoys—a bugler of the 6th infantry, through mistake, sounded the retreat—and it became for the time a scene of sava qui peut. In vain did the officers, especially Major Scott of H. M.'s 44th, knowing the fearful predica-
ment of his commanding officer, exhort and be-
seech their men to charge forward—not a soul would follow them, save a private of the 44th named Steward, who was afterwards promoted for his solitary gallantry. Let me here do Bri-
gadier Shelton justice: his acknowledged cour-
age redeemed the day; for, exposing his own person to a hot fire, he stood firm amidst the crowd of fugitives, and by his exhortations and example at last rallied them; advancing again to the attack, again our men faltered, notwith-
standing that the fire of the great guns from the cantonments, and that of Capt. Mackenzie's juzailchees from the N. E. angle of the Mission Compound, together with a demonstration on the part of our cavalry, had greatly abated the ardour of the Afghan horse. A third time did the Brigadier bring on his men to the assault, which now proved successful. We became masters of the fort. But what, in the mean-
time, had been passing inside the fort, where, it will be remembered, several of our brave brethren had been shot up, as it were, in the lions' den?

On the first retreat of our men, Lieut. Bird, with Col. Mackerell and several Europeans, had hastily shut the gate by which the garrison had for the most part evacuated the place, securing the chain with a bayonet: the repulse outside, however, encouraged the enemy to re-
turn in great numbers, and, it being impossible to remain near the gate on account of the hot fire poured in through the crevices, our few heroes speedily had the mortification to see their foes not only re-entering the wicket, but, having drawn the bayonet, rush in with loud shouts through the now re-opened gate. Poor Mackerell, having fallen, was literally hacked}

to pieces, although still alive at the termination of the contest. Lieut. Bird, with two Sepoys, retreated into a stable, the door of which they closed; all the rest of the men, endeavouring to escape through the wicket, were met and slaughtered. Bird's place of concealment at first, in the confusion, escaped the observation of the temporarily triumphant Afghans; at last it was discovered, and an attack commenced at the door. This being barricaded with logs of wood, and whatever else the tenants of the stable could find, resisted their efforts, while Bird and his now solitary companion, a Sepoy of the 37th N. I. (the other having been struck down,) maintained as hot a fire as they could, each shot taking deadly effect from the prox-
imity of the party engaged. The fall of their companions deterred the mass of the assailants from a simultaneous rush, which must have succeeded; and thus that truly chivalrous, high-

minded, and amiable young gentleman, whose subsequent fate must be ranked among the mys-
terious dispensations of Providence which we cannot for the present fathom, stood at bay with his equally brave comrade for upwards of a quarter of an hour, when, having only five car-
triges left, in spite of having rifled the pouch of the dead man, they were rescued as related above. Our troops literally found the pair "grim and lonely there," upwards of thirty of the enemy having fallen by their unassisted prowess.

Our loss on this occasion was not less than 200 killed and wounded. Four neighbouring forts were immediately evacuated by the enemy, and occupied by our troops: they were found to contain about 1400 mounds of grain; in re-
moving which no time was lost, but as it was not found practicable to bring off more than half before night-fall, Capt. Boyd, the Assist.-
Com.-Gen., requested Brig. Shelton that a guard might be thrown into a small fort, where it must be left for the night; this was, however, refused, and on the following morning, as might have been expected, the grain was all gone: perma-
nent possession was, however, taken of the Rika-
bush and Zulfiakar forts, the towers of the re-
mainder being blown up on the following day.

Numbers of Giljie horse and foot still main-
taining their position on the Seelah Sung heights, Brig. Shelton moved his force towards that quar-
ter. On reaching the base of the hill, fire was opened from the two H. A. guns, which, with the firm front presented by our troops, caused the enemy shortly to retire towards the city, and ere we turned homeward not a man re-
mained in sight.

November 13th. The enemy appeared in

The enemy appeared in

great force on the western heights, where, having posted two guns, they fired into can-
tonments with considerable precision. At the earnest entreaty of the Envoy, it was deter-
mined that a party, under Brigadier Shelton, should sally forth to attack them, and, if possi-
ble, capture their guns. The force ordered for

this service was not ready until 3 p. m. It con-

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sisted of the following troops:—2 squadrons 5th Light Cavalry, under Col. Chambers; 1 squadron Shah's 2d Irregular Horse, under Lieut. Le Geyt; 1 troop of Skinner's Horse, under Lieut. Walker; the Body Guard; 6 companies her Majesty's 44th, under Major Scott; 6 companies 37th, under Major Swayne; 4 companies Shah's 6th Infantry, under Capt. Hopkins; and 1 H. A. gun and 1 Mountain Train do. under myself, escorted by a company of 6th Shah's under Capt. Marshall. After quitting cantonments, the troops took the direction of a gorge between the two hills bounding the plain, distant about a mile (the enemy's horse crowning that to the left,) and advanced in separate columns at so brisk a pace, that it seemed a race which should arrive first at the scene of action. The infantry had actually reached the foot of the hill, and were on the point of ascending to the charge, ere the H. A. gun, which had been detained in the rear by sticking fast in a canal, could be got ready for action; nor had more than one round of grape been fired, ere the advance, led on by the gallant Major Thain, had closed upon the foe, who resolutely stood their ground on the summit of the ridge, and unflinchingly received the discharge of our musketry, which, strange to say, even at the short range of ten or twelve yards, did little or no execution! From this cause the enemy, growing bolder every moment, advanced close up to the bayonets of our infantry, upon whom they pressed so perseveringly, as to succeed in driving them backwards to the foot of the hill, wounding Major Thain on the left shoulder, and sabring several of the men. Several rounds of grape and shrapnel were now poured in, and threw them into some confusion, whereupon a timely charge of our cavalry, Anderson's horse taking the lead, drove them again up the hill, when our infantry once more advancing carried the height, the enemy retreating along the ridge, closely followed by our troops, and abandoning their guns to us. The H. A. gun now took up a position in the middle of the gorge, whence it played with effect on a large body of horse assembled on the plain west of the hill, which forthwith retreated to a distance.

Our troops had now got into ground where it was impracticable for Horse-Artillery to follow. I accordingly pushed forward with one artillery-man and a supply of drag-ropes and spikes, to look out for the deserted guns of the enemy; one of these, a 4-pounder, was easily removed along the ridge by a party of the Shah's 8th infantry; but the other a 6-pounder, was awkwardly situated in a ravine half way down the side of the hill, our troops, with the Mountain-Train 3-pounder, being drawn up along the ridge just above it. The evening was now fast closing in, and a large body of Afghan infantry occupied some enclosures on the plain below, whence they kept up so hot a fire upon the gun, as to render its removal by no means an easy task; but the Envoy having sent us a message of entreaty that no exaction might be spared to complete the triumph of the day by bringing off both the enemy's guns, Major Scott, of her Majesty's 44th, repeatedly called on his men to descend with him to drag the 6-pounder away; but, strange to say, his frequent appeals to their soldierly feelings were made in vain: with a few gallant exceptions they remained immovable, nor could the Sepoys be induced to lead the way where their European brethren so obstinately hung back. Meanwhile it became nearly dark, and the further detention of the troops being attended with risk, as the enemy, though driven from the hill, still maintained a threatening attitude below, I descended with the Horse-Artillery gunner, and having driven in a spike, returned to assist in making sure of the captured 4-pounder. This, from the steepness of the hill, and the numerous water-cuts which every where intersected the plain, proved a somewhat troublesome business. Lieut. Macquerney, however, with a company of the Shah's 6th Infantry, urged on his men with zeal, and we at last had the satisfaction to deposit our prize safe within the cantonment gates. Meanwhile the enemy, favoured by the darkness, pressed hard upon our returning troops, and by dint of incessant firing and shouting rendered their homeward march somewhat disorderly, effecting, however, but little damage.

It was no small disadvantage under which we laboured, that no temporary success of our troops over those of the enemy could be followed up, nor even possession be retained of the ground gained by us at the point of the bayonet, owing to the necessity of withdrawing our men into their quarters at night. On reaching the cantonment, we found the garrison in a state of considerable alarm, and a continual blaze of musketry illuminating the whole line of rampart. This had arisen from a demonstration of attack having been made by the enemy on the southwest bastion, which had been immediately checked by a few rounds of grape from the guns, and by a well-directed fire from the zugeliches under Capt. Mackenzie; but it was long ere quiet could be restored, the men continuing to discharge their pieces at they knew not what.

Our infantry soldiers, both European and Native, might have taken a salutary lesson from the Afghans in the use of their fire-arms; the latter invariably taking steady deliberate aim, and seldom throwing away a single shot; whereas our men seemed to fire entirely at random, without any aim at all: hence the impunity with which the Afghan horsemen braved the discharge of our musketry in this day's action within twelve yards, not one shot, to all appearance, taking effect. In this affair Capt. Paton, Assist.-Quart.-Mast.-Gen., had the misfortune to receive a wound in the left arm, which rendered amputation necessary, and the valuable services of one of our most efficient staff officers were thus lost. This was the last success our arms were destined to experience. Henceforward it becomes my weary task to relate a catalogue of errors, disasters, and difficulties, which, follow-
ing close upon each other, disgusted our officers, disheartened our soldiers, and finally sunk us all into irretrievable ruin, as though Heaven itself, by a combination of evil circumstances for its own inscrutable purposes, had planned our downfall. But here it is fit I should relate the scenes that had all this while been enacting at our solitary outpost in Kohistan.

CHAPTER IV.


On the 15th November, Major Pottinger, C. B. and Lieut. Haughton, Adjt. of the Shah's 4th, or Goorkha regiment, came in from Charekar, both severely wounded, the former in the leg, and the latter having had his right hand amputated, besides several cuts in the neck and left arm. Their escape was wonderful.

The following is an outline of what had taken place in Kohistan, from the commencement of the insurrection up to the present date.

It appears, from Major Pottinger's account of the transactions of that period, that it was not without reason he had so urgently applied to Sir William Macnaghten for reinforcements. Towards the end of October, premonitory signs of the coming tempest had become so unequivocally threatening as to confirm Major Pottinger in his worst suspicions, and in his conviction that order could not possibly be restored without a departure on the part of government from the long-suffering system which had been obstinately pursued with respect to Nijrow in particular; but his conviction alone could do little to stem the torrent of coming events.

About this time Meer Musjeeede, a contumacious rebel against the Shah's authority, who had been expelled from Kohistan during General Sale's campaign in that country in 1840, and who had taken refuge in Nijrow after the fashion of many other men of similar stamp, obstinately refusing to make his submission to the Shah even upon the most favourable terms, openly put himself at the head of a powerful and well-organized party, with the avowed intention of expelling the Feringees and overturning the existing government. He was speedily joined by the most influential of the Nijrow chiefs. A few of these made their appearance before Lughmanee, where Major Pottinger resided, and proffered their services towards the maintenance of the public tranquillity. It will be seen that their object was the blackest treachery.

I shall here relate Major Pottinger's story, almost in his own words, as given to me.

In the course of the forenoon of the 3d of November, Major Pottinger had an interview with a number of the more influential chiefs in his house or fort, and, about noon, went into the garden to receive those of inferior rank, accompanied by his visitors; here they were joined by Lieut. Charles Rattray, Major Pottinger's Assistant. In discussing the question of the rewards to which their services might entitle them, the head man declared that, although they were willing to agree to Major Pottinger's propositions, they could not answer for their clansmen, and the above-mentioned petty chiefs, who were awaiting the expected conference at some little distance. Mr. Rattray, accordingly, in company with several of the principal, joined the latter, and, shortly after, proceeded with them to an adjoining field, where numbers of their armed retainers were assembled, for the purpose of ascertaining their sentiments on the subject of the conference. While thus engaged, this most promising and brave young officer apparently became aware of intended foul play, and turned to leave the field, when he was immediately shot down. At this time Major Pottinger was still sitting in his garden, in company with several of the above-mentioned chiefs, and had just received intelligence of the purposed treachery from Mahomed Kasim Khan, a debashee of Hazirbash, a small detachment of which composed a part of his escort: he had with difficulty comprehended the man's meaning, which was conveyed by hints, when the sound of firing was heard:—the chiefs that were with him rose and fled, and he escaped into the fort by the postern gate; which having secured, he, from the terre-plein of the rampart, saw poor Mr. Rattray lying badly wounded in the field at the distance of some 300 yards, and the late pretended negotiators making off in all directions with the plunder of the camp of the Hazirbash detachment. Of these plunderers a party passing close to Mr. Rattray, and observing that life was not extinct, one of them put his gun close to his head, and blew his brains out,—several others discharging their pieces into different parts of his body.

Major Pottinger's guard, being by this time on the alert, opened a fire, which speedily cleared the open space; but the enemy, seeking shelter in the numerous watercourses, and under the low walls surrounding the fort, harassed them incessantly until the appearance of Lieut. Haughton, adjutant of the Goorkha regiment, who, advancing from Charekar, where the corps was cantoned, distant about three miles, speedily drove the assailants from their cover. Capt. Codrington, who commanded the regiment, chanced to be in Lughmanee at this very time; and, on Mr. Haughton's approach, he led out a sortie and joined him: the skirmish was sharp, and the enemy suffered severely. Capt. Codrington remaining in possession of an adjacent canal, the bank of which was immediately cut, to supply the tank of the fort with water in case of accidents.

The evening had now closed in, and the enemy had retired, taking up a position which
seemed to threaten the Charekar road. Capt. Codrington accordingly left Lughmanee in haste, strengthening Major Pottinger’s party to about 100 men, these having to garrison four small forts. He promised, however, to relieve them the next morning, and to send a further supply of ammunition, of which there only remained 1500 rounds. Capt. Codrington reached Charekar unmolested; and the enemy, returning to their former point of attack, carried off their dead with impunity, the garrison being too weak to make a sally. On the morning of the 4th, Capt. Codrington despatched four companies with a six-pounder gun, according to promise. Their march caused numbers of the enemy now assembled on all sides to retreat; but one large body remained in position on the skirts of the mountain range to their right, and threatened their flank. Mr. Haughton, who commanded, detached Ensign Salisbury with a company to disperse them, which, in spite of the disparity of numbers, was effected in good style. Unhappily the Goorkhas, being young soldiers, and flushed with success, pressed forward in pursuit with too much eagerness, regardless of the recalling bugle, when at last Mr. Salisbury with difficulty halted them, and endeavoured to retrace his steps. The enemy, observing the error they had committed in separating themselves too far from their main body, rallied and followed them in their retreat so closely, as to oblige Mr. Salisbury to halt his little band frequently, and face about. Mr. Haughton, consequently, in order to extricate the compromised company, halted his convoy, and despatched the greatest part of his men in the direction of the skirmish. All this encouraged the other parties of the enemy who had retired to return, against whom, in numbers not less than 4000 men, Mr. Haughton maintained his ground until rejoined by his subaltern, when, seeing the hopelessness of making good his way to Lughmanee, he retreated, and regained in safety the fortified barracks at Charekar. Many of the men fell in this expedition, which would have proved infinitely more disastrous, from the number of the enemy’s cavalry, who latterly seemed to gain confidence at every stage, but for the extraordinary gallantry and conduct of Mr. Haughton, who with a handful of men and a gun, protected the rear of our over-matched troops. Mr. Salisbury was mortally wounded, and the trail of the gun gave way just as the party reached Charekar.

This disappointment led Major Pottinger to believe that no second attempt would be made to relieve them; and as he had no ammunition beyond the supply in the men’s pouches, he determined to retreat on Charekar after dark: the better to hide his intention, he ordered grain to be brought into the fort. Meantime the Charekar cantonment was attacked on all sides, and in the afternoon large bodies of the enemy were detached thence, and joining others from that part of the valley, recommended their investment of Lughmanee. That part of the Major’s garrison which occupied the small fort to the east of the principal one, defended by himself, although their orders were not to vacate their posts until after dark, being panic-stricken, did so at once, gaining the stronger position, but leaving behind several wounded comrades and their havelkar, who remained staunch to his duty: these, however, were brought off. Major Pottinger then strengthened the garrison of a cluster of adjacent huts, which, being surrounded by a sort of rude fortification, formed a tolerably good outwork; but the want of European officers to control the men was soon lamentably apparent, and in a short time the Goorkhas, headed by their native officer, abandoned the hamlet, followed as a matter of course by the few Afghan soldiers attached to Capt. Codrington’s person, who had remained faithful until then. This last misfortune gave the enemy cover up to the very gate of the stronghold, and before dark they had succeeded in getting possession of a gun-shed built against its outer wall, whence they commenced mining.

As soon as night had fairly closed in, Major Pottinger drew together the Goorkha garrison outside the postern gate, under pretence of making a sortie, and thus separated them from the Afghans and their followers, who remained inside; he then marched for Charekar, the garrison of the remaining fort joining him as he drew on; he passed by the investing posts in perfect silence, taking his route along the skirts of the mountains to avoid the main road, and arrived in safety at Charekar. In Lughmanee he abandoned the hostages whom he had taken from the Kohistan chiefs, two boxes of treasure containing 2000 rupees, about sixty stand of juzails, all his office records, Mr. Rattray’s, Dr. Grant’s, and his own personal property, and a number of horses belonging to himself and the above-mentioned two officers, and to some horsemen who had not deserted—for the greater part of his mounted escort had fled in the beginning of the affray. The Heraties, and seven or eight Peshawarnees, were the only Afghans who adhered to him: the Cabulees, had deserted to a man, immediately on the murder of Mr. Rattray; they had been much disgusted the preceding month, as well as their comrades who proved unfaithful too, by the sudden reduction of a portion of his escort, which naturally led them to apprehend that their livelihood from the British service was of a precarious nature.

On the morning of 5th Nov. large bodies of the enemy closed in round the Charekar barracks, and about 7 o’clock they attacked the outposts with a spirit engendered by the success of the preceding evening. Capt. Codrington requested Major Pottinger to take charge of what artillery he had, and to move a squadron in support of the skirmishers, which he did. The skirmishers were driven in, and, while retreating, Major Pottinger was wounded in the leg by a musket-shot. Encouraged by this, and by the unfinished state of the works round the barracks, in the entrance of which there was
no gate, the enemy advanced with great determination to the attack, and dislodged the Goorkhas from some mud huts outside, which were still occupied by a part of the regiment. In this affair Capt. Codrington, an officer of whose merits it is difficult to speak too highly, fell mortally wounded. The main post was, however, successfully defended, and the enemy driven back with considerable loss; upon which Mr. Haughton (who had now succeeded to the command, the only remaining officer being Mr. Rose, a mere youth,) made a sortie and drove the enemy out of the gardens occupied by them in the morning, maintaining his ground against their most desperate efforts until after dark. Relief was then sent to the garrison (consisting of about 50 men) of Khaja Meer's fort, which it had been found expedient to occupy previously, because it commanded the interior of the barracks on the southern side.

From this time the unfortunate horses and cattle of the garrison were obliged to endure the extremity of thirst, there being no water for them, and the supply for even the fighting men scanty in the extreme, obtained only from a few pools in the ditch of the rampart, which had been formed by a seasonal fall of rain. During the 6th the enemy renewed their attack in augmented numbers, the whole population of the country apparently swarming to the scene of action. Notwithstanding two successful sorties, all the outposts were driven in by dark, and thenceforth the garrison was confined to the barracks itself.

On the 7th the enemy got possession of Khaja Meer's fort: the regimental moonshoe had been gained over; and through him the native officer was induced to surrender. From the towers of that fort, on the 8th, the enemy offered terms, on the condition that all the infidels should embrace Mahomedanism. Major Pottinger replied, that they had come to aid a Mahomedan sovereign in the recovery of his rights; that they consequently were within the pale of Islam, and exempt from coercion on the score of religion. The enemy rejoined, that the King himself had ordered them to attack the Kaffirs, and wished to know if Major Pottinger would yield on receiving an order. He refused to do so, except on the production of a written document. All this time the garrison was sorely galled from the post of vantage in possession of the enemy.

On the 9th, the enemy were enabled by the carelessness of the guard to blow up a part of the south-west tower of the barracks; but, before they could profit by the breach and the panic of the men, Mr. Haughton rallied the fugitives, and, leading them back, secured the top of the parapet wall with a barricade of boards and sandbags.

On the 10th, the officers drew their last pool of water, and served out half a wineglass to each fighting man.

On the 11th, all could not share even in that miserable proportion, and their sufferings from thirst were dreadful. During the night a sortie was made, and some of the followers brought in a little water from a distant place, the sight of which only served to aggravate the distress of the majority; still, however, the fortitude of these brave and hardy soldiers remained unshaken, although apathy, the result of intense suffering, especially among the Hindoos, began to bumm their faculties.

On the 12th, after dark, Mr. Haughton ordered out a party to cover the water-carriers in an attempt to obtain a supply; but the overharassed Sepoys, unable to restrain themselves, dashed out of the ranks on approaching the coveted element, instead of standing to their arms to repel the enemy, and, consequently, the expedition failed in its object. Another sortie, consisting of two companies under Ensign Rose, was then ordered out, one of which, having separated from the other, dispersed in search of water; that under Mr. Rose himself fell on a post of the besiegers, every man of which they bayoneted; but, being unaccountably struck with a panic, the men fled back to the barracks, leaving Mr. Rose almost alone, who was then obliged to return, having accomplished his object but partially. These circumstances were communicated by Mr. Haughton to Major Pottinger (whose wound had disabled him from active bodily co-operation in these last events), together with the startling intelligence, that the corps was almost wholly disorganized from the large amount of killed and wounded, the hardships it had undergone, the utter inefficiency of the native officers, who had no sort of control over the soldiers, the exhaustion of the men from constant duty, and the total want of water and provisions.

Relief from Cabul, for which Major Pottinger had written repeatedly, seemed now hopeless, and an attempt at protracted defence of the post appeared likely to ensure the destruction of its brave defenders. Major Pottinger considered that the only remaining chance of saving any portion of the regiment was a retreat to Cabul; and, although that was abundantly perilous, he entertained a hope that a few of the most active men who were not encumbered with wives and children might escape. Then was felt most bitterly, the impolicy of the encouragement which had been held out to all the recruits to bring their families with them, on what, even at the time of their being raised, was looked on by the most able officers as likely to prove a campaign of several years. Mr. Haughton coincided in the Major's views, and it was agreed, to ensure secrecy, that the men should not be informed of their intentions until paraded for the march.

This wretched state of things continued until the afternoon of the 13th, when Mr. Haughton discovered amongst the Punjaee artillery-men two who had deserted a few days previously, and who apparently had returned for the purpose of seducing their comrades. He immediately seized them; but, while he was in the act of their apprehension, the jemadar of the artillery, himself a Punjaee Mussulman, snatched...
a sword from a bystander, and cut down that
officer, repeating his blows as he lay on the
ground. Before the astonished Goorkhas could
draw their knives or handle their muskets, this
miscreant, followed by all the artillery-men and
the greater number of the Mahomedans in the
barracks, rushed out of the gate and escaped.
The tumult and confusion occasioned by this
impressed Major Pottinger with the idea that
the enemy had driven the men from the walls;
under this impression, he caused himself to be
carried to the main gate, but on his arrival he
found that Dr. Grant had secured that point, and
rallied the men. The native officers immediately
gathered round him, with many of the Sepoys,
to assert their fidelity; but demoralization had
evidently progressed fearfully, as may be judged
from the fact that the garrison had plundered
the treasure and the quarters of the deceased
Capt. Codrington the instant the Major had left
them, and that in the face of the enemy's fire
they had pulled down the officers' boxes, which
had been piled up as traverses to protect the
doorway, broken them open, and pillaged them.
Dr. Grant then amputated Mr. Haughton's right
hand, and hastily dressed the severe wounds
which he had received in his left arm and on
his neck. In the evening the doctor spiked all
the guns with his own hands, and the garrison
then left the barracks by the postern gate. The
advance was led by Major Pottinger (Mr.
Haughton, who accompanied him, being unable
to do more than sit passively on his horse;) Dr.
Grant brought out the main body, and Ensign
Rose, with the Quart.-Mast.-Serje., commanded
the rear.

Notwithstanding the previous sufferings of
these unfortunate men, it may be said that here
commenced their real disasters. In vain did
Major Pottinger attempt to lead his men to
seize a building generally occupied by the enemy
after nightfall, by the possession of which the
exit of the main body from the barracks might
be covered. In fact it was with much difficulty
that he eventually succeeded in halting them at
about half a mile from the barracks until the
main body and rear should close up. The men
were naturally occupied entirely with their
families, and such property as it had been
impossible to prevent their bringing away; and
discipline, the only source of hope under such
circumstances, was at an end.

After the junction of the main body and rear,
Dr. Grant suddenly disappeared, and was not
afterwards seen.

The regiment then proceeded along the road
to Sinjit Durrah, where Major Pottinger knew
that water could be procured. On reaching the
first stream, the last remnant of control over
this disorderly mob was lost; much delay took
place, and, in moving on, the advance became
suddenly separated from the main body. After
an anxious search Major Pottinger effected a
reunion.

At Sinjit Durrah they quitted the road to
avoid alarming the villages and any outposts
that might be stationed there; and much time
was lost in regaining the track from the other
side; at Istalif the same manoeuvre was prac-
tised. Major Pottinger now found very few
inclined to push on; exhaustion from the pain of
his wound precluded the possibility of his
being of any further use as a leader; and he
determined to push on with Mr. Haughton
towards Cabul, although with faint hope that
the strength of either would prove adequate to
the exertion. Having no guide, they got into
many difficulties; and day was breaking by the
time they reached the range of mountains half
way between Charrek and Cabul. Men and
horses were by this time incapable of further
endurance: the latter, it must be remembered,
had been ten days without water previously to
starting, and five days without food; they were
still upwards of twenty miles from any place of
safety; their sufferings from their wounds, fa-
tigue, hunger, and thirst, made life a burden,
and at this time despair had almost obtained a
victory—but God sustained them. By Mr.
Haughton's advice they sought shelter in a
very deep but dry ravine, close to a small vil-
lage, hoping that their proximity to danger
might prove a source of safety; as it was pro-
bable that the inhabitants, who by this time
must have been on the alert, would scarcely
think of looking for their prey close to their own
doors. The companions of Major Pottinger and
Mr. Haughton were a sepoy of the regiment,
a moonshee, and the regimental baniah.

In the forenoon they were alarmed by a firing
on the mountains above them; the cause of this,
as it appeared afterwards, was that a few of the
fugitive Goorkhas had ascended the hills for
safety (which, indeed, it was Major Pottinger's
wish to do, until he yielded to the arguments
of his companion), whither they were pursued
and massacred by the country people. The
rest of the day passed in tranquillity; and
again, under the friendly shroud of darkness,
having previously calculated their exact posi-
tion, did this sorely-bested little party resume
their dangerous route. It was providential that
Major Pottinger had, from his habits as a tra-
veller through unknown and difficult regions,
accustomed himself to ascertain and remember
the bearings of the most conspicuous landmarks
of the countries he traversed; it was therefore
comparatively easy for him to lead the way over
the steep and rugged peaks, by which alone
they might hope to find a safe path,—for the
main road, and even the more accessible tracks
across the tops of the mountains, were closely
beset, and watch-fires gleamed in all directions.
Indeed Gholam-Moyun-ood-deer, a distinguished
partisan in the service of the rebels, had been
despatched from Cabul, with a number of his
most active followers, purposely to intercept
and seize the Major, of whose flight intelligence
had been early received, and actually was at
that time patrolling those very heights over
which the fugitives passed. But the protecting
hand of Providence was displayed not only in
CHAPTER V.

Removal from cantonment to Bala Hissar discussed.


November 16th.—The impression made on the enemy by the action of the 13th was so far salutary, that they did not venture to annoy us again for several days. Advantage was taken of this respite to throw magazine supplies from time to time into the Bala Hissar, a duty which was ably performed by Lieut. Walker, with a resulah of irregular horse under cover of night. But even in this short interval of comparative rest, such was the wretched construction of the cantonment, that the mere ordinary routine of garrison duty, and the necessity of closely manning our long line of rampart both by day and night, was a severe trial to the health and patience of the troops; especially now that the winter began to show symptoms of unusual severity. There seemed, indeed, every probability of an early fall of snow, to which all looked forward with dread, as the harbinger of fresh difficulties and of augmented suffering.

These considerations, and the manifest superiority of the Bala Hissar as a military position, led to the early discussion of the expediency of abandoning the cantonment and consolidating our forces in the above-mentioned stronghold. The Envoy himself was, from the first, greatly in favour of this move, until overruled by the many objections urged against it by the military authorities; to which, as will be seen by a letter from him presently quoted, he learned by degrees to attach some weight himself; but to the very last it was a measure that had many advocates, and I venture to state my own firm belief that, had we at this time moved into the Bala Hissar, Cabul would have been still in our possession. The chief objections urged were, 1st, the difficulty of conveying our sick and wounded; 2dly, the want of firewood; 3dly, the want of forage for the cavalry; 4thly, the triumph that our abandonment of cantonments would afford the enemy; 5thly, the risk of defeat on the way thither. On the other hand it was advanced, 1st, that, though to carry the sick would be difficult, it still was not impossible; for so short a distance two, or even three, men could be conveyed on each doolie; some might manage to walk, and the rest could be mounted on the yahoos and camels, on top of their loads; 2dly, although wood was scarce in the Bala Hissar, there was enough for purposes of cooking, and for the want of fires the troops would be amply compensated by the comparative ease and comfort they would enjoy in other respects; 3dly, the horses must, in the case of there being no forage, have been shot; but the want of cavalry would have been little felt in such a situation; 4thly, as we should have destroyed all that was valuable before leaving,
the supposed triumph of the enemy would have been very short-lived, and would soon have given way to a feeling of disappointment at the valueless nature of their acquisition, and of dismay at the strength and security of our new position; 6thly, the distance did not exceed two miles, and one half of that distance was protected by the guns of the Bala Hissar.

If we had occupied the Seelahung hills with a strong party, placing guns there to sweep the plain on the cantonment side, the enemy could have done little to impede our march, without risking a battle with our whole force in a fair field, to which they were generally averse, but which would, perhaps, have been the best mode for us of deciding the struggle.

To remove so large a force, clogged with so many thousands of camp followers, without loss of some kind, was, of course, next to impossible; but ought such considerations to have interfered with a step which would have been attended in the long run with such great military and political advantages? Our troops, once collected in the Bala Hissar, could have been spared for offensive operations against the city and the neighbouring forts, by which means plenty of food and forage would in all probability have been readily procured, while the commanding nature of the position would have caused the enemy to despair of driving us out, and a large party would probably have been ere long formed in our favour. Such were the chief arguments employed on either side; but Brigadier Shelton having firmly set his face against the movement from the first moment of its proposition, all serious idea of it was gradually abandoned, though it continued to the very last a subject of common discussion.

November 18th.—Accounts were this day received from Jellalabad, that Gen. Sale, having sallied from the town, had repulsed the enemy with considerable loss. At the beginning of the insurrection, Gen. Sale's brigade was at Gundanuk; and I have already mentioned, that an order recalling it to Cabul was immediately despatched by the Envoy. Gen. Sale, on receipt of it summoned a council of war, by whom it was unanimously agreed to be impracticable to obey the order. The circumstances of his march to Jellalabad are already well known to the public. The hope of his return had tended much to support our spirits; our disappointment was therefore great to learn that all expectation of aid from that quarter was at an end. Our eyes were now turned towards the Candahar force as our last resource, though an advance from that quarter seemed scarcely practicable so late in the year.

Much discussion took place this evening regarding the expediency of taking Mahmood Khan's fort. There were many reasons to urge in favour of making the attempt. It was one of the chief resorts of the rebels during the day, and they had established a battery of two guns under the walls, from which they constantly fired upon our foraging parties, and upon the southeast bastion of cantonments. It was about 900 yards distant from our rampart, which was too far for breaching with the 9-pounders; but a dry canal, which ran towards it in a zigzag direction, afforded facilities for a regular approach within 300 yards, of which advantage might have been taken to enable the artillery to make a breach. Secondly, this fort commanded the road all the way up to the Bala Hissar, and the possession of it would at once have secured to us an easy communication with that place, and with the city. Thirdly, the Envoy declared his opinion that the moral effect derived from its possession would be more likely to create a diversion in our favour than any other blow we could strike, as the Afghans had always attached great importance to its occupation. These considerations had decided the General in favour of making the attempt this very night, by blowing open the gate, and a storming party was actually warned for the duty, when Lieut. Sturt, the engineer officer, raising some sudden objection, the plan was given up, and never afterwards resumed by the military. It was, however, the cause of no small astonishment to the officers in the Bala Hissar, who, from their commanding situation, could observe all that took place on both sides, that Mahmood Khan's fort should have been suffered to remain in the hands of the enemy, though at night it was often garrisoned by a mere handful of men. This fort, nevertheless gave abundant occupation to the artillery, who, when nothing else was going on, were frequently employed in disturbing the enemy in that quarter with one of the iron 9-pounders, and an occasional shelling from the mortar.

November 19th.—A letter was this day received by the General from the Envoy to the following effect:—“That, all hope of assistance from Jellalabad being over, it behoved us to take our future proceedings into consideration. He himself conceived it our imperative duty to hold on as long as possible in our present position, and he thought we might even struggle through the whole winter by making the Mahomedans and Christians live chiefly upon flesh, supposing our supplies of grain to fail; by which means, as the essentials of wood and water were abundant, he considered our position might be rendered impregnable. A retreat towards Jellalabad would teem not only with disaster, but dishonour, and ought not to be contemplated until the very last extremity. In eight or ten days we should be better able to judge whether such extremity should be resorted to. In that case, we should have to sacrifice not only the valuable property of Government, but his majesty Shah Shoojah, to support whose authority we were employed by Government; and even were we to make good our retreat to Jellalabad, we should have no shelter for our troops, and our camp followers would all be sacrificed. He had frequently thought of negotiating, but there was no party
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of sufficient power and influence to protect us. Another alternative would be to throw ourselves into the Bala Hissar; but he feared that would be also a disastrous retreat, to effect which much property must be necessarily sacrificed. Our heavy guns might be turned against us, and food and fuel might be scarce, for a further supply of which we might be dependent on sorties into the city, in which, if beaten, we must of course be ruined. On the whole, he was decidedly of opinion that we should hold out; it was still possible that reinforcements might arrive from Candahar, or something might turn up in our favour; there were hopes, too, that, on the setting in of winter, the enemy would disperse. He had been long disposed to recommend a blow being struck to retrieve our fortunes, such as taking Mahmood Khan’s fort; but he had since reason to believe this would not answer. In eight or ten days, he concluded, it would remain for the military authorities to determine whether there was any chance of improving our position, and to decide whether it would be more prudent to attempt a retreat to Jellalabad, or to the Bala Hissar. If provision sufficient for the winter could be procured, on no account would he leave the cantonment.”

November 22d.—The village of Beymaroo (or “husbandless,” from a beautiful virgin who was buried there) was situated about half a mile to the north of cantonments, on the Kohistan road, at the northeastern extremity of a hill which bounded the plain to the west. As it was built on a slope, and within musket-shot, the upper houses commanded a large portion of the Mission Compound. From this village we for a long time drew supplies, the Envoy largely bribing the proprietor, to which, however, the enemy in some measure put a stop by taking possession of it every day.

This morning, large bodies of Afghan horse and foot, having again issued from the city, proceeded to crown the summit of the described hill. It was determined, at the recommendation of the Envoy, to send a party of our troops to forestall the enemy in the occupation of the village; and Major Swaye, 5th N. I., was appointed to that duty, with a detachment composed as follows:—a Wing 5th N. I., 2 Resillas Irregular Horse, 1 Resilla 5th Light Cavalry, and one Mountain-train gun. The party had already reached the village, when it was deemed proper to send after it a Horse Artillery gun, which I was requested by the General to accompany. Major Swaye, however, it would seem by his own account, found the village already occupied by a body of Kohistanese, and the entrance blocked up in such a manner that he considered it out of his power to force a passage. On arriving at the place with the H. A. gun, I found him in an orchard on the roadside, the trees of which partially protected the men from a very sharp fire, poured in amongst them from the houses. There being no shelter for the gun here, nor any mode of employing it to advantage, it was ordered to cross some fields to the right, and take up a position where it could best fire upon the village, and upon the heights above it, which were now crowded with the enemy’s infantry. In order to protect the horses, I drew up the gun near the fort of Zoolfa Khan, under the walls of which they had shelter; but for the gun itself no other position could be found than in the open field, where it was exposed to the full fire of the enemy posted in the village and behind the neighbouring walls. The Mountain-train gun was also with me, and both did some execution among the people on the summit of the hill, though to little purpose.

Major Swaye, whose orders were to storm the village, would neither go forward nor retire; but, concealing his men under the cover of some low walls, he all day long maintained an useless fire on the houses of Beymaroo, without the slightest satisfactory result. The cavalry were drawn up in rear of the gun on the open plain, as a conspicuous mark for the Kohistanese, and where, as there was nothing for them to do, they accordingly did nothing. Thus we remained for five or six hours, during which time the artillery stood exposed to the deliberate aim of the numerous marksmen who occupied the village and its immediate vicinity, whose bullets continually sang in our ears, often striking the gun, and grazing the ground on which we stood. Only two gunners, however, out of six were wounded, but the cavalry in our rear had many casualties both among men and horses.

Late in the evening, a party of Afghan horse, moving round from behind Beymaroo, proceeded towards a fort in our rear, whence a cross fire was opened upon us. Brigadier Shelton now joined, bringing with him a reinforcement from the 5th N. I., under Col. Oliver. Major Swaye, with two companies, was then sent to reconnoitre the fort whence the fire proceeded, and the H. A. gun was at the same time moved round, so as to bear upon the Afghan cavalry, who hovered among the trees in the same quarter. While engaged in this operation, I received a bullet through the left hand, which for the present terminated my active services. Shortly after this the troops were recalled into cantonments.

It is worthy of note, that Mahomed Akber Khan, second son of the late Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, arrived in Kabul this night from Bamean. This man was destined to exercise an evil influence over our future fortunes. The crisis of our struggle was already nigh at hand.

CHAPTER VI.


November 23d.—This day decided the fate of the Kabul force. At a council held at the General’s house on the night of the 22d it was determined, on the special recommendation of
the Envoy, that in consequence of the inconvenience sustained by the enemy so frequently taking possession of Beymaroo, and interrupting our foraging parties, a force, under Brigadier Shelton, should on the following morning take the village by assault, and maintain the hill above it against whatever number of the enemy might appear. Accordingly, at 2 a.m., the under-mentioned troops* moved out of cantonments in perfect silence by the Kohostan gate, and skirting the musjed immediately opposite, which was held by a company of Her Majesty's 44th, took the direction of the gorge at the farther extremity of the Beymaroo hill, which they ascended, dragging the gun to the top with great difficulty, from the rugged and steep nature of the side, which labour was greatly facilitated by the exertions of 200 commissariat swusoons, who had volunteered for the occasion. The whole force then moved to the knoll at the N. E. extremity of the hill, which overhung the village of Beymaroo. The gun was placed in position commanding an enclosure in the village, which, from its fires, was judged to be the principal bivouac of the enemy, and a sharp fire of grape commenced, which evidently created great confusion, but it was presently answered by a discharge of juzails; the enemy forsaking the open space, and covering themselves in the houses and towers: to this we replied in the intervals of the cannonade by discharges of musketry. It was suggested by Capt. Belllew and others to Brigadier Shelton to storm the village, while the evident panic of the enemy lasted, under cover of the darkness, there being no moon: to this the Brigadier did not accede.

When the day broke, parties of the enemy were descried hurrying from the village, and taking across the plain towards the distant fort, their fire having previously slackened from the failure of their ammunition. At this time, certainly, not above 40 men remained in the village. A storming party, consisting of 2 companies 37th N. I. and some Europeans, under Majors Swaney and Kershaw, were ordered to carry the village; but Major Swaney, taking a wrong direction, missed the principal entrance, which was open, and arrived at a small kirkhee, or wicket, which was barricaded, and which he had no means of forcing, so that he was obliged to cover himself and his men as well as he could from the sure aim of the enemy's marksmen, by whose fire his party suffered considerably, himself being shot through the neck.

After remaining thus for about half an hour, he was recalled by the Brigadier, who observed large bodies of armed men pouring out from the city towards the scene of conflict. Meanwhile Lieut. Walker had been directed to lead his irregular horse down into the plain on the west side of the hill, to cut off such fugitives from the village as he might be able to intercept, and to cover himself from the fire of infantry under the walls of an old fort not far from the base of the hill. Brigadier Shelton, leaving three companies of the 37th N. I. on the knoll above Beymaroo as a reserve, under Major Kershaw, moved back with the troops and guns to the part of the hill which overlooked the gorge.

Shortly after this it was suggested to raise a sunga, or stone breastwork, for the protection of the troops wholly exposed to the distant fire of the enemy's juzails; but this proposition was not acted on. Immense numbers of the enemy, issuing from the city, had now crowned the summits of the hill opposite the gorge,—in all, probably 10,000 men. The plain on the west of the two hills was swept by swarms of their cavalry, who evidently designed to cut off the small party of Irregular Horse under Lieut. Walker; while the failure of our attempt to storm the village had rendered it easy for the enemy to throw strong reinforcements into it, and to supply the ammunition of which they had been in great want.

About 7 a.m., the fire from the enemy's hill was so galling, that the few skirmishers sent to the brow of our hill could with difficulty retain their posts. As an instance of the backwardness which now began to develop itself among our men, it must be mentioned, that Lieut.-Col. Oliver endeavored to induce a party of his own regiment to follow him to the brow of the hill, to keep down the sharp fire of a number of the enemy, who had ensconced themselves in a small ravine commanding the foremost square; not a man would follow him,—and it was only after that brave officer had gone forward himself into the thickest of the fire, saying, "Although my men desert me, I myself will do my duty," that about a dozen were shamefully performing theirs. The remainder of the troops (the infantry formed into two squares, and the cavalry being drawn up en masse immediately in their rear) suffered severely without being able to retaliate, from the comparatively short range of the musket. Our single gun maintained as hot a fire on the masses of the enemy as possible, doing great execution; but the want of a second gun to take up the fire was sensibly felt, inasmuch as, after a short time, the vent became too hot for the artillerymen to serve. This state of things continued until between 9 and 10 o'clock, when a large party of the enemy's cavalry threatened our right flank, and, to prevent his destruction, Lieut. Walker was recalled. This demonstration, however, was repulsed by a well-directed discharge of shrapnell from the H. A. gun, by one of which a chief of consequence, supposed to be Abdoollah Khan, Achukzye, was mortally wounded.

By the recall of Lieut. Walker the enemy were enabled to surround our position at all
points, except that facing the cantonments; our gun ammunition was almost expended, and the men were fatigued with fatigue and thirst (no water being procurable), while the number of killed and wounded was-swelled every instant.

About this time (between 10 and 11 A. M.) large bodies of the enemy’s infantry advanced across the plain from the Shah Bagh to the end of the hill, to cut off the supplies of ammunition coming from cantonments, as also the dhoolies on which we endeavoured to send off a few of the wounded. These, however, were checked by a party of our troops in the musjed, opposite the Kohistan gate, and by about fifty juzailshees under the temporary command of Capt. Trevor, (Capt. Mackenzie, their leader, having been requested by Brigadier Shelton to act as one of the staff for the day,) who lined some low walls and water courses, as well as by frequent discharges of round shot and shrapnell from the cantonment guns under Lieut. Warburton.

Previously to this, numbers of the most daring Ghazees had descended into the gorge, and, taking advantage of some hillocks on the ascent towards our position, had crept gradually up, maintaining a deadly fire on our skirmishers, who were unfortunately, wholly exposed; they became at length disheartened, and gave way. At this moment the Brigadier offered a reward of 100 rupees to any man who should take a flag of the enemy, which had been planted behind a tumulus about thirty yards in front of the square, and he fruitlessly endeavoured to induce the men to charge bayonets; several of the officers at the same time advanced to the front, and actually pelted the enemy with stones.* All attempts, however, to encourage our men were in vain. The attacking party were now emboldened to make a rush upon our gun; our cavalry were ordered to charge, but again in vain, for the men would not follow their officers.† The panic spread, and our troops gave way, except the second square, which had been formed about 200 yards in the rear, and three companies under Major Kershaw at the other extremity of the hill; behind this second square the officers with great difficulty rallied the fugitives, leaving the gun in the hands of the enemy, who lost no time in walking off with the limber and horses.

By this time the news of Aboolah Khan’s wound had spread among the ranks of the enemy, causing great confusion, which extended to the Ghazees now in possession of the gun. This, and the tolerably firm attitude resumed by our troops, induced them to content themselves with the limber and horses, and retire. Their retreat gave fresh courage to our disheartened soldiers, who again took possession of the gun, and advanced to the brow of the hill, where were found the bodies of Capt. Macintosh and Lieut. Laing, as well as those of the soldiers slain in the onset, including two H. A. men, who, with a devotion worthy of British soldiers, had perished while vainly endeavouring to defend their charge. Some fresh gun-ammunition having now arrived from cantonments, carried by Lascars, a fire was again opened on the ranks of the enemy; but we were unable to push the advantage gained by the momentary disorder alluded to above, because, in fact, the cavalry would not act. In the observations on this action, made hereafter, there will be found some palliation for the backwardness of the cavalry on this occasion, in spite of the gallant bearing of their leaders; the infantry were too few, and too much worn out and disheartened, to be able to make a forward movement. The consequence was, that not only did the whole force of the enemy come on with renewed vigour and spirits, maintaining at the same time the fatal jazail fire which had already so grievously thinned our ranks, but fresh numbers poured out of the city, and from the surrounding villages, until the hill occupied by them scarcely afforded room for them to stand.

This unequal conflict having lasted until past noon, during which period reinforcements and an additional gun had been in vain solicited from the cantonments, Brigadier Shelton sent Capt. Mackenzie to request Major Kershaw to move up his reserve (which could scarcely so be called, having been the whole day hard pressed by large bodies of the enemy in the village, and by parties occupying ruins and broken ground on the skirts of his position). The Major, fearing that, if he abandoned the knoll on which he had been stationed, our retreat to the cantonments (then becoming more and more imperatively necessary) might be cut off, made answer, that “he begged to suggest, that the Brigadier should fall back upon him.” Before this message could be delivered, the front ranks of the advanced square, at the Brigadier’s extremity of the hill, had been literally mowed down;—most of the artillerists, who performed their duty in a manner which is beyond praise, shared the same fate. The manoeuvre practised by the Ghazees previously was repeated by still greater numbers. The evident wantonness of our troops, and the imminent danger to which the gun was a second time exposed, induced the Brigadier, after repeated suggestions from Serg. Mulhall, who commanded the battery, to order the gun to be limbered up—a second limber having arrived from cantonments—and to retire towards Major Kershaw’s position. Scarcely had this movement been commenced, when a rush from the Ghazees completely broke the square;—all order was at an end:—the entreaties and commands of the officers, * The names of this little band of heroes deserve to be recorded; they were Capt. Macintosh and Lieut. Laing, who were almost instantly killed, and Capts. Mackenzie, Trup, and Leighton; the latter fell in the retreat of the army from Cabul, the other two happily still survive to fight their country’s battles; of such men the Indian army may well be proud.
† Capts. Bott and Collyer, 5th Light Cavalry; Lieut. Walker, Irregular Horse; Russel, Ishmael Khan, Jemadar Synd, Mahomed Synd, and Mirza Musseer Bey, of Anderson’s Horse.
endeavouring to rally the men, were not even listened to, and an utter rout ensued down the hill in the direction of cantonments, the enemy closely following, whose cavalry, in particular, made a fearful slaughter among the unresisting fugitives. Major Kershaw’s party, perceiving this disaster, endeavoured to escape; but strong parties, issuing from the village, cut off their retreat, and thus great numbers of our Sepoys perished: the grenadier company, especially, was all but annihilated. The mingled tide of flight and pursuit seemed, to those who manned the walls of cantonment, to be about to enter the gate together; and, by some fatality, the ammunition of the great guns in battery within the cantonments was almost expended. A heavy fire, however, was opened from the Shah’s 5th Infantry in the Mission Compound: a fresh troop of the 5th Cavalry, under Lient. Hardyman, charged across the plain towards the enemy, joined by Lient. Walker, who had rallied fifteen or twenty of his own men; during which gallant effort this most promising and brave young officer received a mortal wound. These operations, assisted by a sharp discharge from the jazailchees under Capt. Trevor, contributed to check the pursuit; and it was observed at the time, and afterwards ascertained to be correct, that a chief (Osman Khan) voluntarily halted his followers, who were among the foremost, and led them off; which may be reckoned, indeed, the chief reason why all of our people, who on that day went forth to battle, were not destroyed. Our loss was tremendous; the principal part of the wounded having been left in the field, including Lient.-Col. Oliver, where they were miserably cut to pieces. Our gun and second limber, which, while endeavouring to gallop down the hill, had over-turned on rough ground, we had the mortification to behold triumphantly carried off by the enemy.

About half an hour previous to the flight of our troops, a note had been written to the Assist.-Adjt.-Gen. by Capt. Troup, earnestly requesting that the Mountain-train gun, which had by that time been repaired, might be sent out with the least possible delay; and the first idea that suggested itself to that officer after our defeat was, that by quickly bringing this gun to bear upon the H. A. gun, then in the hands of the enemy, the latter might still be saved. He therefore galloped with speed to cantonments, where finding the Mountain-train gun just ready to start, he was on the point of leading it out of the gate, when his progress was interrupted by the Assist.-Adjt.-Gen., on the plea that it would now be of no use. This is the more to be lamented, as, from the spot occupied by Capt. Trevor’s jazailchees, who, protected by a low wall, still kept up a sharp and effectual fire on the enemy, the range to the side of the hill whence the Affghans were endeavouring to carry off the captured gun, about which they clustered in thousands, was so short, that grape, even from a small calibre, must have prevented the execution of their intentions. Had the company of fresh infantry, which was drawn up outside the gate under command of Lient. Alexander, moved forward in company with the mountain gun to the support of the above gallant handful of jazailchees, excellent service might have been rendered. But it seemed as if we were under the ban of Heaven.

**Observations.**

In this miserable and disastrous affair no less than six great errors must present themselves, even to the most unpractised military eye, each of which contributed in no slight degree to the defeat of our troops, opposed as they were by overwhelming numbers.

1st. The first and perhaps most fatal mistake of all was the taking out a single gun. The General Order by the Marquess of Hastings, expressly forbidding less than two guns to take the field, under any circumstances or on any pretence whatever, when another is available, must be well known at least to every officer who has served in India. This positive prohibition was the offspring of dearly-bought experience; and the action of Beymaroo affords another convincing example of the risk to which a single gun is exposed, when unsupported by the fire of a second. It was certainly the Brigadier’s intention to take the mountain gun also; but this had unfortunately been disabled on the previous day, and it had been twice specially reported, both to the Brigadier and to the General the foregoing night, by Capt. Troup, that it could not be got ready before 12 a.m. on the following day.

2dly. The second error is scarcely less evident than the first.—Had immediate advantage been taken of the panic which our unexpected cannonade created among the possessors of the village,—whose slack fire afforded sufficient evidence of the actual fact that they were not only contemptible in numbers, but short of ammunition,—had, I say, a storming party been led to the attack under cover of the darkness, which would have nullified the advantage they possessed in being under cover, the place must inevitably have fallen into our hands, and thus would the principal object of the sally have been gained, and a good line of retreat secured for our troops in case of necessity.

3dly. The third error was so manifest as to be quite accountable. A party of 100 sappers had accompanied the force for the express purpose of raising a busca. The fittest place for such a work would have been half-way along the ridge occupied by us, where our troops would then have been wholly protected from the fire of the jazails from the opposite hill, while the enemy could not have advanced to the attack without exposing themselves to the full effects of our musketry and grape. It would, in fact, have infused into our troops a sense of security from any sudden charge of the enemy’s horse, and at the same time have enabled our
own cavalry to issue forth with the assurance of having in their rear a place of defence, on which to fall back, if hard pressed by the enemy. It has been seen that no such defence was raised.

4thly. All have heard of the British squares at Waterloo, which defied the repeated desperate onsets of Napoleon's choicest cavalry. At Beymaroo we formed squares to resist the distan fire of infantry, thus presenting a solid mass against the aim of perhaps the best marks- men in the world, the said squares being securely perched on the summit of a steep and narrow ridge, up which no cavalry could charge with effect. A Peninsular General would consider this to be a novel fashion; yet Brigadier Shelton had the benefit of Peninsular experience in his younger days, and, it must be owned, was never surpassed in dauntless bravery.

5thly. Our cavalry, instead of being found upon the plain, where they might have been useful in protecting our line of communications with the cantonments, and would have been able to advance readily to any point where their services might have been required, were hemmed in between two infantry squares, and exposed for several hours to a destructive fire from the enemy's juzails, on ground where, even under the most favourable circumstances, they could not have acted with effect. This false and unsatisfactory position of course discouraged the troopers; and, when the infantry finally gave way, the two arms of the service became mixed up in a way that greatly in- creased the general confusion, and rendered it impossible for the infantry to rally, even had they been so disposed. The truth is, that the cavalry were not allowed fair play, and such a position must have disgusted and dispirited any troops.

6thly. Shortly after our regaining possession of the gun, one of the Brigadier's staff, Capt. Mackenzie, feeling convinced that, from the temper of the troops, and from the impossibility of rectifying the false position in which the force was placed, not only was success beyond hope, but that defeat in its most disastrous shape was fast approaching, proposed to the Brigadier to endeavour to effect a retreat, while it was yet in his power to do so with comparative impunity. His reply was, "Oh, no! we will hold the hill some time longer." At that time, even if the slaughter of the soldiery, the loss of officers, the evident panic in our ranks, and the worse than false nature of our position, had not been sufficient to open all eyes as to the impossibility even of partial success, (for the real object of the expedition, viz. the possession of the village of Beymaroo, had been, as it were, abandoned from the very first,) the weakness and exhaustion of both men and horses, who were not only worn out by bodily fatigue, but suffering grievously from extreme thirst and the debility attendant on long fasting, ought to have banished all idea of further delaying a move-
cully, encumbered as we should be with numerous sick and wounded. The enemy would doubtless oppose us with their whole force, and the greater part of the troops would be required to cover the operation, thus leaving the cantonments imperfectly defended; that the men were harassed, dispirited, and greatly reduced in numbers; and failure would be attended with certain destruction to the whole force. To remove the ammunition and stores would be the work of several days, during which the enemy would hover round, and offer every obstacle to our operations. Our wounded were increased, whilst our means of conveying them were diminished. Would the Bala Hissar hold the force with all the followers! Water was already said to be selling there at a high price.* We had barely twenty days' supply of provisions in the cantonment; and, even supposing we could find means to carry it with us, there was no prospect of obtaining more in the Bala Hissar. A retreat thence would be worse than from our present position, after having abandoned our cattle; and the sick and wounded must be left behind us.” In these opinions Brigadier Shelton entirely concurred. An appalling list of objections, it must be confessed, but insufficient to shake my belief that a removal of the force into the Bala Hissar was not only practicable but necessary for our safety and honour; while the risks attending it, though formidable, were only such as we ought, as soldiers, to have unhesitatingly incurred. Shah Shoohaj had moreover declared himself impatient to receive us; and, even had the dreaded ruin overwhelmed us in the attempt, would it not have been a more manly and honourable course, than the ignominious treaty we shortly afterwards entered into with a treacherous band of rebels, by which we deserted the sovereign whom it was our duty to protect to the last drop of our blood? Had we boldly salved forth, preferring death to dishonour, would not the fate of our poor fellows have been an hundred fold happier than that they subsequently experienced in their miserable retreat, inasmuch as they would have died in the consciousness of having bravely done their duty! Never were troops exposed to greater hardships and dangers; yet, sad to say, never did soldiers shed their blood with less beneficial result than during the investment of the British lines at Cabul. While, therefore, justice is done to the memory of the dead, and those, who encountered a thousand perils in the brave and skilful performance of their duty, must be held up to that honour which is their due—while the tear of pity may well be shed at their untimely fate—the blame and discredit also must be theirs, who rendered nugatory all the oblations of blood that were offered, all the advantages that were gained, and finally involved a still formidable force in ruin and disgrace. But to return to my narrative.

A letter to the address of the Envoy was this day received from Osman Khan,* Barukzye, a near relative of the new King, and generally supposed to have a favourable bearing towards us, wherein he took credit to himself for having “checked the ardour of his followers in their pursuit of our flying troops on the preceding day, when, by following up their success, the loss of our cantonments and the destruction of our force was inevitable; but that it was not the wish of the chief to proceed to such dreadful extremities, their sole desire being that we should quietly evacuate the country, leaving them to govern it according to their own rules, and with a king of their own choosing.” On the receipt of this friendly communication, the Envoy requested the General to state his opinion regarding the possibility, in a military point of view, of retaining our position in the cantonments; as, in case of a negative reply, he might be able to enter into negotiations with the existing rulers of the country.

“The General replied to the effect that “we had now been in a state of siege for three weeks; our provisions were nearly expended, and our forage entirely consumed, without the prospect of procuring a fresh supply; that our troops were much reduced by casualties, and the large number of sick and wounded increased almost daily; and that, considering the difficulty of defending the extensive and ill-situated cantonment, the near approach of winter, the fact of our communications being cut off, and that we had no prospect of reinforcement, with the whole country in arms against us, he did not think it possible to retain our present position in the country, and therefore thought the Envoy ought to avail himself of the offer to negotiate, which had been made him.”

November 27th.—Nothing else of consequence took place until this morning, when two deputies from the assembled chiefs, having made their appearance at the bridge, were ushered into cantonments by Capts. Lawrence and Trevor, the Envoy having agreed to confer with them, on condition that nothing should be proposed which it would be derogatory in him to consider. The interview took place in the officers’ guard-room at the eastern gate; the exact particulars did not transpire, but the demands made by the chiefs were such as it was impossible to comply with, and the deputies took leave of the Envoy with the exclamation that “we should meet again in battle!” “We shall at all events meet,” replied Sir William, “at the day of judgment.” At night the Envoy received a letter from the chiefs, proposing terms of so disgraceful and insulting a nature as seemed at once to preclude all hope of terminating our difficulties by treaty. The tenor of them was as follows: “That we should deliver up Shah Shoohaj and his whole family; lay down our arms; and make an unconditional surrender; when they might perhaps be induced to spare

* This chief had sheltered Capt. Drummond in his own house since the first day of the outbreak.
our lives, and allow us to leave the country on condition of our never returning." The Envoy's reply was such as well became the representative of his country's honour. "He was astonished," he said, "at their departing from that good faith for which he had given them credit, by violating the conditions on which he had been led to entertain proposals for a pacific arrangement; that the terms they proposed were too dishonourable to be entertained for a moment; and that, if they persisted in them, he must again appeal to arms, leaving the result to the God of battles."

December 1st.—No active renewal of hostilities took place until to-day, when a desperate effort was made by the enemy to gain possession of the Baba Hisar, which they endeavoured to effect by a night attack, in the first instance, on the Bourge-i-lakh, an isolated tower forming an outwork to the fortress, and from its elevated position commanding almost the entire works. This point was, however, strongly reinforced without delay by Major Ewart, commanding the garrison, and notwithstanding the determined spirit exhibited by the enemy, who made repeated charges up the hill, they were repulsed with considerable slaughter.

December 4th.—At an early hour the enemy moved out in force from the city, and, having crowned the Baymaroo hills, posted two guns in the gorge, from which they maintained a tolerably brisk fire for several hours into the cantonments, effecting fortunately but little mischief; in the evening they, as usual, retired to their respective haunts. During the night a rush was suddenly made by a party of Afghans to the gate of Mahomed Shereef's fort, garrisoned by our troops, which they attempted, in imitation of our own method, to breach with powder bags, but without success.

December 5th.—This day the enemy completed the destruction of our bridge over the river, which they commenced on the 24th ult., no precaution having been taken to prevent the evil. Day after day we quietly looked on without an effort to save it, orders being in vain solicited by various officers for preventive measures to be adopted. In consequence of the enemy having commenced mining one of the towers of Mahomed Shereef's fort, the garrison was reinforced, and Lieut. Sturt succeeded during the night in destroying the mine. This, however, could only be effected at the expense of opening a passage under the walls, which it became necessary to barricade; and although this measure of precaution was efficiently executed, such was the nervous state of the party composing the garrison, that no reliance could be placed on their stability in case of an attack.

December 6th.—The garrison of Mahomed Shereef's fort was relieved at an early hour by one company of H. M.'s 44th, under Lieut. Grey, and one company 37th N. I. under Lieut. Hawtrey, an amply sufficient force for the defence of the place against any sudden onset; but, unhappily, the fears of the old garrison were communicated to the new, and, owing to the representations of Lieut. Hawtrey, the defences were minutely examined by Lieut. Sturt, the garrison engineer, and by him pronounced to be complete. Scarcely, however, had that officer returned to cantonments, ere information was conveyed to the General that the detachment, having been seized with a panic, had taken flight over the walls, and abandoned the fort to the enemy. It would appear that a small party of jujalchees, having crept up to the undermined tower under cover of the trees in the Shah Bagh, had fired upon the garrison through the barricaded breach which I have above described, unfortunately wounding Lieut. Grey, upon whose departure for medical aid the Europeans, deprived of their officer, lost what little confidence they had before possessed, and, collecting their bedding under the walls, betrayed symptoms of an intention to retreat. The enemy meanwhile, emboldened by the slackened fire of the defenders, approached momentarily nearer to the walls, and, making a sudden rush to the barricade, completed the panic of the garrison, who now made their escape over the walls in the greatest consternation, deíst to the indignant remonstrances of their gallant commander, who in vain entreated them not to disgrace themselves and him by such cowardly proceedings. Even the Sepoys, who at first remained staunch, contaminated by the bad example set them by their European brethren, refused to rally; and Lieut. Hawtrey, finding himself deserted by all, was obliged reluctantly to follow, being the last to leave the fort. It is, however, worthy of mention, that two Sepoys of the 37th N. I. were left dead in the fort, and two others were wounded, while not a man of the 44th was touched, excepting one whose hand suffered from the accidental explosion of a grenade.

The enemy, though at first few in numbers, were not slow to avail themselves of the advantage afforded them by this miserable conduct of our troops, and their banner was soon planted in triumph on the walls, amidst the exulting shouts of hundreds. Much recrimination took place between the Europeans and the Sepoys engaged in this affair, each declaring the other had been the first to run; and a court of inquiry was assembled to investigate the matter, the result of which, though never entirely divulged, was generally supposed to be favourable to the Sepoys, it being a known fact, that the Europeans had brought off nearly all their bedding safe, whilst the Sepoys had left every thing behind. At all events, a circumstance soon occurred, which abundantly testified the impression made on those in command. At this time the bazar village was garrisoned by a party of H. M.'s 44th, who, on observing the flight of the soldiers from Mahomed Shereef's fort, were actually on the point of abandoning their own post, when they were observed and stopped by some officers, of whom one was Lieut. White, the adjutant of the regiment; but so little de-
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Pendence could now be placed on their stability, that a guard from the 37th N. I. was stationed at the entrance of the bazar, with strict orders to prevent the exit of any Europeans on duty in the place.

December 7th.—The European garrison was this day withdrawn from the bazar, and a company of the 37th N. I. substituted in their room! This, being the weakest point of our defences, had hitherto been protected entirely by parties of H. M.'s 44th, which post of honour they were now considered unworthy to retain.

I may here be excused for offering a few brief remarks.

In the course of this narrative, I have been compelled by stern truth to note down facts nearly affecting the honour and interest of a British regiment. It may, or rather I fear it must, inevitably happen that my unreserved statements of the Cabul occurrences will prove unacceptable to many, whose private or public feelings are interested in glossing over or suppressing the numerous errors committed and censures deservedly incurred. But my heart tells me that no paltry motives of rivalry or malice influence my pen; rather a sincere and honest desire to benefit the public service, by pointing out the rocks on which our reputation was wrecked, the means by which our honour was sullied and our Indian empire endangered, as a warning to future actors in similar scenes. In a word, I believe that more good is likely to ensue from the publication of the whole unmitigated truth, than from a mere garbled statement of it. A kingdom has been lost—an army slain;—and surely, if I can show that, had we been but true to ourselves, and had vigorous measures been adopted, the result might have been widely different, I shall have written an instructive lesson to rulers and subjects, to generals and armies, and shall not have incurred in vain the disapprobation of the self-interested or the proud. It is notorious that the 44th foot had been for a long time previous to these occurrences in a state of woful deterioration. I firmly believe that in this, and in every other respect, they stood alone as a regiment of that noble army whose glorious deeds in all quarters of the globe have formed, with those of the British navy, the foundation of our pride, and have supplied for ages to come a theme of wonder and admiration. The regiment in question fell a prey to a vital disease, which the Horse Guards alone could have remedied, and which is now beyond the reach of proper investigation. May a redeeming glory and renown rise from its ashes.

The alarming discovery having been made that our supply of provisions had been materially overrated, and that not even a sufficiency for one day remained in store, Capt. Hay was despatched with a convoy of military stores into the Bala Hissar, with orders to bring back the animals laden with grain. He started several hours before daybreak, but on reaching the Seecah Sung hill, a few straggling shots being fired upon his rear, the men riding the laden yaboos (Afghan ponies) were panic-stricken, and, hastily casting the loads to the ground, galloped for safety to the front. Much private property was lost at the same time, for, notwithstanding all the opposition that had been made to the proposal of a retreat to the Bala Hissar, the General in some degree deferred to the opinions of those who favoured the movement, by adopting the half measure of sending in magazine supplies from time to time by dribbles. This led many to suppose that the whole force would sooner or later retreat thither, and accordingly advantage was taken of every opportunity to send in a few private necessaries in advance. On this occasion the attempt failed in the manner I have above related; but Capt. Hay nevertheless accomplished the primary object of his journey, by bringing back as much provisions as could be collected on so short a notice.

December 8th.—The Envoy, having addressed a public letter to the General, requested him to state "whether or not it was his opinion that any further attempt to hold out against the enemy would merely have the effect of sacrificing both His Majesty Shah Shoohaj and ourselves; and whether, supposing this to be so, the only alternative left was not to negotiate for our safe retreat out of the country, on the most favourable terms possible?" The General, in reply, stated his conviction that "the present situation of the troops was such, from the want of provisions and the impracticability of procuring more, that no time ought to be lost in entering into negotiations for a safe retreat from the country: That, as regarded the troops at Candahar, and the rumours of their approach to our assistance, he would be sorry, in the absence of all authentic information, to risk the sacrifice of the troops by waiting for their arrival, when we were ignorant even of their having commenced their march, and were reduced to three days' supply of provisions for our Sepoys at half rations, and almost without any forage for our horses and cattle: That our number of sick and wounded in hospital exceeded 600, and our means for their transport were far from adequate, owing to the death by starvation of so many of our camels, from which cause also we should be obliged, at this inclement season, to leave their tents and bedding behind, with such a march before us: That, as regarded the King, he must be excused from entering upon that point of the Envoy's letter, and leave its consideration to his better knowledge and judgment; but he might be allowed to say that it little became him, as commanding the British troops in Affghakhan, to regard the necessity of negotiation in any other light than as concerned their honour and welfare, for both of which he should be answerable, by a further stay here, after the sudden and universal rebellion against His Majesty's authority which had taken place throughout his dominions: That the whole of the grain and forage in the vic-
nity was exhausted, and the defence of the extensive and ill-selected cantonment would not admit of distant expeditions, to obtain supplies from the strongly fortified dwellings of an armed and hostile population; our present numbers being insufficient for its defence, and obliging the whole of the troops to be almost constantly under arms. In conclusion, he could only repeat his opinion that the Envoy should lose no time in entering into negotiations. This letter was countersigned by Brigadiers Shelton and Anquetil, and Colonel Chambers, who entirely concurred in the opinions it expressed. Meanwhile starvation stared us in the face, and it became necessary to adopt immediate measures for obtaining a further supply of provisions. A consultation was accordingly held with this object at the General's house, and it was determined that an attack should be made on the neighbouring fort of Khooja Ruwash at an early hour the following morning.

December 9th.—The morning dawned, but no signs of preparation appeared for the proposed enterprise; no bridge was laid down for the passage of the guns and cavalry; no troops were in readiness to march; and it was plain that either no orders had been given, or no attention had been paid to them. Thus, notwithstanding the importance of its object, the expedition was suffered to die a natural death.

Upon this subject I shall only remark that Brigadier Shelton commanded the garrison, and that with him the necessary arrangements rested.

Intelligence having been this day received of a decisive victory gained over the enemy by Gen. Sale at Jellalabad, the Envoy conceived it might have the effect of modifying the General's opinion, regarding the immediate necessity of negotiating with the rebel chiefs, and addressed him a letter on the subject. The General, however, declared in reply, that, pleasing as the intelligence was, it could not in the slightest degree influence our position, so as to affect the expediency of our treating; in forming which opinion he was much influenced by the joint representations that had been just made to him by Capt. Boyd and Johnson, the respective heads of the Company's and Shah's commissioner, wherein they declared their utter inability to procure grain or forage within three or four miles, and that, although three days' supply of atta (ground wheat) might still be procurable from the Bala Hissar, yet every additional day's delay now crippled the cattle more and more, and rendered our position more perilous. Notwithstanding these apparently conclusive arguments, there existed strong grounds for believing that the Bala Hissar, contained a much larger supply of provisions than was generally supposed.

December 10th.—Another convoy of military stores was despatched to the Bala Hissar this morning under command of Lieut. Le Geyt, by whom a further supply of atta was brought back in return.

December 11th.—The rebel chiefs having manifested an inclination to treat, the Envoy, accompanied by Capts. Lawrence, Mackenzie, and Trevor, went out to meet them on the plain towards Seah Sung. There were present Mahomed Akber Khan, Osman Khan, Mahomed Khan Naib Ameer (commonly called Naib Ameer), Barukzyes;—Mahomed Shah Khan, Humza Khan, Khoda Bux Khan, Gileyes;—Juayut Oolol Khan, Populzye;—Khan Shereen Khan, Kuzzilbash;—and several others of inferior note, but all heads of tribes. After the exchange of salutations, Sir William addressed the assembled Khans, alluding to past times, during which relations of perfect cordiality and friendship had existed between them and the English. He greatly lamented that feelings of so pleasant and mutually beneficial a nature should have been thus rudely interrupted; but professed himself wholly ignorant of the causes of such interruption. He proceeded to state that sentiments of good-will towards the Affghan nation had principally induced the British government to lend their aid, in restoring to the seat of his ancestors a king, who, notwithstanding his misfortunes, originating in causes to which he would not then allude, had ever reigned in the hearts of the mass of his people; that the restoration of their monarch had apparently given the utmost satisfaction to all classes throughout his dominions. If, however, that satisfaction had passed away, and given place to emotions of a wholly contrary nature (and he supposed that the assembled Sirdars and Khans might be considered the mouth-piece of the people), it no longer became the British Government to persist in a course so displeasing to those chiefly interested in the result. On this account he was willing to enter into negotiations, for the smoothing over of present difficulties, and for the adopting of such measures as were likely to be the most conducive towards the re-establishment of that mutual friendship between the British and Affghan governments, the maintenance of which, he felt assured, must be earnestly desired by both parties. To all these propositions Mahomed Akber Khan and Osman Khan, as the principal personages present, expressed, with the hearty concurrence of the inferior chiefs, their entire assent, adding many expressions of their personal esteem for the Envoy himself, and their gratitude for the way in which the exiled Ameer had been used. The Envoy then requested permission to read to them a paper containing a general sketch of the proposed treaty. This being agreed to, the articles of the treaty were read and discussed. Their general purport was to the effect—that the British should evacuate Affghanistan, including Candahar, Ghuznee, Cabul, Jellalabad, and all the other stations absolutely within the limits of the country so called;—that they should be permitted to return not only unmolested to India, but that supplies of every description should be afforded them in their road thither, certain men of consequence accompany-
ing them as hostages;—that the Ameer Dost Mahommed Khan, his family, and every Afghan now in exile for political offences, should be allowed to return to their country;—that Shah Shoojah and his family should be allowed the option of remaining at Cabul or proceeding with the British troops to Looldiana, in either case receiving from the government a pension of one lac of rupees per annum;—that means of transport for the conveyance of our baggage, stores, &c., including that required by the royal family, in case of their adopting the latter alternative, should be furnished by the existing Afghan government; that an amnesty should be granted to all those who had made themselves obnoxious on account of their attachment to Shah Shoojah and his allies, the British:—that all prisoners should be released;—that no British force should be ever again sent into Afghanistan, unless called for by the Afghan government, between whom and the British nation perpetual friendship should be established on the sure foundation of mutual good offices.

To all these terms the chiefs cordially agreed, with the exception of Mahommed Akber, who cavilled at several, especially that of the amnesty, but was overruled by his coadjutors. He positively refused to permit the garrison to be supplied with provisions until it had quitted the cantonments, which movement he clamorously demanded should take place the following morning. His violence caused some confusion; but the more temperate of his party having interfered, it was finally agreed that our evacuation of the cantonments should take place in three days—that provisions should be supplied—and that to all the above-mentioned articles of this new treaty a formal assent in writing should be sent, with all the usual forms of a restored peace. The chiefs, on returning to the city, took with them Capt. Trevor as a hostage for the sincerity of the Envoy. During the whole of this interview, which took place not far from the bottom of the Sacah Sung hills, great anxiety was felt in the cantonments from the apparent danger to which the Envoy was exposed,—he being accompanied only by a few troopers of the body-guard,—and from the circumstance of large bodies of the enemy's horse and foot being seen to pass towards the scene of conference from the city, their leaders evidently with much difficulty restraining their advance beyond a certain point. Sir William, however, although not unaware of the perfidious nature of those he had to deal with, nor insensible to the risk he ran, (a shot in fact, from the fanatic multitude, having whistled over the heads of the gentlemen in attendance on him, as they advanced towards the rendezvous,) wisely imagined that a display of confidence was the best mode of begetting good faith. It is, however, pretty certain that the tumultuary movements of the Afghan troops, whose presence was in direct violation of the stipulations under which the conference was held, were not without their cause, it having been the earnest desire of M-

hommed Akber to seize upon the Envoy's person at that very meeting, from which step he was with difficulty restrained by the other Khans. But no sense of personal danger could have deterred a man of Sir William's truly chivalrous and undaunted character from the performance of any duty, private or public.

Would that he had been more alive to the apprehensions which influenced common men! We might not then have to mourn over the untimely fate of one, whose memory must be ever cherished in the hearts of all who knew and were capable of appreciating him, notwithstanding the disastrous termination of his political career, as that of a good, and, in many essential points, a great man.

CHAPTER VIII.


December 12th.—Ir is undeniable that Sir William Macnaughten was forced into this treaty with men whose power he despised, and whose treachery was proverbial, against his own judgment, by the pressing representations of our military heads. It is no less true that, whatever may have been his political remissness or want of foresight before the rebellion broke out, he had, throughout the perils that afterwards beset us, displayed a truly British spirit of unfailing fortitude and indelatable energy, calculated, under more auspicious leaders, to have stimulated the zeal and value of the troops, and to have cheered them under the trials and hardships they were called on to endure; and I can safely add, without fear of contradiction, that scarcely an enterprise was undertaken throughout the siege, but at the suggestion, and even the entreaties, of the Envoy, he volunteering to take on himself the entire responsibility. Justice demands this tribute to the memory of one, whose acts, as they will assuredly undergo the severe scrutiny of his contrymen, it therefore becomes the duty of every eye-witness, who bears testimony on the subject, not only to shield from misrepresentation, but, where they are deserving of it, to hold up to public admiration. I am led to write this solely by my public knowledge of the man. If I could bring myself, on matters of such vital importance, to follow the dictates of mere private feeling, my bias would be altogether on the side of my late lamented military chief, who honoured me with his friendship, and for whose infirmities every allowance ought, in common justice, to be made.

With a mind and talents of no ordinary stamp, and a hitherto unsullied fame, he committed the fatal error of transporting himself suddenly from a state of prolonged luxurious repose, at an advanced age, to undertake the fatigues and cares
inseparable from high military command, in a foreign uncongenial clime; he thus not only ruined his already shattered health, but (which to a soldier was a far worse calamity) grievously damaged that high reputation which his early services had secured for him. His fate ought to serve as a warning to others of his class, who, priding themselves on a Peninsular fame, of some thirty years' standing, are too apt to forget the inroads that time may have meanwhile made on mind and body; and who would do well to bear in remembrance that, of two of the most iron intellects of their day—one of them was even the greatest general of his age—it was written with too much truth,—

"From Marlborough's eyes the tears of dotage flow, And Swift expires a drivelier and a show."

The terms of the new treaty were immediately made known to Shah Shoojah, by which that unfortunate monarch found himself once more doomed to an old age of exile and degradation. The first step towards its fulfilment was the withdrawal of our troops from the Bala Hisar, which was to have taken place this very day, but was postponed for a short time longer, to admit of the necessary preparations being made. A deputation of chiefs had an interview in the close of the day, who were the bearers of a most unexpected proposition, to the effect that Shah Shoojah should continue king, on condition of intermarrying his daughters with the leading Afghan chiefs, and abandoning the offensive practice of keeping the chief nobles of his kingdom waiting for hours at his gate, in expectation of audience. The Afghans hate ceremony, which Shah Shoojah carried at all times to an absurd extent; hence much of his unpopularity. This arrangement was not intended to annul those parts of the treaty which related to our immediate evacuation of the country, for the fulfilment of which some married families were demanded as hostages.

December 13th.—Such was the inveterate pride of the King, that he yielded a most reluctant consent to the above-mentioned proposals, notwithstanding that the only alternative was the instant resignation of his kingdom. Little confidence was, however, placed by the Envoy in the sincerity of the chiefs, whose hatred of the Durrance ruler was notorious. As our retreat was now fully decided on, and our well-stocked magazine was shortly to fall a prey to our enemies, the General ordered that some ammunition should be distributed to certain of the camp followers; and commanding officers were directed to indent for new arms and accoutrements, in exchange for such as were old and damaged. The reins of discipline had, however, by this time become so terribly relaxed, and so little attention was paid to superior orders by either officers or men, that many of the officers in command of companies rested content with sending their men to the magazine, to help themselves at will, the stores being unfortu-

nately, in the absence of any finished building for their reception, arranged under the trees of an orchard, in charge of a small guard. The consequence was, as might have been expected, a scene of disgraceful confusion and plunder, which was rendered worse by a rush of camp-followers, who, imagining that a licence had been given for every one to take whatever he pleased, flocked in hundreds to the spot, and terribly increased the tumult; insomuch that the authority of several officers, who, observing what was going on, exerted themselves to restore order, was for several minutes set at open defiance. At last, however, the place was cleared of the intruders, and the greater portion of the stolen articles was recovered the same evening. But this event may be taken as an instance of the unsteadiness of the troops, and of the recklessness that now began to extend itself amongst all ranks of the force.

At 2 p.m. the troops in the Bala Hisar, consisting of the 54th N. I., half of Capt. Nicholl's troop of horse artillery, and a detachment of the mountain train, with 2 howitzers, under Lieut. Green, commenced their evacuation of that fortress. They were also encumbered with an iron nine-pounder gun, and a twenty-four pounder brass howitzer, drawn by bullocks, which it was the General's wish should have been left behind, but his order to that effect had by some accident missed its destination. As the utmost scarcity of provisions prevailed in cantonments, Capt. Kirby, the commissariat officer, had zealously exerted himself to collect a supply of about 1600 mounds of wheat and flour to carry thither. Much delay, however, occurred in packing and loading; and, the best part of the day being nearly spent ere above one third of that quantity was ready, Major Ewart deemed it advisable to move off without further loss of time. He found Mahomed Akber Khan in waiting with a small body of followers outside the gate, for the purpose of escorting him to cantonments; and, as evening drew nigh, a dense crowd of armed Afghans had been observed to collect on the Seehah Sung hill, along the base of which our troops must pass, giving rise to suspicions of some meditated treachery. While the rear-guard, with the Mountain-train gun and a portion of the baggage, was leaving the gate, some of Mahomed Akber's followers, pushing quietly past them, endeavoured to effect an entrance into the fort; but on their being recognised by the king's guard, the gates were immediately shut, and a round or two of grape fired upon the intruders, with so indiscriminate an aim as to endanger the lives of Capt. Conolly and several of the Sepoys, of whom some were severely wounded. It can scarcely be doubted that Mahomed Akber's intention was to have seized the gate with a few of his men, until a rush of the Afghans from the hill should have enabled him to carry the body of the place by storm. The vigilance of the garrison having defeated this plan, the wily chief, imagining that the gates would again be opened
to readmit our troops, informed Major Ewart that, owing to the lateness of the hour and the threatening attitude assumed by the crowd on the hill, it would be necessary to postpone his march until the following morning. In consequence of this sudden ill-timed announcement, Major Ewart applied to the King for the immediate readmission of his troops for shelter during the night; but the monarch, whose suspicions of foul play on the part of Mahomed Akber were now fully awakened, positively refused to accede to the request. The prospect of passing the night in the low marshy ground under the walls, without tents, bedding, firewood, or food, for officers or men, was sufficiently cheerless; while the fear of treachery on the part of Mahomed Akber, and the dangerous vicinity of an armed multitude, whose watch-fires already gleamed on the adjacent hills, tended but little to relieve the discomforts of such a situation. The cold was intensely bitter, and perhaps so miserable a night had never before been spent by Indian troops.

December 14th.—At an early hour this morning, Mahomed Akber having declared his readiness to proceed, the troops commenced their march. The advance-guard was suffered to proceed unmolested; but the rear-guard, on reaching the base of the Seehah Sung hill, was fired upon by the enemy, who crowned the ridge; and the iron nine-pounder bearing for a few moments accidentally separated from the columns in crossing a water-cut, an instantaneous rush was made upon it by a number of Afghans, and a poor sick European artillery-man, who, for want of a more suitable conveyance, had been lashed to the gun, was unmercifully butchered. The approach of the rear-guard, and a round or two of grape from the mountain train howitzer, drove off the assailants; and they were restrained from offering any additional annoyance by the exertions of Mahomed Akber himself, who, galloping in amongst them with a few followers, threatened to cut down any who dared to be guilty of further opposition to the progress of the detachment, which accordingly reached cantonments safe at about 9 a.m.

December 16th.—Shah Shoojah having, for reasons best known to himself, withdrawn his consent to the arrangement which was to have continued him in the possession of his rights, the treaty resumed its original form; but the chiefs positively refused to supply provisions or forage, until we should further assure them of our sincerity by giving up every fort in the immediate vicinity of cantonments. Forage had for many days been so scarce, that the horses and cattle were kept alive by paring off the bark of trees, and by eating their own dung over and over again, which was regularly collected and spread before them. The camp-followers were destitute of other food than the flesh of animals, which expired daily from starvation and cold. The daily consumption of atta by the fighting men was about 150 maunds, and not above two days' supply remained in store. By giving up the forts in question, all of which commanded the cantonment, we should place ourselves entirely at the mercy of the enemy, who could at any time render our position untenable. But our leaders now seemed to consider that we had no other chance left than to concede to the demands of the chiefs, however unreasonable; and our troops were accordingly withdrawn from the Rikabashee, Magazine, and Zoolfekar's forts, and from the Musjeed opposite the western gate, all of which were forthwith occupied by the Afghans, who, on their part, sent in Nussuroollah Khan, a brother of Nuwab Zuman Khan, as a hostage, and a supply of about 150 maunds of atta for the troops. They likewise promised us 2000 camels and 400 yabobs for the march to Jellalabad.

December 18th.—The delay of the chiefs in furnishing the necessary carriage, and the Shah's dilatoriness in deciding on his future course, compelled us from day to day to postpone our departure. Meanwhile the increasing severity of the winter rendered every hour's procrastination of the utmost consequence; and this morning our situation was rendered more desperate than ever by a heavy fall of snow, which covered the ground to the depth of five inches, and never afterwards disappeared. Thus a new enemy entered on the scene, which we were destined to find even more formidable than an army of rebels.

December 19th.—The Envoy wrote an order for the evacuation of Ghuznee, and it was arranged that the 27th N.I., which garrisoned the place, should march through the Zoormut Valley, and pursue the route of Dera Ishmael Khan. The 22d was fixed for our departure.

December 20th.—The Envoy had an interview with the chiefs, who now demanded that a portion of our guns and ammunition should be immediately given up. They also required Brigadier Shelton as a hostage. It was proposed by Lieut. Sturt to the General to break off the treaty, and march forthwith to Jellalabad, devoting all the means of transport we possessed to the service of the sick, and the conveyance of such public stores as were absolutely necessary. But neither the General nor his immediate advisers could bring them to adopt a course which would have saved the national honour, at the risk of sacrificing our whole force.

It has been truly said that a council of war never fights. A door of hope had until this day, still remained open to us in the approach of Col. Macclare's force to our assistance from Candahar; we now heard with despair of its retreat from Tazee, in consequence of the snow.

December 21st.—The Envoy met Osman Khan and Mahomed Akber Khan on the plain, when four hostages were fixed upon, two of whom (Capts. Conolly and Airey) were at once given over. Brigadier Shelton, having expressed a decided objection to undertake the duty, was not insisted upon. In the evening Capts. Trevor and Drummond were permitted to return to
cantonments, the latter officer having been concealed in the city since the 2d of November.

December 22d.—I was ordered to conduct an officer of Nuwab Zuman Khan over the magazine, that he might make choice of such stores as would be most acceptable to the chiefs. I recommended a large pile of 8-inch shells to his notice, which I knew would be of no use to the chiefs, as the mortars were with Capt. Abbott’s battery at Jellalabad. He eagerly seized the bait, and departed in great glee, with his prize laden on some old ammunition-wagons.

The Envoy at the same time sent his carriage as a present to Mahomed Akber Khan. That same night the last-named chief spread the net into which Sir William Macnaghten was, on the following day, so miserably lured to his destruction. Capt. Skinner, at this time living under Mahomed Akber’s protection, was made the bearer of proposals to the Envoy, of so advantageous a nature, as to prove, in his forlorn circumstances, irresistibly tempting.

Amenooollah Khan, the most influential of the rebels, was to be seized on the following day, and delivered up to us as a prisoner. Mahomed Khan’s fort was to be immediately occupied by one of our regiments, and the Bala Hissar by another. Shah Shoojah was to continue king; Mahomed Akber was to become his wazir, and our troops were to remain in their present position until the following spring.—That a scheme like this, bearing impracticability on its very face, should have for a moment deceived a man of Sir William’s usual intelligence and penetration, is indeed an extraordinary instance of infatuation, that can only be accounted for on the principle that a drowning man will catch at a straw. Our fortunes were now at their lowest ebb; the chiefs were apparently delaying our departure until the snow should have formed an impassable barrier to the removal of our troops, who, even in the absence of an enemy, would but too probably perish from cold and famine. A treaty formed with men famished for falsehood and treachery, and who had already shown an utter disregard of some of its most important stipulations, could be regarded as little better than so much waste paper; added to which considerations, Sir William felt that his own fame was deeply involved in the issue of that policy, of which he had from the very first been the prime advocate and upholder, and that with it he must stand or fall. The specious project of Mahomed Akber offered a solution to the difficulties that beset his path, at which he grasped with an eagerness engendered by despair. The strength of the rebels had hitherto lain in their unanimity; the proposed stroke of policy would at once dissolve the confederacy, and open a road by which to retrieve our ruined fortunes. On either hand there was danger; and, miserable as Sir Wil-

* That of invading Afghistan for the purpose of restoring Shah Shoojah as king.

liam’s life had been for the past six weeks, he was willing to stake his all on the issue of a plan which seemed to offer a faint hope of recovering the ground we had lost.

In a fatal hour he signed his name to a paper consenting to the arrangement.—His doom was sealed.—The whole was a scheme got up by the chiefs, to test his sincerity.

December 23d.—At about noon Sir William Macnaghten, attended by Capts. Lawrence, Trevor, and Mackenzie, left the mission-house to attend a conference with Mahomed Akber Khan on the plain towards Seeha Sung. Previously to this he had requested the General that two regiments and two guns might be in readiness for secret service, and that, as the interview would be of a critical nature, the garrison might be kept well on the alert, and the walls strongly manned. In leaving the cantonments, Sir William expressed his disappointment at the paucity of men on the ramparts, and the apparent inerntness of the garrison at such a critical moment, saying, “However, it is all of a piece with the military arrangements throughout the siege.” On his leaving the gate only sixteen troopers of the body-guard were in attendance, but the remainder shortly afterwards joined, under Lieut. Le Geyt.

Sir William now for the first time explained to the officers who accompanied him the objects of the present conference; and Capt. Lawrence was warned to be in readiness to gallop to the Bala Hissar, to prepare the King for the approach of a regiment.

Apprehensions being expressed of the danger to which the scheme might expose him, in case of treachery on the part of Mahomed Akber, he replied, “Dangerous it is; but if it succeeds, it is worth all risks: the rebels have not fulfilled even one article of the treaty, and I have no confidence in them; and if by it we can only save our honour, all will be well. At any rate, I would rather suffer a hundred deaths, than live the last six weeks over again.”

Meanwhile crowds of armed Afghans were observed hovering near the cantonment and about Mahomed Khan’s fort, causing misgivings in the minds of all but the Envoy himself, whose confidence remained unshaken. On arriving near the bridge, they were met by Mahomed Akber Khan, Mahomed Shah Khan, Dost Mahomed Khan, Khooda Bux Khan, Azad Khan, and other chiefs, amongst whom was the brother of Amenooollah Khan, whose presence might have been sufficient to convince Sir William that he had been duped.

The usual civilities having passed, the Envoy presented Akber Khan with a valuable Arab horse, which had only that morning been purchased for 3000 rupees. The whole party then sat down near some rising ground, which partially concealed them from cantonments.

Capt. Lawrence having called attention to the number of inferior followers around them, with a view of their being ordered to a distance, Mahomed Akber exclaimed, “No, they are all
in the secret;’ which words had scarcely been uttered, when Sir William and his three companions found themselves suddenly grasped firmly by the hands from behind, whilst their swords and pistols were rudely snatched away by the chiefs and their followers. The three officers were immediately pulled forcibly along and compelled to mount on horseback, each behind a Giljye chief, escorted by a number of armed retainers, who with difficulty repelled the efforts of a crowd of fanatic Ghazees, who, on seeing the affray, had rushed to the spot, calling aloud for the blood of the hated infidels, aiming at them desperate blows with their long knives and other weapons, and only deterred from firing by the fear of killing a chief. The unfortunate Envoy was last seen struggling violently with Mahomed Akber, “consternation and horror depicted on his countenance.”

On their nearing Mahomed Khan’s fort, renewed attempts were made to assassinate the three captive officers by the crowd there assembled. Capt. Trevor, who was seated behind Dost Mahomed Khan, unhappily fell to the ground, and was instantly slain. Caps. Lawrence and Mackenzie reached the fort in safety, but the latter was much bruised in various parts of his body, and both were greatly exhausted from the excitement they had undergone.

At the entrance of the fort, a furious out was aimed at Capt. Mackenzie’s head by a ruffian named Moollah Momin, which was warded off by Mahomed Shah Khan, that chief receiving the blow on his own shoulder. Being taken into a small room, they found themselves still in continual jeopardy from repeated assaults of the Ghazees without, who were with the greatest difficulty restrained from shooting them through the window, where the hand of some recent European victim (afterwards ascertained to be that of the Envoy himself) was insuitlingly held up to their view. Throughout this trying scene they received repeated assurances of protection from the Giljye chief; but Amenoolah Khan coming in gave vent to a torrent of angry abuse, and even threatened to blow them with a gun. It is deserving of notice, that, amidst the congratulations which on all sides met the ear of Mahomed Shah Khan on the events of the day, the solitary voice of an aged Moollah was raised in condemnation of the deed, which he solemnly pronounced to be “fool,” and calculated to cast a lasting disgrace on the religion of Mahomed. At midnight they were removed to the house of Mahomed Akber Khan. As they passed through the streets of Cabul, notwithstanding the excitement that had prevailed throughout the day, it resembled a city of the dead; nor did they meet a single soul.

By Akber Khan they were received courteously, and were now informed for the first time by Capt. Skinner of the murder of the Envoy and Capt. Trevor. That Sir William Macnaghten met his death at the hands of Mahomed Akber himself there can be no reasonable doubt. That chief had pledged himself to his confidants to seize the Envoy that day, and bring him into the city, when the chiefs hoped to have been able to dictate their own terms, retaining him as a hostages for their fulfillment. Finding it impossible, from the strenuous resistance Sir William offered, to carry him off alive, and yet determined not to disappoint the public expectation altogether,—influenced also by his tiger passions, and the remembrance of his father’s wrongs,—Mahomed Akber drew a ‘pistol, the Envoy’s own gift a few hours before, and shot him through the body, which was immediately hacked to pieces by the ferocious Ghazees, by whom the dismembered trunk was afterwards carried to the city, and publicly exposed in the Char Chouk, or principal mart. The head was taken to the house of Nuwab Zuman Khan, where it was triumphantly exhibited to Capt. Conolly.

Such was the cruel fate of Sir William Macnaghten, the accomplished scholar, the distinguished politician, and the representative of Great Britain at the court of Shah Shooja-Ool-Moolk.

It cannot but be acceptable to my readers, if I here present entire the interesting and important letters of Capts. Mackenzie and Lawrence on this melancholy subject.

Letter addressed by Captain C. Mackenzie to Lieutenant Vincent Eyre.

My dear Eyre,

You ask for a minute account of the circumstances attending the assassination of the late Sir William Macnaghten, and my own detention and imprisonment on that occasion. You may remember, that for many days previous to the fatal 23d December, the poor Envoy had been subjected to more wear and tear, both of body and mind, than it was possible for the strongest intellect to bear without deeply feeling its effects. He had fulfilled all the preliminary conditions of the treaty which had been proposed between the British and the Afghan insurgents, whereas the Khans had in no one particular adhered to their engagements. Bad faith was evident in all their proceedings, and our condition was a desperate one; more especially as Sir William had ascertained, by bitter experience, that no hope remained in the energies and resources of our military leaders, who had formally protested that they could do nothing more. Beset by this disgraceful imbecility on the one hand, and by systematic treachery on the other, the unfortunate Envoy was driven to his wits’ end, and, as will be seen, forgot, in a fatal moment, the wholesome rule which he had theretofore laid down for himself, of refusing to hold communication with individuals of the rebel party, especially with him who was notorious, even amongst his villainous countrymen, for ferocity and treachery, to wit, Mahomed Akber Khan. Late in the evening of the 22d December, Captain James Skinner, who, after having been concealed between the British part of the siege, had latterly been the guest of Mahomed Akber, arrived in cantonments, accompanied by Mahomed Sudeeq Khan, a first cousin of Mahomed Akber, and by Sirwar Khan, the Arhanee merchant, who, in the begin-
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ning of the campaign, had furnished the army with camels, and who had been much in the confidence of Sir A. Burnes, being, in fact, one of our staunchest friends. The two latter remained in a different apartment, while Skinner dined with the Envoy. During dinner, Skinner jestingly remarked that he felt as if laden with combustibles, being charged with a message from Mahomed Akber to the Envoy of a most portentous nature.

Even then I remarked that the Envoy's eye glanced eagerly towards Skinner with an expression of hope. In fact, he was like a drowning man catching at straws. Skinner however referred to his Afghan companions, and after dinner the four retired into a room by themselves. My knowledge of what there took place is gained from poor Skinner's own relation, as given during my subsequent captivity with him in Akber's house. Mahomed Sudeeq disclosed Mahomed Akber's proposition to the Envoy, which was, that the following day Sir William should meet him (Mahomed Akber) and a few of his immediate friends, viz. the chiefs of the Eastern Giljyes, outside the cantonments, when a final agreement should be made, so as to be fully understood by both parties; that Sir William should have a considerable body of troops in readiness, which, on a given signal, were to join with those of Mahomed Akber and the Giljyes, assault and take Mahmood Khan's fort, and secure the person of Ameenoollah. At this stage of the proposition Mahomed Sudeeq signified that, for a certain sum of money, the head of Ameenoollah should be presented to the Envoy; but from this Sir William shrank with abhorrence, declaring that it was neither his custom nor that of his country to give a price for blood. Mahomed Sudeeq then went on to say, that, after having subdued the rest of the Khans, the English should be permitted to remain in the country eight months longer, so as to save their purdah (veil, or credit), but they were then to evacuate Afghanistan, as if of their own accord; that Shah Shojoa was to continue king of the country, and that Mahomed Akber was to be his wuzzer, (vizier.) As usual, a sum of money (Mahomed Akber's assistance), the British Government were to pay him 30 lacs of rupees, and 4 lacs of rupees per annum during his life! To this extraordinary and wild proposal, Sir William gave ear with an eagerness which nothing can account for but the supposition, confirmed by many other circumstances, that his strong mind had been harassed, until it had, in some degree, lost its equi-

poise; and he not only assented fully to these terms, but actually gave a Persian paper to that effect, written in his own hand, declaring as his motives that it was not only an excellent opportunity to carry into effect the real wishes of government, which were to evacuate the country with as much credit to ourselves as possible, but that it would give England time to enter into a treaty with Russia, defining the bounds beyond which neither were to pass in Central Asia. So ended this fatal conference, the nature and result of which, contrary to his usual custom, Sir William communicated to none of those, who, on all former occasions were fully in his confidence, viz. Trevor, Lawrence, and myself. It seemed as if he feared that we might insist on the impracticability of the plan, which he must have studiously concealed from himself. All the following morning his manner was distracted and hurried in a way that none of us had ever before witnessed. It seems that Mahomed Akber had demanded a favourite Arab horse, belonging to Captain Grant, Assist-

Adj. Gen. of force. To avoid the necessity of parting with the animal, Captain Grant had fixed his price at the exorbitant sum of 5000 rupees; unwilling to give so large a price, but determined to gratify the Sirdar, Sir William sent me to Captain Grant to prevail upon him to take a smaller sum, but with orders that if he were peremptory, the 5000 rupees should be given. I obtained the horse for 3000 rupees, and Sir William appeared much pleased with the prospect of gratifying Mahomed Akber by the present.

After breakfast, Trevor, Lawrence, and myself were summoned to attend the Envoy during his conference with Mahomed Akber Khan. I found him alone, when for the first time, he disclosed to me the nature of the transaction he was engaged in. I immediately warned him that it was a plot against him. He replied hastily, "A plot! let me alone for that, trust me for that, and you will see no further remonstrances." Sir William then arranged with Gen. Elphinstone that the 54th regiment, under Major Ewart, should be held in readiness for immediate service. The Shah's 6th, and two guns, were also warned. It is a curious circumstance, and betrays the unhappy vaccination of poor Elphinstone, that after Sir William had actu-

ally quitted the cantonment in full expectation that every thing had been arranged according to his desire, he (the General) addressed a letter to him, which never reached him, remonstrating on the danger of the proposed attack, and strongly objecting to the employment of the two above regiments. About 12 o'clock Sir William, Trevor, Lawrence, and myself set forth on our ill-omened expedition. As we approached the Secah Sang gate, Sir William observed with much vexation that the troops were not in readiness, protesting at the same time, however, that, desperate as the proposed attempt was, it was better that it should be made, and that a thousand deaths were preferable to the life of an Envoy.

After passing the gate, he remembered the horse which he had intended as a present for Akber, and sent me back for it. When I rejoined him, I found that the small number of the body guard who had accompanied him had been ordered to halt, and that he, Trevor, and Lawrence, had advanced in the direction of Mahomed Khan's fort, being some 500 or 600 yards from the eastern rampart, and were there awaiting the approach of Mahomed Akber and his party, who now made their appearance. Close by were some hillocks, on the further side of which from the cantonment a carpet was spread where the snow lay least thick, and there the Khans and Sir William sat down to hold their conference. Men talk of presentiment; I suppose it was something of the kind which came over me, for I could scarcely prevail upon myself to quit my horse. I did so, however, and was invited to sit down among the Sirdars. After the usual salutations Mahomed Akber commenced business, by asking the Envoy if he was perfectly ready to carry into effect the proposition of the preceding night? The Envoy replied, "Why not?" My attention was then called off by an old Afghan acquaintance of mine, formerly chief of the Cabul police, by name Ghulam Moyun-oold-deen. I rose from my recum-

ent posture, and stood apart with him conversing.
I afterwards remembered that my friend betrayed much anxiety as to where my pistols were and why I did not carry them on my person. I answered that although I wore my sword for form, it was not necessary at a friendly conference to be armed cap-a-pea. His discourse was also full of extravagant compliments, I suppose for the purpose of lulling me to sleep. At length my attention was called off from what he was saying, by observing that a number of men, armed to the teeth, had gradually approached to the scene of conference, and were drawing round in a sort of circle. This Lawrence and myself pointed out to some of the chief men, who affected at first to drive them off with whips; but Mahomed Akber observed that it was of no consequence, as they were in the secret. I again resumed my conversation with Gholam Moyun-oodeen, when suddenly I heard Mahomed Akber call out, "Begeer! begeer!" (seize! seize!) and turning round, I saw him grasp the Envoy's left hand with an expression in his face of the most diabolical ferocity. I think it was Sultan Jan who laid hold of the Envoy's right hand. They dragged him in a stooping posture down the hill. The only words I heard were: "William utter being, 'As barak ira' la'at," (for God's sake)! I saw his face bowing, and it was full of horror and astonishment. I did not see what became of Trevor, but Lawrence was dragged past me by several Afghans, whom I saw wrest his weapons from him. Up to this moment I was so engrossed in observing what was taking place, that I actually was not aware that my own right arm was mastered, that my urbane friend held a pistol to my temple, and that I was surrounded by a circle of Ghazees with drawn swords and cocked jaurails. Resistance was in vain; so, listening to the exhortations of Gholam Moyun-oodeen, which were enforced by the whistling of divers bullets over my head, I hurried through the snow with him to the place where his horse was standing, being despoiled en route of my sabre, and narrowly escaping divers attempts made on my life. As I mounted behind my captor, now my energetic defender, the enemy increased around as, the cries of "Kill the Kafir!" became more vehement, and although we hurried on at a fast canter, it was with the utmost difficulty Gholam Moyun-oodeen, although assisted by one or two friends or followers, could ward off and avoid the sword-cuts aimed at me, the rascales being afraid to fire lest they should kill my conductor. Indeed he was obliged to wheel his horse round once, and taking off his turban (the last appeal a Mussulman can make), to implore them for God's sake to respect the life of his friend. At last, ascending a slippery bank, the horse fell. My cap had been snatched off, and I now received a heavy blow on the head from a bludgeon, which fortunately did not quite deprive me of my senses. I had sufficient sense left to shoot ahead of the fallen horse, where my protector with another man joined me, and clasping me in their arms, hurried me towards the wall of Mahomed Khan's fort. How I reached the spot where Mahomed Akber was receiving the gratulations of the multitude I know not, but I remember a fanatic rushing on me and threatening his hand in my collar until I became exhausted from suffocation. I must do Mahomed Akber the justice to say, that, finding the Ghazees bent on my slaughter, even after I had reached his stirrup, he drew his sword and laid about him right manfully, for my conductor and Meerza Baodeen Khan were obliged to press me up against the wall, covering me with their own bodies, and protesting that no blow should reach me but through their persons.

Pride, however, overcame Mahomed Akber's sense of courtesy, when he thought I was safe, for he then turned round to me, and repeatedly said in a tone of triumphant derision, "Shuma moolk-i-ma me gered?" (You'll seize my country, will you?) he then rode off, and I was hurried towards the gate of the fort. Here new dangers awaited me; for Moolah Momin, fresh from the slaughter of poor Trevor, who was killed riding close behind me, —Sultan Jan having the credit of having given him the first sabre cut,—stood here with his followers, whom he exhorted to slay me, setting them the example by cutting fiercely at me himself. Fortunately a gun stood between us, but still he would have effected his purpose, had not Mahomed Shah Khan at that instant, with some followers, come to my assistance. I suppose it may have been the chief himself throwing his arm around my neck, and receiving on his shoulder a cut aimed by Moolah Momin at my head. During the bustle I pushed forward into the fort, and was immediately taken to a sort of dungeon, where I found Lawrence safe, but somewhat exhausted by his hideous ride and the violence he had sustained, although unwounded. Here the Giljye chiefs, Mahomed Shah Khan, and his brother Dost Mahomed Khan, presently joined us, and endeavoured to cheer up our flagging spirits, assuring us that the Envoy and Trevor were not dead, but on the contrary quite well. They stayed with us during the afternoon, their presence being absolutely necessary for our protection. Many attempts were made by the fanatics to force the door to accomplish our destruction. Others spit at us and abused us through a small window, through which one fellow levelled a blunderbuss at us, which was struck up by our keepers and himself thrust back. At this appearance of a second musket, the Abdool Momin and his brother did me a similar favour. I had been plundered of my rings and every thing else previously, by the understanders.

Reaching Mahomed Akber's abode, we were shown into the room where he lay in bed. He received us with great outward show of courtesy, assuring us of the welfare of the Envoy and Trevor, but there was a constraint in his manner for which I could not account. We were shortly taken to
another apartment, where we found Skinner, who had returned, being on parole, early in the morning. Doubt and gloom marked our meeting, and the latter was fearfully deepened by the intelligence which we now received from our fellow-captive of the base murder of Sir William and Trevor. He informed us that the head of the former had been carried about the city in triumph. We of course spent a miserable night. The next day we were taken under a strong guard to the house of Zeman Khan, where a council of the Khans was being held. Here we found Captains Conolly and Airey, who had some days previously been sent to the hur- wah's house as hostages for the performance of cer- tain parts of the treaty which was to have been entered into. A violent discussion took place, in which Mahomed Akber bore the most prominent part. We were vehemently accused of treachery, and every thing that was bad, and told that the whole of the transactions of the night previous had been a trick of Mahomed Akber, and Ameenoollah, to ascertain the Envoy's sincerity. They declared that they would now grant us no terms, save on the surrender of the whole of the married families as hostages, all the guns, ammunition, and treasure. At this time Conolly told me that he was not aware of the Envoy's presence until he was called in by the council, being informed that the Envoy had been shown to the house, and that his and Trevor's bodies had been taken away in the public bazaar, or chowk; and that it was with the greatest difficulty that the old hur- wah, Zuman Khan, had saved him and Airey from being murdered by a body of fanatics, who had attempted to rush into the room where they were. Also that previous to the arrival of Lawrence, Skin- ner, and myself, Mahomed Akber had been relating the events of the preceding day to the Jeerga or council, and that he had unguardedly avowed hav- ing, while endeavouring to force the Envoy either to mount on horseback or to move more quickly, struck and, that, seeing Conolly's was fastened upon him with an expression of intense indignation, he had altered the phrase and said, "I mean I pushed him."

After an immense deal of gabble, a proposal for a renewal of the treaty, not, however, demanding all the guns, was determined to be sent to the can- tonments, and Skinner, Lawrence, and myself were marched back to Akber's house, enduring en route all manner of threats and insults. Here we were closely confined in an inner apartment, which was indeed necessary for our safety. That evening we received a visit from Mahomed Akber, Sultan Jan, and several other Afghans. Mahomed Akber exhibited his double-barrelled pistols to us, which he had worn the previous day, requesting us to put their locks to rights, something being amiss. Two of the barrels had been recently discharged, which he endeavoured in a most confused way to account for by saying, that he had been charged by a horse lad of the escort, and had fired both barrels at him. Nor was this all. We had, even attempting to charge, the only man who ad- vanced to the rescue having been a Hindoo Jom- dar of Chuprasies, who was instantly cut to pieces by the assembled Ghazees. This defence he made without any accusation on our part, betraying the anxiety of a liar to be believed. On the 26th, Capt. Lawrence was taken to the house of Ameeno-ollah, whence he did not return to us. Captain Skinner and myself remained in Akber's house until the 30th. During this time we were civilly treated, and conversed with numbers of Afghan gentlemen who came to visit us. Some of them asserted that the Envoy had been murdered by the unruly soldiers. Others could not deny that Akber himself was the assassin. For two or three days we had a fellow-prisoner in poor Sirwar Khan, who had been deceived throughout the whole mat- ter, and out of whom they were then endeavouring to screw money. He of course was aware from his countrymen that, not only had Akber committed the murder, but that he protested to the Gahzees that he gloried in the deed. On one occasion a moonshee of Major Pottinger, who had escaped from Charekhar, named Mohun Beer, came direct from the presence of Mahomed Akber to visit us. He told us that Mahomed Akber had begun to see the impolicy of having murdered the Envoy, which fact he had just avowed to him, shedding many tears either of pretended remorse, or of real vexa- tion, at having committed himself. On several occasions Mahomed Akber personally, and by deputy, besought Skinner and myself to give him advice, as to how he was to extricate himself from the dilemma in which he was placed, more than once endeavouring to excuse himself for not having effectually protected the Envoy, by saying that Sir William had drawn a sword stick upon him. It seems that meanwhile the renewed negotiations with Major Pottinger, who had assumed the En- voy's place in cantonments, had been brought to a head, for on the night of the 30th, Akber furnished me with an Afghan dress (Skinner already wore one) and sent us both back to cantonments. Several Afghans, with whom I fell in afterwards, pro- tested to me that they had seen Mahomed Akber shooit the Envoy with his own hand; amongst them Meeraaz Boodoode Khan, who, being an old ac- quaintance, always retained a sneaking kindness for the English.

I am, my dear Eyre, yours very truly,

C. Mackenzie

Cabul, 29th July, 1842.

(True copy.)

Vint. Eyre, Lieut. Bengal Artillery.

Letter addressed by Capt. G. St. P. Lawrence, late Military Secretary to the Envoy, to Major E. Pottinger, C.B., late in charge of the Cabul Mission.

Sir,

In compliance with your request, I have the honour to detail the particulars of my capture, and of the death of my ever-to-be-lamented chief.

On the morning of the 23rd December, at 11 a.m., I received a note from the late Sir W. H. Macnaghten, warning me to attend, with Captains Trevor and Mackenzie, an interview he was about to have with Sirdar Mahomed Akber Khan. Ac- cordingly, with the above-named officers, at about 12, I accompanied Sir William, having previously heard him tell Major-General Elphinstone to have two regiments of infantry and two guns ready for secret service. In passing through cantonments, on my observing that there were more Afghans in cantonments than usual, or than I deemed safe, the Envoy directed one of his Afghan attendants to proceed and cause them all to leave, at the same time remarking, how strange it was that, although the General was fully acquainted with the then very critical state of affairs, no preparations ap- peared to have been made, adding, "however, it
is all of a piece with the military arrangements throughout the siege." He then said, "There is not enough of the escort with us," to which I replied, that he had only ordered eight or ten, but that I had brought sixteen, and that I would send for the remainder, which I accordingly did, asking Lieut. Le Geyt to bring them, and to tell Brigadier Shelton, who had expressed a wish to attend the next interview, that he might accompany them.

On passing the gate, we observed some hundreds of armed Afghans within a few yards of it, on which I called to the officer on duty to get the reserve under arms, and brought outside to disperse them, and to send to the General to have the garri-

son on the alert. Towards Mahmood Khan's fort, were a number of armed Afghans, but we observed none nearer.

The Envoy now told us that he, on the night previous, had received a proposal from Sirdar Ma-

homed Akber Khan to which he had agreed, and that the Khan would bring our present difficulties to an early and happy solution; that Mahomed Akber Khan was to give up Naib Ameenoollah Khan as a prisoner to us, for which purpose a regiment was to proceed to Mahmood Khan's fort, and another corps was to occupy the Bala Hissar. Sir William then warned me to be ready to gallop to the king with the intelli-
gegence of the approach of the regiment, and to acquaint him with Akber's proposal. On one of us remarking that the scheme seemed a dangerous one, and asking if he did not apprehend any treachery, he replied: "Dangerous it is, but, if it succeeds, it is worth all risks; the rebels have not fulfilled even one article of the treaty, and I have no confidence in them, and if by it we can only save our honour, all will be well; at any rate, I would rather suffer an hundred deaths, than live the last six weeks over again." We proceeded to near the usual spot, and met Sirdar Mahmood Akber Khan, who was acco-
mpanied by several Gillyy chiefs, Mahmood Shah Khan, Dest Maho-

med Khan, Khoda Bux Khan, Azad Khan, &c. After the usual salutations, the Envoy presented a valuable horse which Akber had asked for, and which had been that morning purchased from Capt. Grant for 3000 rupees. The Sirdar acknow-

ledged the attention, and expressed his thanks for a handsome brace of double-barrelled pistols which the Envoy had purchased from me, and sent to him, with his carriage and pair of horses, the day before.

The party dismounted, and horse clothes were spread on a small hillock which partially concealed us from cantonments, and which was chosen, they said, as being free from snow. The Envoy threw himself on the bank with Mahomed Akber and Captains Trevor and Mackenzie beside him; I stood behind Sir William till, pressed by Dest Mahomed Khan. I knelt on one knee, having first called the Envoy's attention to the number of Afghans around us, saying that if the subject of the conference was of that secret nature I believed it to be, they had better be removed. He spoke to Mahomed Akber, who replied, "No, they are all in the secret." Hardly had he so said, when I found my arms locked, my pistols and sword wrenched from my belt, and myself forcibly raised from the ground and pushed along, Mahomed Shah Khan, who held me, calling out, "Come along, if you value your life." I turned, and saw the Envoy lying, his head where his heels had been, and his hands locked in Mahomed Akber's, consternation and horror depicted in his countenance. Seeing I could do nothing, I let myself be pulled on by Mahomed Shah Khan. Some shots were fired, and I was hurried to his horse, on which he jumped, telling me to get up behind, which I did, and we proceeded, escorted by several armed men who kept off a crowd of Ghazees, who sprang up on every side shouting for me to be given up for them to slay, cutting at me with their swords and knives, and poking me in the ribs with their guns; they were afraid to fire, lest they should injure their chief. The horsemen kept them pretty well off, but not sufficiently so to prevent my being much bruised. In this manner we hurried to-

wards Mahomed Khan's fort, near which we met some hundreds of horsemen who were keeping off the Ghazees, who were here in greater numbers, and more vociferous for my blood. We, however, reached the fort in safety, and I was pushed into a small room, and mahomed Khan returned to the gate of the fort, and bringing in Captain Macrae, whose horse had there fallen. This he did, re-

ceiving a cut through his neechea (Scotcho coat) on his arm, which was aimed at that officer, who was ushered into the room with me much exhausted and bruised from blows on his head and body. We sat down with some soldiers who were put over us with a view to protect us from the mob, who now surrounded the house, and who till dark continued execrating and spitting at us, calling on the men to give us up to be slaughtered.

One produced a hand (European) which appeared to have been recently cut off; another presented a blunderbuss, and was about to fire it, when it was knocked aside by one of our guard. Several of the Sirdars came in during the day, and told us to be assured that no harm should befal us; that the Envoy and Trevor were safe in the city (a false-

hood, as will be afterwards seen). Naib Ameen-
oollah Khan and his sons also came. Theする, in great distress, and said that we either should be de-

served to be, blown away from a gun. Mahomed Shah Khan and Dest Mahomed Khan begged he would not so talk, and took him out of the room. Towards night food was given to us, and postheens to sleep on: our watches, rings, and silk handker-

chiefs were taken from us; but in all other re-

spects we were un molested.

The followers of Mahomed Shah Khan repeated-
ly congratulated him on the events of the day, with one exception, viz. an old Moollah, who loudly exclaimed that "the name of the faithful was tarn-

ished, and that in future no belief could be placed in them; that the deed was foul and could never be of advantage to the authors." At midnight we were taken through the city to the house of Maho-

med Akber Khan, who received us courteously, lamenting the occurrences of the day: here we found Captain Skinner, and for the first time heard the dreadful tale, and said that we either should be de-

scribed to be, blown away from a gun. Mahomed Shah Khan and Dest Mahomed Khan begged he would not so talk, and took him out of the room. Towards night food was given to us, and postheens to sleep on: our watches, rings, and silk handker-

chiefs were taken from us; but in all other re-

spects we were unmolested.
immediately shot and his body cut to pieces by the Ghazees; that Captain Trevor had been conveyed behind Dost Mahomed Khan as far as Mahomed Khan's fort, where he was cut down, but that his body was not mangled, though carried in triumph through the city. On the following morning (24th) we (Captain Skinner, Mackenzie, and self) were taken to Nuwab Zuman Khan's house, escorted by Sultan Jan and other chiefs, to protect us from the Ghazees; there we met Captains Conolly and Airey (Hostages) and all the rebel Sirdars assembled in council. The Envoy's death was lamented, but his conduct severely censured, and it was said that now no faith could be placed in our words. A new treaty however was discussed, and sent to the General and Major Pottinger, and towards evening we returned as we came to Mahomed Akber's, where I remained a prisoner, but well and courteously treated till the morning of the 26th, when I was sent to Naib Ameenoollah Khan. On reaching his house I was ushered into his private apartment. The Naib received me kindly, showed me the Envoy's original letter in reply to Mahomed Akber's proposition, touching his being made Shah Shujah's Wuzzer, receiving a lack of rupees on giving the Naib a prisoner to us, thirty lacks on the final settlement of the insurgents, &c. To this the Naib added that the Envoy had told Mahomed Akber's cousin that a lack of rupees would be given for his (Ameenoollah Khan's) head. I promptly replied, 'is false,' that Sir William had never done so, that it was utterly foreign and repugnant to his nature, and to British usage. The Naib expressed himself in strong terms against the Envoy, contrasting his own fair and open conduct with that of Sir William. He told me that General Elphinstone and Major Pottinger had begged I might be released, as my presence was necessary to enable them to prepare bills on India, which it had been arranged the Sirdars were to get. After some delay, consequent on my asking for Captain Mackenzie to be released with me, and Mahomed Akber's stoutly refusing the release of either of us, I was sent into cantonments on the morning of the 29th, escorted by the Naib's eldest son and a strong party of horse and foot, being disguised as an Afghan for my greater protection. I must here record that nothing could exceed the Naib's kindness and attention to me while under his roof.

I have, &c. &c.

(Signed) - G. St P. Lawrence,
Military Secretary
to the late Envoy and Minister.

Camp Zoudah,
Ten miles South of Tezenz,
10th May, 1842.

(True copy.)
Vint. Eyre, Lieut. Bengal Artillery.

CHAPTER IX.


But what were our troops about all this time? Were no steps taken to rescue the Envoy and his friends from their perilous position? Where was the body-guard which followed them from cantonments! These questions will naturally occur to all who read the foregoing pages, and I wish it were in my power to render satisfactory answers.

The body-guard had only got a few hundred yards from the gate in their progress to the scene of conference, when they suddenly faced about and came galloping back, several shots being fired at them in their retreat. Lieut. Le Geyt, in passing through the gate, exclaimed that the Envoy had been carried off, and it was believed that, finding his men would not advance to the rescue, he came back for assistance. But the intelligence he brought, instead of rousing our leaders to instant action, seemed to paralyze their faculties; and although it was evident that our Envoy had been basely entrapped, if not actually murdered, before our very gate, and though even now crowds of Afghans, horse and foot, were seen passing and repassing to and fro in hostile array, between Mahomed's fort and the place of meeting, not a gun was opened upon them; not a soldier was stirred from his post; no sortie was apparently even thought of; treachery was allowed to triumph in open day; the murder of a British Envoy was perpetrated in the face and within musket-shot of a British army; and not only was no effort made to avenge the dauntlessly deed, but the body was left lying on the plain to be mangled and insulted, and finally carried off to be paraded in the public market by a ruffianly mob of fanatical barbarians.

Intense was the anxiety and wretched the suspense felt by all during the rest of the day. A number of Afghans, who were trafficking in cantonments at the time of the conference, on hearing the report of fire-arms in that direction, endeavoured to escape, but were detained by the officer at the gate. No certain tidings regarding the Envoy could be obtained: many confidently affirmed that he was alive and unharmed in Mahomed's fort; but Lieut. Warren stoutly maintained that he had kept his eye upon Sir William from the moment of his leaving the gate, and had distinctly seen him fall to the ground, and the Afghans hacking at his body. The agony of his poor wife during this dread interval of suspense may be imagined.

December 24th.—The fate of the Envoy and his three companions remained a mystery, until the arrival of a note from Capt. Conolly notifying his death and that of Capt. Trevor, and the safety of Capts. Lawrence and Mackenzie.

The two latter officers had been that morning escorted to a conference of chiefs at the house of Nuwab Zuman Khan, where the late Envoy's conduct was severely commented on; but his death was nevertheless lamented. The treaty was again discussed; and, after a few alterations and additions had been made, it was sent to Gen. Elphinstone, with an explanation of the breach of faith which had cost the Envoy his life.

Gen. Elphinstone now requested Major Pottinger to assume the office of political agent and adviser, which, though still suffering greatly from his wound, and incapacitated from active bodily
exertion, that gallant officer's strict sense of public duty forbade him to decline, although he plainly perceived our affairs to be so irretrievably ruined, as to render the distinction any thing but enviable, or likely to improve his hardly-earned fame.

The additional clauses in the treaty now proposed for our renewed acceptance were—1st. That we should leave behind all our guns, excepting six. 2nd. That we should immediately give up all our treasures. 3rd. That the hostages should all be exchanged for married men, with their wives and families. The difficulties of Major Pottinger's position will be readily perceived, when it is borne in mind that he had before him the most conclusive evidence of the late Envoy's ill-advised intrigue with Mahomed Akber Khan, in direct violation of that very treaty, which was now once more tendered for consideration.

December 25th.—A more cheerless Christmas-day perhaps never dawned upon British soldiers in a strange land; and the few whom the force of habit urged to exchange the customary greetings of the season, did so with countenances and in tones indicative of any thing but merriment. At night there was an alarm, and the drum beat to arms, but nothing occurred of any consequence.

December 26th.—Letters were received from Capt. Mackeson, political agent at Peshawur, announcing the march of strong reinforcements from India. An offer was made by Mahomed Osman Khan to escort us all safe to Peshawur for five lacs of rupees; and shortly after this the Naib Ameer arrived, with a verbal agreement to certain amendments which had been proposed in the treaty by Major Pottinger. He was accompanied by a Cashmeer merchant and several Hindoo shroffs, for the purpose of negotiating bills to the amount of fourteen lacs of rupees, payable to the several chiefs on the promise of the late Envoy.

Major Pottinger being altogether averse from the payment of this money, and indeed strongly opposed to any treaty binding the Indian government to a course of policy which it might find inconvenient to adopt, a council of war was convened by the General, consisting of himself, Brigadiers Shelton and Anquetil, Col. Chambers, Capt. Bellew, Assist. Qr.-Mast.-Gen., and Capt. Grant, Assist. Adjt.-Gen. In the presence of this council, Major Pottinger declared his conviction that no confidence could be placed in any treaty formed with the Afghan chiefs; that, under such circumstances, to bind the hands of government, by promising to evacuate the country, and to restore the deposed Ameer, and to waste moreover so much public money, merely to save our own lives and property, would be inconsistent with the duty we owed our country and the government we served; and that the only honourable course would be either to hold out to the last at Cabul, or to force our immediate retreat to Jellalabad.

This, however, the officers composing the council, one and all, declared to be impracticable, owing to the want of provisions, the surrender of the surrounding forts, and the insuperable difficulties of the road at the present season; they therefore deemed it preferable to pay any sum of money, rather than sacrifice the whole force in a hopeless prolongation of hostilities. It was accordingly determined, nem. con., that Major Pottinger should at once renew the negotiations which had been commenced by Sir William Macnaghten, and that the sums promised to the chiefs by that functionary previous to his murder should be paid.

Major Pottinger's objections being thus overruled, the tendered treaty was forthwith accepted, and a requisition was made for the release of Capt. Lawrence, whose presence was necessary to prepare the bills on India. Four married hostages, with their wives and children, being required by the chiefs, a circular was sent round, to ascertain if that number would volunteer to remain, a salary of 2,000 rupees per month being guaranteed to each, as an inducement.

Such, however, was the horror entertained of Affghan treachery since the late tragioccur- rence, that some officers went so far as to say they would sooner shoot their wives at once than commit them to the charge of men, who had proved themselves devoid of common honour and humanity. There were, in fact, but one or two who consented to stay, if the General considered that by so doing they would benefit the public service.

December 27th.—The Chiefs were informed that it was contrary to the usages of war to give up ladies as hostages, and that the General could not consent to an arrangement, which would brand him with perpetual disgrace in his own country.

December 29th.—The Naib Ameer came in from the city with Capt. Lawrence and the shroffs, when the bills were prepared without farther delay. Capts. Drummond, Walsh, Warburton, and Webb, having been accepted as hostages, were sent to join Capts. Conolly and Airey at the house of Nuwab Zuman Khan. A portion of the sick and wounded, amongst whom was Lieut. Haughton of the Goorkha regiment, were likewise conveyed to the city, and placed under the protection of the chiefs. Three of the Shah's guns, with the greater portion of our treasure, were made over during the day, much to the evident disgust of the soldiery.

December 30th.—The remainder of the sick went into the city, Lieut. Evans, H. M.'s 44th foot being placed in command, and Dr. Campbell, 54th N. T., with Dr. Berwick of the Mission, in medical charge of the whole. Two more of the Shah's guns were given up. It snowed hard the whole day. A crowd of armed Gilyjes and Ghazees took up a threatening position close to the eastern gate, and even attempted to force an entrance into cantonments: Much annoyance was daily experienced from these people, who were in the
habit of plundering the peaceable dealers, who flocked in from the city with grain and forage, the moment they issued from the cantonments; they even committed frequent assaults on our Sepoys, and orders to fire on them on such occasions were repeatedly solicited in vain, although it was well known that the chiefs themselves advised us to do so, and the General had given Brigadier Shelton positive instructions to that effect, whenever circumstances might render it advisable. The consequence was that our soldiers were daily constrained to endure the most insulting and contemptuous taunts and treatment, from fellows whom a single charge of bayonets would have scattered like chaff; but who were emboldened by the apparent tameness of our troops, which they doubtless attributed to the want of common pluck, rather than to the restraints of discipline. Capt. Mackenzie and Skinner obtained their release this evening, the latter officer having, since the outbreak of the rebellion, passed through some curious adventures, in the disguise of an Afghan female.

January 5th.—Affairs continued in the same unsetled state until this date. The chiefs postponed our departure from day to day on divers pretences. It had been agreed that Nuwab Jubbar Khan should escort us to Jellalabad with about 2000 followers, who were to be entertained for that purpose.

It is supposed that, up to the very last, the majority of chiefs doubted the reality of our intention to depart: and many, fearful of the civil discord for which our retreat would be the signal, would have gladly detained us at Cabul. Attempts were made continually by Akbar Khan to wean the Hindostanees from their allegiance, and to induce them to desert. Numerous cautions were received from various well-wishers, to place no confidence in the professions of the chiefs, who had sworn together to accomplish our entire destruction. Shah Shojaah himself sent more than one solemn warning, and, finding we were bent on taking our own course, used his utmost endeavours to persuade Lady Macnaghten to take advantage of his protection in the Bala Hissar. He also appealed to Brigadier Anquetil, who commanded the Shah's force, "if it were well to forsake him in the hour of need, and to deprive him of the aid of that force, which he had hitherto been taught to consider as his own!" All was however unavailing. The General and his council of war had determined that go we must, and go we accordingly did.

In the foregoing chapters I have offered what I honestly believe to be a faithful narration of the dismal train of events which preceded the evacuation of Cabul, and the abandonment of Shah Shojaah, by the British army. In taking a retrospective view of those unprecedented occurrences, it is evident that our reverses may be mainly attributed to a lack of ordinary foresight and penetration on the part of the chief military and civil authorities, on their first entering on the occupation of this country; a country whose innumerable fortified strongholds and difficult mountain passes, in the hands of a proud and warlike population, never really subdued nor reconciled to our rule, though unable to oppose the march of a disciplined army through their land, ought to have induced a more than common degree of vigilance and circumspection, in making adequate provision against any such popular outbreak as might have been anticipated, and did actually occur. But, instead of applying his undeniable talents to the completion of that conquest, which gained him an illustrious title and a wide renown, Lord Keane contented himself with the superficial success, which attended his progress through a country hitherto untraversed by an European army, since the classic days of Alexander the Great; he hurried off, with too great eagerness to enjoy the applause which awaited him in England, and left to his successors the far more arduous task of securing in their grasp the unwieldy prize, of which he had obtained the nominal possession.

On his return to India, Lord Keane took with him a large portion of the Bengal force, with which he had arrived at Cabul; the whole of the Bombay troops made a simultaneous homeward movement; and the army, with which he had entered Afghanistan, was thus reduced to a miserable moiety, before any steps had been taken to guard against surprise by the erection of a stronghold on the approved principles of modern warfare, or the establishment of a line of military posts to keep open our communications with India, on which country the army must necessarily for a long time have been entirely dependent for the munitions of war. The distance from Cabul to Ferozepore, our nearest Indian station, is about 600 miles. Between Cabul and Peshawur occur the stupendous and dangerous defiles of Khoord-Cabul, Tezeen, Purreedurrah, Jugdulluk, and Khyber, throughout whose whole extent food and forage are procurable only at long intervals, and even then with much difficulty.

From Peshawur to Ferozepore is the Punjab, or country of the Seiks, traversed by five great rivers, and occupied by a powerful nation, on whose pacific professions no reliance could be placed. Along this extended line of communication Lord Keane established but one small solitary post, in the fort of Ali Musjed, in the heart of the Khyber pass. He left behind him, in fact, an army, whose isolated position and reduced strength offered the strongest possible temptation to a proud and restless race, to rally their scattered tribes in one grand effort to regain their lost independence.

In Lord Keane's successors may be seen the same disposition to be too easily satisfied with the outward semblance of tranquillity. Another brigade was ere long withdrawn from a force already insufficient for any great emergency;
nor was their position for holding in subjection a vanquished people much improved by their estab-
lishment in an ill-situated and ill-constructed cantonment, with their commissariat stores sepa-
rated from their lines of defence. To the latter
mentioned error may be mainly attributed the evacuation of Cabul and the destruction of the army; for there can be no doubt that, notwithstanding all the difficulties of our position, and the incompetence of our commanders, had the cantonments been well supplied with provisions, the troops could have easily held out until the arrival of reinforcements from India. The real
cause of our retreat was, beyond all question, famine. We were not driven, but starved, out of Cabul; and although, in my relation of our military transactions, I have been compelled by a regard to truth unwillingly to record proceed-
ings which must be condemned by all, I do not the less feel most sensibly that every allowance
ought in common justice to be made for men, who from the very commencement of the con-
flict, saw the combined horrors of starvation and a rigorous winter frowning in their face.—no succeers within reach,—their retreat cut off,—and all their sanguinary efforts either altogether
futile, or at best deferring for a few short days the ruin which on every side threatened to overwhel'm them.

In connection with this subject, I may be ex-
cused for quoting, in conclusion, the powerful reasoning of a recent writer in the Bombay Times.—

"When a soldier finds that his every move-
ment is directed by a master mind; that, when
he is apparently thrust into the greatest danger,
he finds, in truth, his greatest security; that his
march to engage an apparently superior force is
not a wild sacrifice, but the result of a well-cal-
culated plan; when he knows that, however ap-
apeances may be, he is sure to come off with
honour, for his brethren in arms are already in
progress to assist him, and will not fail to be
forthcoming at the hour appointed; when he
sees that there is a watchful eye over him, pro-
viding for all his wants, assisting him to over-
come all his difficulties, and enabling him to
reap the fruit of all his successes; when he
finds that even retreat is but a preparation for
victory, and, as if guided by Providence, all his
movements, though to him incomprehensible,
are sure to prove steps to some great end;—
when the soldier finds this, he rises and lies
down in security, and there is no danger which
he will not brave. But when, in every thing
they undertake, they find the reverse of the
picture I have drawn; when they are marched,
as they imagine to glory, but find it is only to
slaughter; when even victory brings no fruit,
and retreat they discover to be flight; when the
support they hope for comes not, and they find
their labours to be without end or purpose;
when the provisions they look for daily are
issued to them no more, and they see all their
efforts paralysed; when an army of thousands
finds itself delivered, bound hand and foot, into

CHAPTER X.

The retreat of the army, and its annihilation.

January 6th.—At last the fatal morning
dawned which was to witness the departure of
the Cabul force from the cantonments, in which
it had sustained a two months’ siege, to encoun-
ter the miseries of a winter march through a
country of perhaps unparalleled difficulty, where
every mountain defile, if obstinately defended
by a determined enemy, must inevitably prove
the grave of hundreds.

Dreary indeed was the scene, over which,
with drooping spirits and dismal forebodings,
we had to bend our unwilling steps. Deep
snow covered every inch of mountain and plain
with one unsplotched sheet of dazzling white, and
so intensely bitter was the cold, as to penetrate
and defy the defences of the warmest clothing.

No signs of the promised escort appeared:
but at an early hour the preparations commenced
for our march. A cut was made through the
eastern rampart, to open an additional passage
for the troops and baggage, a sufficient num-
ber of gun-wagons and platform planks were taken
down to the river for the formation of a tem-
porary bridge, and every available camel and ya-
bo (the whole amounting to 2000) was laden
with military stores, commissariat supplies, and
such small proportion of camp-equipage as was
indispensably necessary to shelter the troops in
a climate of extraordinary rigour.

The strength of the whole force at this time
was, so far as can now be ascertained, very
nearly as follows:—

1 troop of horse artillery 90
H. M.'s 44th foot 600
5th regt. light cavalry, 2
squad. 260
5th Shah's irreg. do. (An-
derson's) 500
Skinner's horse, 1 ressala 70
4th irreg. do. 1 do. 70
Mission escort, or body-
guard, 70
5th native infantry, 700
37th do. 600
54th do. 650
6th Shah's infantry 690
Sappers and miners 2840.
Shah's do. 240
Half the mountain train 30
Total 4500 fighting men.

6 horse artillery guns.
3 mountain train do.

Besides the above, the camp-followers
amounted, at a very moderate computation, to
about 12,000 men, besides women and children. These proved from the very first mile a serious cog upon our movements, and were, indeed, the main cause of our subsequent misfortunes. It is to be devoutly hoped that every future commander-in-chief of the Indian army will adopt decisive measures, to prevent a force employed on field service from being ever again afflicted with such a curse.

The order of march was as follows:

| H. M.'s 44th foot | The advance, under Brigadier Anquetil. |
| Sappers and miners | |
| 1st swiss light infantry | |
| 3rd mountain gun battalion | |
| The escort, with the ladies | |
| The invalids and sick | |
| 2 horse artillery guns | |
| Anderson's Irregular horse | |
| 37th native infantry, with treasure | |
| 5th native infantry, with baggage | |
| 54th native infantry | |
| 6th Shah's infantry | |
| 5th light cavalry | |
| 4 horse artillery guns | |

All being ready at 9 A.M., the advance commenced moving out. At this time not a single Afghan was to be seen in any direction, and the peaceful aspect of affairs gave rise to strong hopes that the chiefs intended to remain true to their engagements.

At 10 A.M. a message was brought from Nawab Jobbar Khan, requesting us to defer our departure another day, as his escort was not yet ready to accompany us. By this time, however, the greater part of the force was in motion, and a crowd of Afghans, who had issued from the village of Bemisroo, impatient for plunder, had forced their way into the northern cantonment, or Mission Compound (which, owing to some mistake, had been evacuated too soon by the Shah's 6th infantry), and were busily engaged in the work of pillage and destruction. The advance was delayed for upwards of an hour at the river, having found the temporary bridge incomplete; and it was noon ere the whole had crossed over, leaving a clear road for the main column to follow.

The order of march, in which the troops started, was, however, soon lost, and the camp-followers with the public and private baggage, once out of cantonments, could not be prevented from mixing themselves up with the troops, to the utter confusion of the whole column.

The main body, with its long train of laden camels, continued to pour out of the gate until the evening, by which time thousands of Afghans, the majority of whom were fanatical Ghazees, thronged the whole area of cantonments, rending the air with their exulting cries, and committing every kind of atrocity. The rear-guard, being unable to restrain them, was obliged to provide for its own safety by taking up a position outside, on the plain, where a great quantity of the baggage had been brought to a standstill at the canal (within 150 yards of the gate), whose slippery sides afforded no safe footing for the beasts of burden. The bridge across the river, being by this time impracticable, occasioned additional delay.

The Afghans, who had hitherto been too busily engaged in the work of plunder and destruction to take much notice of the troops, now began to line the ramparts, and annoy them with a mischievous fire of juzails, under which many fell; and it became necessary, for the preservation of those who remained, to spike and abandon two of the horse artillery guns.

Night had now closed around; but the Ghazees, having fired the residency and almost every other building in the cantonment, the confagration illuminated the surrounding country for several miles, presenting a spectacle of fearful sublimity. In the mad fervour of their religious zeal, these ignorant fanatics even set fire to the gun-carriages belonging to the various pieces of ordnance, which we had left in position round the works, of whose use the Afghan chiefs were thus luckily deprived. The General had been often urged to destroy these guns, rather than suffer them to fall into the enemy's hands, but he considered that it would have been a breach of the treaty to do so. Before the rear-guard commenced its march, Lt. Hardyman of the 5th light cavalry, with fifty rank and file, were stretched lifeless on the snow. Much baggage was abandoned at starting, and much was plundered on the road.

Scores of worn-out Sepoys and camp followers lined the way, having sat down in despair to perish in the snow. It was 2 A.M. ere the rear-guard reached camp at Bygram, a distance of only five miles. Here all was confusion. The tents had been pitched without the slightest regard to regularity, those of different regiments being huddled together in one intricate mass, mixed up with baggage, camp-followers, camels, and horses, in a way which beggars description. The flimsy canvas of the soldiers' tents was but a poor protection from the cold, which towards morning became more and more intense; and thousands of poor wretched creatures were obliged to lie down on the bare snow, without either shelter, fire, or food. Several died during the night; amongst whom was an European conductor of ordnance.

About twenty juzailchees, who still held faithfully by Capt. Mackenzie, suffered less than the rest, owing to their systematic mode of proceeding. Their first step on reaching the ground was to clear a small space from the snow, where they then laid themselves down in a circle, closely packed together, with their feet meeting in the centre; all the warm clothing they could muster among them being spread equally over the whole. By these simple means sufficient animal warmth was generated to preserve them from being frost-bitten; and Capt. Mackenzie, who himself shared their homely bed, declared that he had felt scarcely any inconvenience from the cold. It was different with our Sepoys and camp followers, who, having had no former experience of such hardships,
were ignorant how they might best provide against them, and the proportion of those who escaped, without suffering in some degree from frost-bites, was very small. Yet this was but the beginning of sorrows!

January 7th.—At 8 A.M. the force moved off in the reverse order of yesterday—if that could be called order which consisted of a mangled mob of soldiers, camp-followers, and baggage-cattle, preserving not even the faintest semblance of that regularity and discipline, on which depended our only chance of escape from the dangers which threatened us. Even at this early stage of the retreat scarcely one half of the Sepoys were fit for duty; hundreds had, from sheer inability to keep their ranks, joined the non-combatants, and thus increased the confusion. As for the Shah's 6th inf., it was no where to be found; only a few straggling files were perceptible here and there; and it was generally believed that the majority of the regiment had absconded during the night to Cabul.

At starting, large clods of hardened snow adhered so firmly to the hoofs of our horses, that a chisel and hammer would have been requisite to dislodge them. The very air we breathed froze in its passage out of the mouth and nostrils, forming a coating of small icicles on our moustaches and beards.

The advance proceeded onward without molestation, though numerous small bodies of Affghan horse and foot were observed hanging about our flanks, and moving in a parallel direction with ourselves. These were at first supposed to form a part of our escort, but the mistake was soon discovered by their attacking the rear-guard, commanded by Brigadier Anquetil, consisting of H. M.'s 44th, Lieut. Green's mountain train guns, and a squadron of irregular horse. Much baggage fell into the enemy's hands, who, though in some degree kept in check by the guns, exhibited a bold front, and maintained a harassing fire on our troops, whose movements were terribly crippled by the disorderly multitude that thronged the road in front. The latter being for several minutes brought to a stand-still by a deep water-cut which intersected the road, the mountain-train guns endeavoured to pass clear of them by making a short detour, in doing which they got separated from the infantry, and—one happening at this unlucky moment to upset—the enemy seized the opportunity to rush forward and capture them, before H. M.'s 44th, who saw too late their awkward predicament, could render effectual assistance.

Their re-capture might still have been effected, could the soldiers have been prevailed upon to make the attempt, a gallant example being shown them by Lieut Green and his few artillerymen, who made a sudden charge upon the foe and spiked the guns, but, not being supported, were obliged a second time to abandon them. Lieut. White, the Adjutant of H. M.'s 44th, received a severe wound through the face on this occasion.

Brigadier Anquetil now sent to the front for reinforcements, which, however, it was found impracticable to furnish, from the crowded state of the road. The Affghan horse shortly after this charged into the very midst of the column of baggage, and carried off large quantities of plunder, creating the greatest confusion and dismay. Numbers fell from wounds, and still greater numbers from mere bodily weakness produced by cold, fasting, and fatigue. It was found necessary to spike and abandon two more horse-artillery guns, which the horses were found perfectly incapable of dragging any further through the deep snow.

On the arrival of the advance at Bootckhak, the General, having been informed that the rear was in danger of being entirely cut off, ordered a halt, and sent back all the troops that could be spared, together with the remaining guns, to drive off the enemy, who had now assembled in great numbers in the rear, and were proceeding to crown some heights on the right commanding the road. This was, however, prevented by our troops under Brigadier Shelton, who took possession of the nearer heights, and kept the enemy in check for upwards of an hour. On this occasion, Lieut. Shaw, of the 54th N. L., was wounded severely in the thigh. Meanwhile Capt. Skinner had fallen in with a follower of Mahomed Akber Khan, from whom having learned that the chief was encamped near at hand, he accompanied the man to his master's presence. Mahomed Akber now informed Captain Skinner that he had been sent by the chiefs to escort us to Jellalabad, and declared that we had been attacked in consequence of having marched contrary to their wishes. He insisted on our halting at Bootckhak till the following morning, in which case he would provide food, forage, and firewood for the troops; but he said that he should expect six hostages to insure our not marching beyond Tezeen, before tidings should be received of Gen. Sale's evacuation of Jellalabad, for which an order had been already despatched to that officer, in compliance with the stipulations of the treaty.

These terms having been agreed to, the firing ceased for the present, and the force came to a halt on some high ground near the entrance of the Khooord-Cabul pass, having in two days accomplished a distance of only ten miles from Cabul.

Here, again, the confusion soon became indescribable. Suffice it to say that an immense multitude of from 14,000 to 16,000 men, with several hundred cavalry horses and baggage cattle, were closely jammed together in one monstrous, unmanageable, jumbling, mass. Night again closed over us, with its attendant train of horrors—starvation, cold, exhaustion, death; and of all deaths I can imagine none more agonizing than that, where a nipping frost tortures every sensitive limb, until the tenacious spirit itself sinks under the exquisite extreme of human suffering.
January 8th.—At an early hour the treacherous Afghans again commenced to molest us with their fire, and several hundreds having assembled in hostile array to the south of the camp, the troops were drawn up in expectation of an attack. Major Thain, putting himself at the head of the 44th foot, and exhorting the men to follow him, led them boldly on to the attack; but the enemy did not think proper to await the shock of bayonets, and effected a hasty retreat. In this business it is satisfactory to be able to state that H. M.'s 44th foot behaved with a resolution and gallantry worthy of British soldiers, and plainly proved that, under an able and judicious leader, they could yet redeem their injured reputation.

Capt. Skinner again went to communicate with Mahomed Akber Khan, who demanded that Major Pottinger and Capts. Lawrence and Mackenzie should immediately be made over to him, which was accordingly done, and hostilities again ceased; the Sirdar promising to send forward some influential men to clear the path from the Giljyes, who occupied it, and were lying in wait for our approach. Once more the living mass of men and animals was in motion. At the entrance of the pass an attempt was made to separate the troops from the non-combatants, which was but partially successful, and created considerable delay. The rapid effects of two nights' exposure to the frost in disorganizing the force can hardly be conceived. It had so nipped the hands and feet of even the strongest men, as to completely prostrate their powers and incapacitate them for service; even the cavalry, who suffered less than the rest, were obliged to be lifted on their horses. In fact only a few hundred serviceable fighting men remained.

The idea of threading the stupendous pass before us, in the face of an armed tribe of bloodthirsty barbarians, with such a dense irregular multitude, was frightful, and the spectacle then presented by that waving sea of animated beings, the majority of whom a few fleeting hours would transform into a line of lifeless carcasses to guide the future traveller on his way, can never be forgotten by those who witnessed it. We had so often been deceived by Afghan professions, that little or no confidence was placed in the present truce; and we commenced our passage through the dreaded pass in no very sanguine temper of mind. This truly formidable defile is about five miles from end to end, and is shut in on either hand by a line of lofty hills, between whose precipitous sides the sun at this season could dart but a momentary ray. Down the centre dashed a mountain torrent, whose impetuous course the frost in vain attempted to arrest, though it succeeded in lining the edges with thick layers of ice, over which the snow lay consolidated in slippery masses, affording no very easy footing for our jaded animals. This stream we had to cross and recross about eight-and-twenty times. As we proceeded onwards, the defile gradually narrowed, and the Giljyes were observed hastening to crown the heights in considerable force. A hot fire was opened on the advance, with whom were several ladies, who, seeing their only chance was to keep themselves in rapid motion, galloped forward at the head of all, running the gauntlet of the enemy's bullets, which whizzed in hundreds about their ears, until they were fairly out of the pass. Providentially the whole escaped, with the exception of Lady Sale, who received a slight wound in the arm. It ought, however, to be mentioned, that several of Mahomed Akber's chief adherents, who had preceded the advance, exerted themselves strenuously to keep down the fire; but nothing could restrain the Giljyes, who seemed fully determined that nobody should interfere to disappoint them of their prey. Onward moved the crowd into the thickest of the fire, and fearful was the slaughter that ensued. An universal panic speedily prevailed, and thousands, seeking refuge in flight, hurried forward to the front, abandoning baggage, arms, ammunition, women, and children, regardless for the moment of every thing but their own lives.

The rear-guard, consisting of H. M.'s 44th and 54th N. I., suffered severely; and at last, finding that delay was only destruction, they followed the general example, and made the best of their way to the front. Another horse-artillery gun was abandoned, and the whole of its artillery-men slain. Capt. Anderson's eldest girl, and Capt. Boyd's youngest boy, fell into the hands of the Afghans. It is supposed that 3000 souls perished in the pass, amongst whom were Capt. Paton, Assist. Qr.-Mast.-Gen.; and Lieut. St. George, 37th N. I.—Major Griffiths, 37th N. I., and Scott, H. M.'s 44th; Capts. Bott, 5th cavalry, and Trqoup, Brigadier-Major Shah's force, Dr. Cardew and Lieut. Sturt, engineers, were wounded, the latter mortally. This fine young officer had nearly cleared the defile when he received his wound, and would have been left on the ground to be hacked to pieces by the Ghazees, who followed in the rear to complete the work of slaughter, but for the generous intrepidity of Lieut. Mein of H. M.'s 13th light infantry, who, on learning what had befallen him, went back to his succour, and stood by him for several minutes, at the imminent risk of his own life, vainly entreating aid from the passers by. He was at length joined by Serjt. Deane of the Sappers, with whose assistance he dragged his friend on a quilt through the remainder of the pass, when he succeeded in mounting him on a miserable pony, and conducted him in safety to camp, where the unfortunate officer lingered till the following morning, and was the only man of the whole force who received Christian burial. Lieut. Mein was himself at this very time suffering from a dangerous wound in the head received in the previous October, and his heroic disregard of self, and fidelity to his friend in the hour of danger, are well deserving of a
record in the annals of British valour and virtue.

On the force reaching Khoord-Cabul, snow began to fall, and continued till morning. Only four small tents were saved, of which one belonged to the General: two were devoted to the ladies and children, and one was given up to the sick; but an immense number of poor wounded wretches wandered about the camp destitute of shelter, and perished during the night. Groans of misery and distress assailed the ear from all quarters. We had ascended to a still colder climate than we had left behind, and were without tents, fuel, or food: the snow was the only bed for all, and of many, ere morning, it proved the winding-sheet. It is only marvellous that any should have survived that fearful night!

January 9th.—Another morning dawned, awakening thousands to increased misery; and many a wretched survivor cast looks of envy at his comrades, who lay stretched beside him in the quiet sleep of death. Daylight was the signal for a renewal of that confusion, which attended every movement of the force. The General had intended us to march at 10 A.M., but a large portion of the troops, with nearly all the camp followers, moved off without orders at 8 A.M., and had advanced about a mile from the camp, when they were recalled by the General, in consequence of a communication from Mahomed Akber Khan, who promised to use every endeavour to furnish us with supplies; but strongly recommended us to halt until he could make some proper arrangements for escorting us down safely. There can be no doubt that the general feeling in camp was adverse to a halt, there being scarcely even a native soldier, who did not plainly perceive that our only chance of escape consisted in moving on as fast as possible. This additional delay, therefore, and prolongation of their sufferings in the snow, of which one more march would have carried them clear, made a very unfavourable impression on the minds of the native soldiers, who now for the first time began very generally to entertain the idea of deserting; nor is it at all astonishing that these symptoms should have first developed themselves amongst the Shah's native cavalry, who were, for the most part, exceedingly young soldiers, and fore-saw full well the fatal result of all these useless and pernicious delays. The love of life is strong in every breast.

These men hitherto behaved remarkably well, notwithstanding the numerous efforts that had been made to detach them from their duty; and, if their fealty at last gave place to the instinct of self-preservation, be it remembered in their favour, that it was not until the position of the force, of which they formed a part, had become altogether desperate beyond the reach of cure.

Towards noon Capt. Skinner arrived in camp with a proposition from Mahomed Akber Khan that all the widowed ladies and married families, whose destitute situation in camp rendered them objects of universal pity and sympathy, should at once be made over to his protection, to preserve them from further hardships and dangers; in this case he promised to escort them down safely, keeping them one day's march in rear of the army. The General, though not himself disposed to place much confidence in Mahomed Akber's friendly professions, was strongly recommended by Capt. Skinner to trust him on the present occasion, as he felt assured that such a mark of confidence would be attended with happy results to the whole force. Anxious at all events to save the ladies and children from further suffering, the General gave his consent to the arrangement, and told Capt. Skinner to prepare all the married officers and ladies to depart immediately with a party of Afghan horse, who were in waiting to receive them. His intention also was that all the wounded officers in camp should have had the option of availing themselves of the same opportunity to seek Mahomed Akber's protection; but the others were hurried off by the Afghans before this had become generally known, and only two were in time to join them.*

Up to this time scarcely one of the ladies had tasted a meal since leaving Cabul. Some had infants a few days old at the breast, and were unable to stand without assistance. Others were so far advanced in pregnancy, that, under ordinary circumstances, a walk across a drawing-room would have been an exertion; yet these helpless women, with their young families, had already been obliged to rough it on the backs of camels, and on the tops of the baggage yahooos: those who had a horse to ride, or were capable of sitting on one, were considered fortunate indeed. Most had been without shelter since quitting the cantonment—their servants had nearly all deserted or been killed—and, with the exception of Lady Macnaghten and Mrs. Trevor, they had lost all their baggage, having nothing in the world left but the clothes on their backs; those, in the case of some of the invalids, consisted of night dresses in which they had started from Cabul in their litters. Under such circumstances a few more hours would probably have seen some of them stiffening corse. The offer of Mahomed Akber was consequently their only chance of preservation. The husbands, better clothed and hardy, would have infinitely preferred taking their chance with the troops; but where is the man who would prefer his own safety, when he thought he could by his presence assist and console those near and dear to him?

It is not therefore wonderful that, from per-


Lieuts. Waller and Eyre were likewise suffering from severe and painful wounds received in action at Cabul, which totally disabled them from active service.
sons so circumstanced, the General's proposal should have met with little opposition, although it was a matter of serious doubt whether the whole were not rushing into the very jaws of death, by placing themselves at the mercy of a man, who had so lately imbued his hands in the blood of a British Envoy, whom he had lured to destruction by similar professions of peace and good-will.

But whatever may have been the secret intent of Akber’s heart, he was at this time our prosed friend and ally, having undertaken to escort the whole force to Jellalabad in safety. Whatever suspicions, therefore, have been entertained of his hypocrisy, it was not in the character of an enemy that he gained possession of the married families; on the contrary, he stood pledged for their safe escort to Jellalabad, no less than for that of the army to which they belonged; and by their unwarrantable detention as prisoners, no less than by the treacherous massacre of the force, he broke the universal law of nations, and was guilty of an unpardonable breach of faith. Shortly after the departure of the married families, it was discovered that the troopers of the Shah’s irregular cavalry and of the mission escort were deserting in great numbers, having been enticed away, as was supposed, by Mahomed Akber, to whom a message of remonstrance was in consequence sent. He assured the General, in reply, that not only would he refrain from enticing the men away, but that every future deserter from our camp should be shot.

Meanwhile a large body of Aflghan horse had been observed in the vicinity of the camp, in company with the cavalry deserters; and, fears being entertained that it was their design to attack the camp, a general parade of the troops was ordered for the purpose of repelling them. The 44th foot at this time was found to muster 100 files, and the native infantry regiments, on an average, about 60 files each. Of the Irregular Horse not above 100 effective troopers remained, and the 5th Light Cavalry, though more faithful to their salt, had been reduced by casualties to about 70 fighting men. On the arrival of Mahomed Akber’s answer to the General’s message, the opportunity was taken of the troops being paraded, to explain to them its purport, and to warn them that every man, who might be discovered deserting, would be shot. At this very time, a Chupprassie of the mission, being caught in the act, was instantly shot, as an example to the rest, by order of the General, and the crime thus received a salutary check. Capt. Mackay, having been chosen to convey to Gen. Sale a fresh order for the evacuation of Jellalabad, was sent over in the evening to the Sirdar with that view. The promises of Mahomed Akber to provide food and fuel were unfulfilled, and another night of starvation and cold consigned more victims to a miserable death.

January 10th.—At break of day all was again confusion, the troops and camp-followers crowding promiscuously to the front, so soon as the orders for a march were given, every one dreading, above all things, to be left in the rear. The European soldiers were now almost the only efficient men left, the Hindoostanee having all suffered more or less from the effects of frost in their hands and feet; few were able even to hold a musket, much less to pull a trigger; in fact, the prolonged delay in the snow had paralysed the mental and bodily powers of the strongest men, rendering them incapable of any useful exertion. Hope seemed to have died in every breast. The wildness of terror was exhibited in every countenance.

The advanced guard (consisting of H. M.’s 44th foot, the sole remaining horse artillery gun, and about fifty troopers of the 6th cavalry) having managed, with much difficulty, to push their way to the front, proceeded a couple of miles without molestation, as far as a narrow gorge between the precipitous spurs of two hills, through which flowed a small stream. Towards this point numbers of Aflghan foot had been observed hurrying, with the evident intention of opposing the passage of the troops, and were now found to occupy the height on the right in considerable force. No sooner did the advance approach within shot, than the enemy, securely perched on their post of vantage, commenced the attack, pouring a destructive fire upon the crowded column, as it slowly drew nigh to the fatal spot. Fresh numbers fell at every volley, and the gorge was soon choked with the dead and dying: the unfortunate Sepoys, seeing no means of escape, and driven to utter desperation, cast away their arms and accoutrements, which only clogged their movements without contributing to their defence, and along with the camp-followers fled for their lives. The Aflghans now rushed down upon their helpless and unresisting victims sword in hand, and a general massacre took place. The last small remnant of the Native Infantry regiments were here scattered and destroyed; and the public treasure, with all the remaining baggage, fell into the hands of the enemy. Meanwhile, the advance, after pushing through the Tungee with great loss, had reached Khebrur-i-Jubbar, about five miles ahead, without more opposition. Here they halted to enable the rear to join, but from the few stragglers who from time to time came up, the astounding truth was brought to light, that, of all who had that morning marched from Khoord-Cabul, they were almost the sole survivors, nearly the whole of the main and rear columns having been cut off and destroyed. About 50 horse artillery-men, with one twelve-pounder howitzer, 70 files H. M.’s 44th, and 150 cavalry troopers, now composed the whole Cabul force; but, notwithstanding the slaughter and dispersion that had taken place, the camp-followers still formed a considerable body.

The approach of a party of Aflghan horse induced the General to draw up his little force in line, preparatory to an expected attack; but on its being ascertained to be Mahomed Akber
Khan and his followers, Captain Skinner was despatched to remonstrate with him on the attack on our troops, after a treaty had been entered into, and their safety guaranteed.

In reply, he expressed his regret at what had occurred, but said that, notwithstanding all his endeavours, he found it impossible to restrain the Giljies, who were in such a state of excitement as to be beyond the control even of their own chiefs. As a last resource, he recommended that the few remaining troops should lay down their arms, and place themselves entirely under his safeguard, in which case he could ensure their safe escort to Jellalabad; but that as the camp-followers still amounted to some thousands, and far outnumbered his own people, there was no alternative but to leave them to their fate. To these terms the General could not bring himself to consent, and the desperate march was resumed. Here Captain Mackay rejoined the troops, as the Sirdar considered it impossible for him at present to make his way safe to Jellalabad.

About five more miles led down the steep descents of the Huft Kotul, into a narrow defile, or confined bed of a mountain stream. A ghastly sight here met the eye, the ground being strewn with the bodies of a number of camp-followers, with whom were several wounded officers and soldiers, who, having gone on ahead of the column, were attacked on reaching the foot of the hill, and massacred. The heights commanding the defile (which was about three miles long) were found crowned with the enemy. Mahomed Akber and his train had taken a short cut over the hills to Tezeen, and were followed by the few remaining troopers of the Irregular Cavalry. Dr. Magrath, seeing them take, as he thought, a wrong direction, hastened to recall them, and was taken prisoner by a Giljie chief. In their passage down the defile, a destructive fire was maintained on the troopers from the heights on either side, and fresh numbers of dead and wounded lined the course of the stream. Brigadier Shelton commanded the rear with a few Europeans, and but for his persevering energy and unflinching fortitude in repelling the assailants, it is probable the whole would have been there sacrificed.

The diminished remnant reached the encamping ground in the Tezeen valley at about 4 p.m., having lost since starting from Cabul, inclusive of camp-followers, about 12,000 men; no less than 15 officers were killed and wounded in this day's disastrous march.

Although it was now sufficiently plain that Mahomed Akber either could not or would not act up to his friendly professions, the General endeavoured to renew his worse than useless negotiation with that chief, in the faint hope that something might still be done to better the situation of the troops; but Capt. Skinner, who was deputed on the occasion, returned with precisely the same answer as before; and as the General could not in honour accede to his proposal, all hope of aid from that quarter was at an end.

It was now determined to make an effort, under cover of darkness, to reach Jugduulkul, a distance of twenty-two miles, by an early hour on the following morning, the principal object being to get through the strong and dangerous pass of that place, before the enemy should have sufficient notice of their intention, to occupy it in any force. As there existed a short cut from Tezeen to Jugduulkul over the hills, the success of the attempt was very doubtful; but the lives of all depended on the issue; and at 7 p.m. the little band renewed its forlorn and dismal march, word having been previously sent to Mahomed Akber that it was the General's intention to move only as far as Seh Baba, distant seven miles. On moving off, the last gun was abandoned, and with it Dr. Cardew, who had been lashed to it in the hope of saving him. This gentleman had rendered himself conspicuous from the commencement of the siege for his zeal and gallantry, and had become a great favourite with the soldiery in consequence, by whom his hapless fate was sincerely lamented. Dr. Duff, the superintendent surgeon of the force, experienced no better fortune, being left in a state of utter exhaustion on the road midway to Seh Baba. Little or no molestation was experienced by the force until reaching Seh Baba, when a few shots being fired at the rear, there was an immediate rush of camp-followers to the front, and the main body of the 44th European soldiers, who had hitherto been well in advance, getting mixed up in the crowd, could not be extricated by withdrawing them to the rear, owing to the narrowness of the road, which now traversed the hills to Burik-âb. Bodies of the neighbouring tribes were by this time on the alert, and fired at random from the heights, it being fortunately too dark for them to aim with precision; but the panic-stricken camp-followers now resembled a herd of startled deer, and fluctuated backwards and forwards, en masse, at every shot, blocking up the entire road, and fatally retarding the progress of the little body of soldiers who, under Brigadier Shelton, brought up the rear.

At Burik-âb a heavy fire was encountered by the hindmost from some caves near the roadside, occasioning fresh disorder, which continued all the way to Kutter-Sung, where the advance arrived at dawn of day, and awaited the junction of the rear, which did not take place till 8 A.M.

January 11th.—The distance from Jugduulkul was still ten miles; the enemy already began to crown the surrounding heights, and it was now evident that the delay occasioned by the camp-followers had cut off the last chance of escape.

From Kutter-Sung to Jugduulkul it was one continued conflict; Brigadier Shelton, with his brave little band in the rear, holding overwhelming numbers in check, and literally performing wonders. But no efforts could avail to ward off the withering fire of juzails, which from all sides assailed the crowded column, lining the road with bleeding carcasses. About 3 p.m. the advance reached Jugduulkul, and
took up its position behind some ruined walls that crowned a height by the road-side. To show an imposing front, the officers extended themselves in line, and Capt. Grant, Asst.-Adjt.-Gen., at the same moment, received a wound in the face. From this eminence they cheered their comrades under Brigadier Shelton in the rear, as they still struggled their way gallantly along every foot of ground, perseveringly followed up by their merciless enemy, until they arrived at their ground. But even here rest was denied them; for the Affghans, immediately occupying two hills which commanded the position, kept up a fire from which the walls of the enclosure afforded but a partial shelter.

The exhausted troops and followers now began to suffer greatly from thirst, which they were unable to satisfy. A tempting stream trickled near the foot of the hill, but to venture down to it was certain death. Some snow that covered the ground was eagerly devoured, but increased instead of alleviating, their sufferings. The raw flesh of three bullocks, which had fortunately been saved, was served out to the soldiers, and ravenously swallowed. At about half past three a message having been brought from Mahomed Akber to Capt. Skinner requesting his presence, that officer promptly obeyed the call, hoping thereby, even at the eleventh hour, to effect some arrangement for the preservation of those who survived. The harassed and worn-out troops, in the expectation of a temporary truce during his absence, threw themselves down to snatch a brief repose; but even this much-needed luxury was denied them by their vigilant foes, who now, from their commanding position, poured into the crowded enclosure death-dealing volleys in rapid succession, causing the utmost consternation among the terrified followers, who rushed wildly out in the vain hope of finding shelter from the fire. At this perilous juncture Capt. Bygrave, with about fifteen brave Europeans, sallied forth in the full determination to drive the enemy from the heights, or perish in the attempt. Unflinchingly they charged up the hill, the enemy retreating before them in the greatest trepidation. The respite, however, thus signal gain was of but short duration, for the heroic little band had no sooner returned, than the enemy reoccupied their posts of vantage, and resumed their fatal fire. Thus passed the time until 5 p.m., when Capt. Skinner returned from his interview with Mahomed Akber, bringing a message to the General from that chief, who requested his presence at a conference, and demanded Brigadier Shelton and Capt. Johnson as hostages for the evacuation of Jellalabad. The General, seeing no alternative, made over temporary command to Brigadier Anquetil, and departed with the two above-named officers under the escort of Mahomed Shah Khan. The troops witnessed their departure with despair, having seen enough of Affghan treachery, to convince them that these repeated negotiations were mere hollow artifices, designed to engender confidence in their victims, preparatory to a fresh sacrifice of blood. The General and his companions were received by the Sirdar with every outward token of kindness, and no time was lost in supplying them with the bodily sustenance they so greatly needed; they were likewise assured that immediate arrangements should be made for the supply of food to the famishing troops, and for their safe escort to Jellalabad, after which they were shown into a small tent, to enjoy, for the first time since leaving Khoor-d-Cabul, a quiet and refreshing sleep.

January 12th. — Numerous Giljye chiefs, with their attendant clansmen, flocked in from the neighbouring parts to pay their homage to Mahomed Akber; and about 9 a.m. a conference was held, at which the three British officers and all the influential chiefs were present. All the latter were loud and profuse in their expressions of bitter hatred against the English, and for a long time the Sirdar’s efforts to conciliate them seemed to be unsuccessful; but the offer of two lacs of rupees appeared at last in some measure to appease them, of which sum Mahomed Akber promised to advance one lac himself, and to be security for the other. The day nevertheless wore on without any thing decisive having been agreed upon. The General became impatient to rejoin his force, and repeatedly urged the Sirdar to furnish him with the necessary escort, informing him at the same time that it was contrary to British notions of military honour, that a general should be separated from his troops in the hour of danger; and that he would infinitely prefer death to such a disgrace. The Sirdar put him off with promises, and at 7 a.m., firing being heard in the direction of the pass, it was ascertained that the troops, impatient of further delay, had actually moved off. From the time of the General’s departure the situation of the troops had been in truth one of dark and cruel suspense, unequake

ed by one solitary ray of hope. At an early hour in the morning, before the enemy had yet made their appearance on the hills, Major Thain, accompanied by Capt. Skinner, rode out a few hundred paces in the direction of Mahomed Akber’s camp, in expectation of meeting a messenger from the Sirdar to the last named officer; a Giljye soldier suddenly made his appearance, and, passing Major Thain, who was several yards in advance, went close up to Capt. Skinner, and shot him with a pistol through the face. Major Thain instantly returned to camp, and announced this act of treachery. The unfortunate officer was carried inside the enclosure, and lingered in great pain till 8 a.m. In him the state lost an officer of whose varied merits as a soldier and a man it is difficult to speak too highly. A deep feeling of anguish and despair now pervaded the whole assemblage. The extremes of hunger, thirst, and fatigue were suffered alike by all; added to which, the Affghans again crowned the heights and recommenced hostilities, keeping up a galling fire the whole day with scarcely half an hour’s intermission.
Sally after sally was made by the Europeans, bravely led on by Major Thain, Capt. Bygrave, and Lieuts. Wade and Macartney; but again and again the enemy returned to worry and destroy. Night came, and all further delay in such a place being useless, the whole saluted forth, determined to pursue the route to Jellalabad at all risks.

The sick and wounded were necessarily abandoned to their fate. Descending into the valley of Jugdulluk, they pursued their way along the bed of the stream for about a mile and a half, encountering a desultory fire from the Giljyes encamped in the vicinity, who were evidently not quite prepared to see them at such an hour, but were soon fully on the alert, some following up the rear, others pressing forward to occupy the pass. This formidable defile is about two miles long, exceedingly narrow, and closed in by lofty precipitous heights. The road has a considerable slope upwards, and, on nearing the summit, further progress was found to be obstructed by two strong barriers formed of branches of the prickly holly-oak, stretching completely across the defile. Immense delay and confusion took place in the general struggle to force a passage through these unexpected obstacles, which gave ample time for the Giljyes to collect in force.

A terrible fire was now poured in from all quarters, and a massacre even worse than that of Tunga Tareekoo commenced, the Afghans rushing in furiously upon the pent-up crowd of troops and followers, and committing wholesale slaughter. A miserably small remnant managed to clear the barriers. Twelve officers,* amongst whom was Brigadier Anquetil, were killed. Upwards of forty† others succeeded in pushing through, about twelve‡ of whom, being pretty well mounted, rode on ahead of the rest with the few remaining cavalry, intending to make the best of their way to Jellalabad. Small straggling parties of the Europeans marched on under different officers; the country became more open, and they suffered little molestation for several miles, most of the Giljyes being too busily engaged in the plundering of the dead to pursue the living. But much delay was occasioned by the anxiety of the men to bring on their wounded comrades, and the rear was much harassed by sudden onsets from parties stationed on the heights, under which the road occasionally wound. On reaching the Sourkab river, they found the enemy in possession of the bridge, and a hot fire was encountered in crossing the ford below it, by which Lieut. Cadet, H. M.'s 44th, was killed, together with several privates.

January 13th.—The morning dawned as they approached Gundamuk, revealing to the enemy, who had by this time increased considerably in their front and rear, the insignificance of their numerical strength. To avoid the vigorous assaults that were now made by their confident foe, they were compelled to leave the road, and take up a defensive position on the height to the left of it, where they made a resolute stand, determined to sell their lives at the dearest possible price. At this time they could only muster about twenty muskets.

Some Afghans horsemen, approaching from the direction of Gundamuk, were now beckoned to, and an attempt was made by Lieut. Hay to enter upon some specific arrangement. Hostilities were for a few minutes suspended, and, at the invitation of a chief, Major Griffiths, the senior officer, accompanied by Mr. Blewitt to act as interpreter, descended the hill to a conference.

Several Afghans now ascended the height, and assumed a friendly tone towards the little party there stationed; but the calm was of short duration, for the soldiers, getting provoked at several attempts being made to snatch away their arms, resumed a hostile attitude, and drove the intruders fiercely down. The die was now cast, and their fate sealed; for the enemy, taking up their post on an opposite hill, marked off man after man, officer after officer, with unerring aim. Parties of Afghans rushed up at intervals to complete the work of extermination, but were as often driven back by the still dauntless handful of invincibles. At length, nearly all being wounded more or less, a final onset of the enemy, sword in hand, terminated the unequal struggle, and completed the dismal tragedy. Major Griffiths and Mr. Blewitt had been previously led off to a neighbouring fort, and were thus saved. Of those whom they left behind, Captain Souter alone, with three or four privates, was spared, and carried off captive, having received a severe wound in the shoulder; he had tied round his waist before leaving Jugdulluk the colours of his regiment, which were thus miraculously preserved.

It only remains to relate the fate of those few officers and men, who rode on ahead of the rest after passing the barriers. Six of the twelve officers, Capts. Bellew, Collier, Hopkins, Lieut. Bird, Drs. Harpur, and Brydon, reached Futtubah in safety, the other six having dropped gradually off by the way and been destroyed. Deceived by the friendly professions of some peasants near the above-named town, who brought them bread to eat, they unwisely delayed a few moments to satisfy the cravings of hunger; the inhabitants meanwhile armed themselves, and, suddenly salying forth, cut down Capt. Bellew and Lieut. Bird; Capts. Collier and Hopkins, and Drs. Harpur and Brydon, rode off, and were pursued; the three former were overtaken and slain within four miles of Jellalabad; Dr. Brydon by a miracle escaped, and was the only officer of the whole Cabul force, who reached that garrison in safety.

Such was the memorable retreat of the British army from Cabul, which, viewed in all its circumstances,—in the military conduct which preceded and brought about such a consummation, the treachery, disaster, and suffering which accompanied it,—is, perhaps, without a parallel in history.

* Appendix. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid.
ROUGH NOTES

DURING

IMPRISONMENT IN AFGHANISTAN.
EDITOR'S NOTICE.

The following "rough notes" will be found a very interesting sequel to the foregoing narrative. They are strictly what they profess to be—penned in haste, to be despatched when opportunity should serve, as perhaps the last proof of his existence, which the writer might give his friends for many a day. How narrowly the Cabul prisoners did at last escape an indefinitely prolonged captivity, is known to all. And now that a gracious Providence has restored them, it is hoped that the Author will, at a future opportunity, be enabled to add more particulars of an every-day life with such a party in an Affghan prison, and to fill up the gap which necessarily now remains between the 28th of June, when these Notes break off, and the 21st of September, on which happy day they again breathed the air of freedom.

January 9th.—In my notes on the retreat of the British force from Cabul, I have already mentioned the departure, from Gen. Elphinstone's camp at Khoord-Cabul, of the ladies, with their husbands and other officers, to the proffered protection of Mahomed Akber Khan; but it may be expedient briefly to remind the reader of the mode in which this event was brought about. I have been assured by Major Pottinger that, on the night of the 8th, the Sirdar, having spontaneously entered on the subject, expressed to that officer his serious apprehensions of the peril to which the ladies and children would be exposed by remaining in camp (it being impossible to restrain the Giljyes from a continuance of hostilities), and that, with a view to prevent further misery and suffering to the individuals in question, he should lose no time in proposing to the General that all the ladies and married families might be made over to his care for safe escort to Jellalabad, keeping one march in rear of the army. Major Pottinger having declared his entire approval of the Sirdar's humane intentions, advantage was taken of Capt. Skinner's return to camp on the following morning, to make known the proposal to Gen. Elphinstone; and a small party of Affghan horse was sent with him, to escort all such as might be able to avail themselves of the offer. The General, hoping that so signal a mark of confidence in Mahomed Akber's good faith, might be attended with beneficial results to the army, and anxious at all events to save the ladies from a prolongation of the hardships they had already endured, readily consented to the arrangement; and, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, deemed it incumbent on him to send his husbands also, more especially as some were helpless from severe wounds. The whole were accordingly ordered to depart immediately with the Affghan escort, by whom we were impatiently hurried off, before the majority had been made clearly to comprehend the reason of their being so suddenly separated from their companions in trouble. At that time so little confidence was placed by any of us in

* Lady Macnaghten,
Lady Sale,*
Mrs. Sturt, her daughter,
Capt. Boyd, wife, and child,
Capt. Anderson, ditto, ditto,
Lieut. Waller,* ditto, ditto,
Lieut. Eyre,* ditto, ditto,
Mr. Ryley, ditto, ditto,
Mrs. Trevor and seven children,
Mrs. Mainwaring and child,
Capt. Troup,*
Lieut. Mein,*
Serjt. Wade and family.

N.B. Those marked thus * were wounded.
Mahomed Akber's plausible professions, that it seemed as though we were but too probably rushing from a state of comparative safety into the very jaws of destruction; but, placing our dependence on a watchful Providence, we bade a hasty, and as it proved to many, an eternal, farewell to our friends, and mournfully followed our conductors to the place allotted for our reception, about two miles distant from camp. The road lay through ravines and wilds of the most savage description, one universal garb of snow clothing the dreary and uninventing scene. On the way we passed several hundred Giljye horse drawn up in line, as if in readiness for an attack on the camp. Half an hour's ride brought us to a small fort perched on the edge of a precipitous bank, which we ascended by a slanting slippery path, and entered the gate with a mistrust by no means diminished by the ferocious looks of the garrison, amidst a circle of whom some of us were kept standing for several minutes, during which our sensations were far from agreeable. At last, however, we were shown into a small inner court, where, to our great relief, we found our three countrymen, Major Pottinger, and Capts. Mackenzie and Lawrence, who had been made over as hostages to Bootkhak, and in the midst of whom sat, to the inexpressible joy of his parents, the youngest boy of Capt. and Mrs. Boyd, who, having been picked up in the Khoord-Cabul pass on the previous day by one of Mahomed Akber's followers, had been committed by that chief to Major Pottinger's protection. The accommodation provided for us, though the best the place afforded, was of the most humble description, consisting of three small dark hovels, into which ladies and gentlemen were promiscuously crowded together, the bachelors being, however, separate from the married families. But even this state of things was heaven itself compared with the cold and misery we had been suffering in camp on the bare snow, and we felt most thankful for the change. The court-yard was all day crowded with the friends and relations of Mahomed Akber, whose bearing towards us was exceedingly kind and courteous; but their presence obliged the ladies to remain closely imured in their dark cells. In the course of the afternoon the chief himself made his appearance, and, having requested an interview with Lady Macaigntgh, expressed to that lady his sorrow at having been instrumental to her present misfortunes, and his desire to contribute to her comfort as long as she remained his guest. But an Afghan nobleman's ideas of comfort fall very far short of an English peasant's; and we soon learned to consider spoons, forks, and other table gear as effeminate luxuries, and plunged our fingers unhesitatingly into the depths of a greasy pilao, for which several of us scrambled out of one common dish. The warmth of a wood* fire, though essential to protect us from the severe extremes of cold, could only be enjoyed at the expense of being blinded and halitified by the smoke; the bare ground was our only bed, and postheens (or sheepskin cloaks) our only covering; but these and various other inconveniences were indeed of small moment, when weighed in the balance against the combination of horrors we had escaped, and which still encompassed our unhappy countrymen and fellow-soldiers in camp.

January 11th.—At about 11 A.M. we started, under an escort of about 50 horse, for Tezeen, having been previously cautioned to use our swords and pistols in case of need, as an attack might be expected from the blood-thirsty Ghazees who thronged the road. The retreating army had marched over the same ground on the previous day, and terrible was the spectacle presented to our eyes along the whole line of road: the snow was absolutely dyed with streaks and patches of blood for whole miles, and at every step we encountered the mangled bodies of British and Hindostanee soldiers, and helpless camp-followers, lying side by side, victims of one treacherous undistinguishing fate, the red stream of life still trickling from many a gaping wound inflicted by the merciless Afghan knife. Here and there small groups of miserable, starving, and frost-bitten wretches, among whom were many women and children, were still permitted to cling to life, perhaps only because death would in their case have been a mercy. The bodies of Major Scott and Ewart, and of Dr. Bryces, were recognised. Numerous parties of truculent Ghazees, the chief perpetrators of these horrors, passed us laden with booty, their naked swords still reeking with the blood of their victims. They uttered deep curses and sanguinary threats at our party, and seemed disappointed that so many of the hated Feringhees should have been suffered to survive. We reached Tezeen, a distance of sixteen miles, at close of day, where the fort of Mahomed Khan received us for the night. Here we found Lieut. Melville of the 54th N. I., who had delivered himself up to Mahomed Akber on the previous day, having received some slight sword cuts in defending the colours of his regiment. We were also sorry to see no less than 400 of our irregular Hindostanee horse encamped outside the fort, having deserted to the enemy on the 9th and 10th. They belonged chiefly to Anderson's horse and the body-guard.

January 12th.—At 10 A.M. we again proceeded on our journey down the Tezeen valley preceded by the cavalry deserts. At Seh Baba, striking off from the high road, which here crosses some hills to the right, we kept our course along the stream,* to the fort of Artemisia, or southernwood, which grows every where in the greatest profusion, and scents the whole atmosphere with its powerful fragrance.

* The Afghans are in many parts of the country almost entirely dependent for fuel on a species of
Surroobee, a distance of sixteen miles. Between Tezeen and Seh Baba we encountered the same horrifying sights as yesterday; we passed the last abandoned horse-artillery gun, the carriage of which had been set on fire by the Ghazees, and was still burning; the corpse of poor Cardew lay stretched beside it, with several of the artillery-men. A little further on we passed the body of Dr. Duff, the superintending surgeon to the force, whose left hand had suffered previous amputation with a pen-knife by Dr. Harcourt! Numbers of worn-out and famished camp-followers were lying under cover of the rocks, within whose crevices they vainly sought a shelter from the cold. By many of these poor wretches we were recognised, and vainly invoked for the food and raiment we were unable to supply. The fate of these unfortunate was a sad subject of reflection to us,—death in its most horrid and protracted form stared them in the face; and the agonies of despair were depicted in every countenance. The fort of Surroobee belongs to Abdoolah Khan, Giljye. Near Seh Baba we were overtaken by Dr. Macgrath of the 37th N. I., who had been taken prisoner on the 10th, and was now sent to join our party; we were thus unexpectedly furnished with medical assistance, of which the sick and wounded had sorely felt the want.

January 13th.—Resuming our march at 10 A.M., we crossed the hills in a southeast direction towards Jugdulluk. The road in many places was very steep, and for several miles traversed a high table-land, presenting no signs of cultivation or human propinquity. Within about five miles of Jugdulluk, we again entered the high road, along which our army had recently passed; and the first sight that presented itself was the body of a fine European soldier:

Again our path was strewn with the mangled victims of war.—We reached Jugdulluk late in the evening; and, passing by the ruined inclosure within which the remnant of the force had so hopelessly sought shelter, we beheld a spectacle more terrible than any we had previously witnessed, the whole interior space being one crowded mass of bloody corpses. The carnage here must have been frightful. The body of Capt. Skinner was recognised, and an Afghan was persuaded by Capt. Lawrence to inter it during the night, Mahomed Akber’s consent having been previously procured. About two hundred yards below this fatal spot we found three ragged tents pitched for our reception, Mahomed Akber Khan being encamped hard by; and we now learned for the first time that Gen. Elphinstone, Brigadier Shelton, and Capt. Johnson, were hostages in his hands, the rest of the force having been annihilated. Mr. Fallon, an assistant in one of the public offices, had also been taken prisoner at the same time.

January 14th.—Shortly after sunrise we pursued our journey, accompanied by Akber Khan, with his hostages, or rather prisoners, and about 600 horse, of whom the Hindoostanee deserters formed a part. The road took a northerly direction up a gorge in the hills, and thence proceeded for five or six miles up a narrow defile, through which runs a small stream whose upper surface was covered with ice. Throughout these regions snow the cold was intense, and we passed several springs whose waters, arrested by the frost, hung suspended in long glittering icicles from the rocks, exhibiting a spectacle whose brilliancy would, under less depressing circumstances, have called forth exclamations of wonder and admiration, which we had not now the heart to utter. After clearing this defile, our course became somewhat easterly, through a more open country, and over a tolerably good road, for four or five miles, when we entered another short defile leading over a rocky ghat, after surmounting which the road again improved, until we reached the steep and difficult pass of Udruk-budruck. The ascent was about 1000 feet, up a narrow winding path, which, from the sharp and jagged nature of the rocks, scarcely afforded a practicable footing for our horses and camels. From the summit we had an extensive view of the country to the north, bounded by lofty snow-clad hills, the intervening space being broken up into innumerable ravines, whose barren surface was unrelieved by a single tree, the only signs of vegetable life being confined to the banks of the Cabul river, which partially fertilized the narrow valley immediately below us. The descent into this plain, down the rugged mountain side, was infinitely more tedious, and attended with greater peril, than the previous ascent, our jaded beasts threatening to cast their riders with violence on the rocks at every step. It was dark ere we reached the fort of Kutz, after a fatiguing journey of twenty-four miles, which had occupied no less than ten hours. This place belongs to Mahomed Ali Khan, Giljye, and is situated near the right bank of the Punjsher river. Although the clounds threatened rain, we were refused admittance within the walls, and were consequently obliged to repose in the open air, exposed the whole night to a high cutting wind. Fortunately we had now descended into a milder climate, or the poor ladies and children must have suffered severely. At midnight we were roused up by the arrival of our daily meals, consisting of half-baked cakes of unleavened bread, and intemperate lumps of tough mutton; but our servants had by this time prepared us some hot tea, which was far more satisfactory to wearied travellers than the solid fare of Afghan cooks.

January 15th.—At an early hour we were again on the move, and a few hundred yards brought us to the Cabul river, which at the ford was divided into two branches, the last extremely rapid, and the water reaching up to our saddle-girths; many of the ladies, being mounted on ponies, were obliged to dismount, and ride astride on the chargers of their Afghan acquaintance, to avoid getting wet. Nothing
could exceed the politeness and attention of Mahomed Akber on this occasion, who manifested the greatest anxiety until all had crossed over in safety. Several men and ponies were swept down by the violence of the current and drowned; a whole host of camp dogs, whose masters had been slain, and who had attached themselves to us, remaining on the other side, to our great relief.—Our course was now northeasterly, over a barren undulating country, for about ten miles, until we reached the fertile valley of Lughmanee, at the border of which we crossed a wide and rapid stream; the whole plain beyond was thickly studded with small high-walled forts and villages, by whose inhabitants we were greeted, en passant, in no measured terms of abuse, in which exercise of speech the fair sex, I am sorry to say, bore a conspicuous part, pronouncing the English ladies not only inimoral in character, but downright "scarcrows" in appearance, and the gentlemen, "dogs," "base born," "infidels," "devils," with many other unpronounceable titles equally complimentary, the whole being wound up with an assurance of certain death to our whole party ere many hours should elapse.

We also passed within a mile of a plain white building on our left, which was pointed out as the tomb of Lamech the father of Noah, and a favourite place of pilgrimage with the Afghans. At about 3 p.m. we reached the walled town of Turghurree, within which we found lodging, after a march of about sixteen miles. We found the Afghan gentry most agreeable travelling companions, possessing a ready fund of easy conversation and pleasantry, with a certain rough polish and artless independence of manner, which, compared with the studied servility and smooth-tongued address of the Hindooostanee nobles, seldom fails to impress our countrymen in their favour.

January 16th.—We were well pleased to find that a day's halt had been determined upon, which was no less acceptable for the needful rest it secured for man and beast, than for the opportunity it afforded us of performing our Sabbath devotions, which, under present circumstances, could not fail to be a source of more than ordinary comfort. Some disturbance was occasioned during the day by a party of Giljyes threatening to attack the town, and a few shots were exchanged from both sides, by which two or three men were said to have been killed. The affair was believed to have originated in discontent at the division of the spoil of our army. This place has a small bazaar, and many poor wanderers from our camp were permitted to take refuge within the walls, where a meal was dealt out to them daily by some charitable Hindoo residents.

January 17th.—The Sirdar's intention had been to keep us at Turghurree for several days; but, owing to the hostile spirit evinced towards us by the populace, he was obliged to hurry us away. At 11 a.m. we accordingly resumed our journey, under a guard of about 200 Juzailchees, whom it had been necessary to collect for our protection. Crowds of Afghans lined the walls to witness our departure, and some of our small remains of baggage fell a prey to the insatiable love of plunder, for which the Giljyes are notorious. Many of our Hindooostanee servants, who had hitherto followed our fortunes, now left us, under the idea that the Sirdar had decided upon our destruction. We pursued a northeasterly course along the valley, passing numerous forts, and at 2 a.m. reached Buddeeabad, a distance of eight miles, where one of the chief strongholds of Mahomed Shah Khan, Giljiye, had been vacated for our reception. The accommodation provided for us here was better than we had hitherto experienced. The fort was of a square form, each face about 50 yards long, with walls 25 feet high, and a flanking tower at each corner. It was further defended by a faussebray and deep ditch all round, the front gate being on the southwest face, and the postern on the northeast, each defended by a tower or bastion. The Zuna-Khan, or private dwelling, occupied two sides of a large square space in the centre, shut in by a high wall, each wing containing three apartments raised about eight feet from the ground, and the outer side of the principal room, consisting entirely of a wooden framework, divided into five compartments, with ornamented panels in each, made to slide up and down at pleasure. All the better sort of houses in the country have the chief rooms constructed in this manner, which is better adapted for the summer than the winter season, as it admits of a free circulation of air, but is an insufficient barrier against the cold. There was no supply of water inside the fort, but a small river ran past, at the distance of half a mile on the southeast side, and a little stream or canal about 100 yards outside the walls. It is singular that few Afghan forts have wells, notwithstanding the general abundance of water near the surface in all the cultivated valleys; and it would, generally speaking, be very easy to cut off the external supply of that necessary element, thus forcing the garrison to surrender without expending a shot. This fort is quite new, having been built since our occupation of the country. The owner, Mahomed Shah Khan, is father-in-law of Mahomed Akber Khan, and is one of the few chiefs who never desisted to acknowledge Shah Shooya. Insatiable avarice and ambition are his ruling passions, and, as our conquest put an end to his promising schemes of aggrandizement, his hatred towards us is intense. Unhappily he exercised great influence over his son-in-law, of whose cause in fact he was the chief supporter; and he was generally admitted to have been the principal instigator to the treacherous seizure of our envoy, for whose murder, however, which was committed in the heat and impulse of the moment, he is not answerable. Mahomed Akber and his cousin Sultan Mahomed Khan, familiarly called Sultan Jan, accompanied us to Buddeeabab, where they endeavour to arrange matters for our comfort to the utmost of their power. Sultan Jan is eminently handsome, proportion-
ately vain, and much given to boasting. Both he and the Sirdar were equally kind and courteous; but the latter is in manner a more perfect gentleman, and never, like his cousin, indulges in comparisons to the disadvantage of the English, of whom he invariably speaks with candour and respect.

The Sirdar has been completely baulked in his plans by the refusal of Gen. Sale to vacate Jellalabad, on which he had by no means calculated; even now he could not be persuaded that an order from Major Pottinger would not be obeyed by Captain Macgregor, the political authority there, although the Major constantly assured him that with us a prisoner, however exalted his rank, not being considered a free agent, has no power or control over any public officers of government, however much his inferiors in rank and station. I have no doubt his hope was that General Sale, yielding to the apparent necessities of the case, would have vacated the town and forthwith retreated to Peshawur, in which case he made pretty sure of the assistance of the Khayberries, in completing the annihilation of the British force.

January 15th.—Mahomed Akker and Sultan Jan departed, with the professed object of attempting the reduction of Jellalabad, and apparently very confident of success. As we remained immured in the fort of Buddeeabab until the 11th of April, I can scarcely expect that a minute detail of daily occurrences during that period would interest the reader. It would be equally idle to note down the various reports that reached us from time to time of passing events. The Afghans excel all the world in the ready fabrication of falsehoods, and those about us were interested in keeping us in the dark as much as possible. Nevertheless the truth could not always be concealed, and we managed, notwithstanding all their vigilance, to obtain pretty accurate intelligence of what was passing in the world without, though of course it was difficult entirely to separate the wheat from the chaff. On our first arrival we suffered some inconvenience from the want of clean linen, having in our transit from fort to fort been much pestered by vermin, of which, after they had once established a footing, it was by no means an easy matter to rid ourselves. The first discovery of a real living l-o-u-s-e was a severe shock to our fine sense of delicacy; but custom reconciles folk to anything, and even the ladies eventually mustered up resolution to look one of these intruders in the face without a scream. The management of our household matters, as well as the duty of general surveillance, was committed to a Mehmandar, who generally took advantage of his temporary authority to feather his own nest, by defrauding us in respect to the quality and quantity of our needful supplies. Moossa Khan was the first agent of this kind with whom we had to deal; and he was so little restrained by scruples, as to pass for a most consummate rogue even among Afghans.

For mere ordinary civility the unfortunate widow of the murdered Envoy found it her interest to have him pay twenty rupees for the recovery of a favourite cat, which Moossa Khan had actually stolen from herself, for the sake of the expected reward. This man was, nevertheless, much trusted by Mahomed Akker, who valued him no less for his capacity for intrigue, than for his unscrupulous zeal in the performance of the meanest or wickedest purposes. Such a coadjutor could not long be spared from his master's side in attendance upon us, and he was accordingly relieved on the 20th January, for the purpose of carrying on intrigues against the British with the leading chieftains of the Punjab. His successor was an old acquaintance of Capt. Troup, named Meerza Bawdeen Khan, who in peaceful times styled himself Syud, but now for a time sunk his religious distinction in the more warlike title of Khan. This man had, at the outbreak of the rebellion, been imprisoned on suspicion of favouring the English, but was released immediately on the arrival of Mahomed Akker, whom he had befriended during that chief's confinement at Bokhara, and to whose fortune he now attached himself. His manners were exceedingly boorish, and he took little pains to render himself agreeable, though, from his previous conduct, there was reason to believe that, under all his roughness of exterior, there lurked a secret preference for our cause. In most respects we certainly benefited by the change.

On the 21st we had rain, and on the 22d snow fell on the neighbouring hills.

On the 23d there was snow in the fort itself, a proof of the unusual severity of the winter, being quite a rare occurrence in this valley.

We had hitherto received our food at the hands of Afghan cooks, who little consulted the delicacy of the European palate. Our daily diet consisted of boiled rice, mutton boiled to rags, and thick cakes of unleavened dough; which, for ladies and children, was not the most enviable fare, whilst the irregular hours at which it was served up interfered greatly with our own comforts. It was now arranged, however, greatly to the satisfaction of all concerned, that our meals should be prepared by our own Hindooostanee servants, the Afghans furnishing materials.

We had a visit from the Sirdar and Sultan-Jan on the 23d, the chief having his head-quarters at present at Trighurree, where he was making preparation for the siege of Jellalabad. Major Pottinger, at his request, wrote a letter to Capt. Macgregor, explaining all that had occurred since the army left Cabul.

On the 24th, the Sirdar, having heard that we were much in want of money, sent 1000 rupees to be distributed among us.

On the 27th, he paid us another visit, his principal object being to induce Major Pottinger to make some alterations in the letter for Capt. Macgregor.
January 29th.—This day was rendered a joyous and eventful one to us, by the arrival from Jellalabad of a budget of letters and newspapers from our brother officers there garrisoned, who had likewise generously subscribed a quantity of clothes and other comforts from their little store for our use. It was truly gratifying to receive these proofs of sympathy from our countrymen, and to have a door of communication opened once more with the civilized world. Some of our friends managed to inform us of all that was going on, by dotting off letters of the alphabet in the newspapers, which is an easy mode of carrying on secret correspondence, and not likely to be detected by an Asiatic. In this manner we became acquainted with Brigadier Wild’s failure in the Khyber pass, and with General Pollock’s march from India: we also heard now for the first time that Dr. Brydon had reached Jellalabad alive, being the only officer who escaped out of the whole army which had left Cabul. Captains Collyer and Hopkins, with Dr. Harper, were found dead within four miles of the town of Jellalabad. It is said that, one of the ill-fated troic having been wounded, the remaining two went back to his assistance; but for which act of charity they would probably have been saved. It is singular that Dr. Brydon was mounted on a miserable pony, and seemed, humanly speaking, one of the most unlikely persons of the whole force to effect so wonderful an escape. Capt. Blewitt, Lieut. Bird, and two or three other officers, with several European soldiers, were killed near Futtehchabads, having imprudently delayed at a village to satisfy the cravings of hunger, and thus given the inhabitants time to arm themselves and overpower them.

February 15th.—The tedium of a prison life was again relieved to-day by the arrival of Abool Guffoor Khan and Dost Mahomed Khan from the Sirdar, bringing with them Major Griffiths of 37th N. I. and Mr. Blewitt, a clerk of the pay office, both of whom, with the Sergt.-Major of the 37th N. I., were taken prisoners at Gundamuk, after witnessing the massacre of almost all the officers and men who reached that place. Capt. Souter, H. M. 44th regiment, was led off at the same time by another chief, having preserved the colours of his regiment by tying them round his waist. The Sergt.-Major was so fortunate as to be set at liberty on the payment of certain rupees as a ransom, and a similar arrangement was on the point of being made for the release of Major Griffiths and Mr. Blewitt, when they were demanded by Mahomed Akber, and unwillingly delivered up by their captor. Major Griffiths had received a severe wound in the arm from a bullet. We were also delighted to learn that Capt. Bygrave, paymaster to the force, was safe, and would soon join us.

By command of Mahomed Akber we were this day ordered to deliver up our arms, which we had hitherto been permitted to retain. The cause of this was declared to be the discovery of a clandestine correspondence, carried on between Major Pottinger and Capt. Macgregor, which had so much displeased the Sirdar, that he sent a solemn warning to the Major to desist from such practices in future, significantly reminding him of the tragical fate of Sir William MacNaughten. Major Pottinger boldly acknowledged the fact of his having written privately to Jellalabad, and justified it on the plea that he had given no promise to the Sirdar to refrain from so doing. By Abdool Guffoor Khan we again enjoyed the gratification of receiving letters from our friends at Jellalabad. This chief was supposed to be friendly to our interests, having materially assisted Gen. Sale with supplies for his force. He was evidently much suspected by the Afghans about us, who maintained a strict watch over every word he uttered during his visit.

February 16th.—Captain Souter joined us to-day, having been made over to the Sirdar by the chief who captured him.

February 19th.—On the 6th, we had a heavy fall of rain, since which the weather had become exceedingly close. This morning it was remarked that an unusual degree of heat and stillness pervaded the air.

Whether these were premonitory symptoms of what was shortly to happen it is impossible to determine; but at 11 a.m. we were suddenly alarmed by a violent rocking of the earth, which momentarily increased to such a degree that we could with difficulty maintain our balance. Large masses of the lofty walls that encompassed us fell in on all sides with a thundering crash; a loud subterraneous rumbling was heard, as of a boiling sea of liquid lava, and wave after wave seemed to lift up the ground on which we stood, causing every building to rock to and fro like a floating vessel. After the scenes of horror we had recently witnessed, it seemed as if the hour of retribution had arrived, and that Heaven designed to destroy the blood-stained earth at one fell sweep. The dwelling in which we lodged was terribly shaken, and the room inhabited by Lady Sale fell in,—her ladieship, who happened to be standing on the roof just above it, having barely time to escape. Most providentially, all the ladies, with their children, made a timely rush into the open air at the commencement of the earthquake, and entirely escaped injury. Gen. Elphinstone, being bedridden, was for several moments in a precarious position, from which he was rescued by the intrepidity of his servant Moore, a private of H. M. 44th, who rushed into his room and carried him forth in his arms. The poor General, notwithstanding all that had occurred to cloud his fame, was greatly beloved by the soldiery, of whom there were few who would not have acted in a similar manner to save his life. The quaking continued for several minutes with unabated violence, and a slight tremor in the earth was perceptible throughout the remainder of the day. The Afghans were, for the time being, overwhelmed...
with terror; for, though slight shocks of earthquake are of common occurrence every year during the cold season, none so fearful as this had visited the country within the memory of the present generation. We shortly learned that our fort had been singularly favoured, almost every other fort in the valley having been laid low, and many inhabitants destroyed in the ruins. The town of Turchurree especially seems to have suffered severely, scarcely a horse being left standing, and several hundreds of people having been killed in the fall.

The first idea that struck the Afghans, after their fears had subsided, was, that the defences of Jellalabad must have been levelled to the ground, and a high road made for the Sirdar and his followers to walk in. Elevated by this hope, they confidently attributed the late phenomenon to a direct interposition of the Prophet in their favour.

We all passed the night in the open air, being afraid to trust the tottering walls of our habitation, especially as shocks of earthquake continued to occur almost every hour, some of which were rather severe.

February 21st.—The swords of Gen. Elphinstone and Brigadier Shelton were this day returned to them by order of the Sirdar.

February 23d.—Capt. Bygrave joined us in a very weak state, having suffered much from frost in one foot, and having entirely lost the ends of his toes. His adventures, after leaving Jugdulik, were perilous, and his ultimate escape wonderful. After starting from Jugdulik on the night of the 12th January, he was one of the first to surmount the strong barriers of prickly holly-oak which choked the pass. Collecting a small party of the men, who were similarly fortunate, he harangued them on the absolute necessity of their holding firmly together in the bond of discipline, for the preservation of their lives, declaring his willingness to lead them, if they would only obey orders, and act with spirit adequate to the emergency. The men, thus addressed, set up a loud cheer, and protested their intention to be guided solely by his commands and wishes. For three or four miles they steadily kept their ranks, and held the pursuing enemy at bay; but at length the repeated onsets of the Afghan horsemen, who every moment increased in number in their rear, threw the little band into confusion, which Capt. Bygrave exerted himself in vain to remedy. The men would neither hold together, nor pursue their march with that steadiness of purpose, on which hung their only chance of safety. Capt. Bygrave at length finding all his efforts to save them unavailing, and foreseeing the inevitable destruction of the whole party, determined, as a last resource, to strike off the high road and endeavour to make his way over the hills to Jellalabad. Mr. Baness, an enterprising merchant, who had become involved in the difficulties that beset our army, was induced to accompany him in this hazardous undertaking. Their course for the first few miles was altogether north, in order to get as far as possible from the track of the pursuing Giljeeys; by day they sought close cover—now among long rushes in the low bed of a mountain stream, and now under the thick foliage of evergreen shrubs on the summit of some lofty snow-clad peak. Their sole subsistence was a few dry grains of coffee, of which Mr. Baness had a small supply in his pocket, with an occasional bit of wild liquorice root, which they fortunately discovered growing in the bed of the Soorkab river. Travelling entirely at night, they experienced great difficulties in steering a direct course among the tortuosities of the innumerable ravines, which every where intersected their desultory track; on one occasion they found themselves suddenly upon the high road, where the first sight that offered itself was the mangled body of an European soldier; and, fearing to proceed along a path so lately beset with enemies, they were obliged to avoid the danger by retracing their steps for many miles. Thus passed four wearisome nights and days, during which time Capt. Bygrave, with frost-bitten feet, and worn-out shoes, had suffered so much from lameness, as to become more and more incapable of progressing; until at last, in the extreme of weakness and misery, having declared to Mr. Baness his inability to proceed further, he endeavoured to persuade that gentleman to seek with him the nearest village, and throw themselves on the protection of a chief. Mr. Baness would not, however, consent to run such hazard, and declared his intention to pursue his course to Jellalabad, if possible. Lotfi, however, to forsake his companion, he urged him unavailingly to fresh exertion; and at length, declaring that for the sake of his large family he was bound to proceed onward without delay, he took a mournful leave of his fellow-traveller, and, after twice returning in the forlorn hope of prevailing on him to move, departed on his solitary way. Left to himself, under such helpless circumstances, Capt. Bygrave almost yielded to despair,—but, after a prolonged slumber, found himself strong enough to walk, or rather crawl, a few miles further. The second night after Mr. Baness's departure brought him to a Giljeey village,* where, lying concealed till morning under some straw in a cave, he gave himself up to the first person who came near, who, being easily conciliated by the offer of some gold, conducted him to a neighbouring hut;—hence, after partaking of some refreshment, he was led to the residence of the chief of the village, Nizam Khan, who received him hospitably, and treated him with the utmost kindness for several days, when he was delivered up to the Sirdar, then encamped at Charbagh, in the neighbourhood of Jellalabad. There he found the chief actively employed in preparing gun-ammunition for the proposed siege; several of our captured guns were there, from which the

* Kutch Soorkab, four miles north of Gundamuk.
Affghan smiths managed to extract the spikes in a very few hours.

March 3rd.—Severe shocks of earthquake every day. The Meerza, professing to have received an order from the Sirdar, insisted on searching the boxes of Lady Macnaghten and Captain Lawrence. Unfortunately, the former had a great number of valuable Cashmere shawls, all of which were critically examined in order to ascertain their probable worth: but much disappointment was evinced that no jewels were forthcoming, as it was generally believed that her ladyship possessed a large assortment. Nothing was taken from her on this occasion; but it might easily be foreseen that such booty would ere long prove an irresistible temptation to our Giljye friends.

A cruel scene took place after this, in the expulsion from the fort of all the unfortunate Hindoostanees, whose feet had been crippled by the frost. The limbs of many of these poor wretches had completely withered, and had become as black as a coal; the feet of others had dropped off from the ankle; and all were suffering such excruciating torture as it is seldom the lot of man to witness. Yet the unmerciful Giljyes, regardless of their sufferings, dragged them forth along the rough ground, to perish miserably in the fields, without food or shelter, or the consolations of human sympathy. The real author of these atrocities was generally believed to be the owner of the fort, Mahomed Shah Khan. The Meerza, however, though compelled to carry the order into effect, readmitted several of the unfortunate victims at night.

March 10th.—In consequence of the repeated earthquakes, we deserted the house, and took up our abode in some small wooden huts constructed by our servants. To-night our slumber was broken by loud cries of "Murder!" which were found to proceed from Lady Sale's Hindoostanee ayah, whom one of her admirers, in a fit of jealousy, had attempted to strangle in her sleep. The wretch failing in his purpose, jumped over the wall, which was about twenty feet high, and, being discovered in the morning, narrowly escaped a hanging by Lynch law at the hands of the Meerza, who was with difficulty persuaded to alter his sentence to banishment from the fort.

March 11th.—Dost Mahomed Khan, accompanied by Imam Verdi, arrived from the Sirdar, and held a long private conference with Major Pottinger. It was generally supposed that Mahomed Akber had made some overtures to the Indian government relative to the return of the Ameer his father. Reports were in circulation of the fall of Ghuznee, which afterwards proved too true. We also learned on good authority that Khoda Bux Khan, a powerful Giljye chief, had left the Sirdar, whose cause seemed on the decline.

March 12th.—Very heavy rain. Heard of Gen. Sale's sortie from Jellalabad in consequence of a supposed attempt on the part of the Affghans to mine the walls;—many of the enemy killed.

March 13th.—A report abroad, which turned out true, that the Sirdar was wounded in the left arm by one of his own followers, who had been bribed with a lack of rupees by Shah Shoja. The assassin was ripped open, according to Affghan custom in such cases.

March 15th.—The Meerza was this day recalled by the Sirdar, and his place filled by the Nazir of Mahomed Shah Khan, Saleh Mahomed. We heard of the murder of Shah Shoja by the hand of Shoja Dowla, eldest son of Nubw Zeman Khan, who shot the unfortunate old king with a double-barrelled gun, as they were proceeding together to the royal camp at Seeah Sung. It is a curious fact that Shah Shoja was present at the birth of his murderer, to whom he gave his own name on the occasion.

March 21st.—The inhabitants of this valley are said to be removing their families and property to the hills for safety. The Safes, a mountain tribe in the neighbourhood, were said to have created much alarm, having been bought over by Capt. Macgregor.

March 24th.—The Nazir endeavoured to find out what amount of ransom was likely to be paid for us, and gave out that two lacks of rupees would be accepted. This, however, seemed to us all a mere ruse to fathom our purses, and he was referred to Capt. Macgregor for the information he required.

March 29th.—Sooltan Jan is said to have gone to oppose General Pollock with 1000 horse.

April 1st.—We received letters from Jellalabad, by which we learned that Gen. Pollock had authorized Capt. Macgregor to ransom us. A severe thunderstorm at night.

April 3rd.—Heard of the destruction of the 27th N. I. at Ghuznee, and of another successful sortie made by Gen. Sale at Jellalabad, by which he obtained a large supply of cattle.

April 9th.—Tidings brought of Mahomed Akber's camp at Char Bagh having been surprised by Gen. Sale, when his whole force was completely routed, three guns recaptured, and the Sirdar himself and friends barely managed to save themselves by flight. The arrival of Mahomed Shah Khan this evening confirmed this joyful intelligence. It had been reported to us this morning that at a council of chiefs held at Tirghurree on the previous night, much debate had taken place regarding the disposal of their prisoners, when it was proposed by some to destroy us at once: our anxiety was, therefore, intense all day, until the Khan by his friendly manner somewhat reassured us. He had a long interview with Major Pottinger, who endeavoured to propose terms for our release; to which, however, the Khan would not listen for a moment, but said we must follow the Sirdar's fortune, who would start for the hills early next morning.

April 10th.—We were all ready for a start at an early hour, but no camels came till 3 p. m.; meanwhile a scene of pillage went on,
in which Mahomed Shah Khan acted the part of robber-chief. His first act was to select all our best horses for himself, after which he deliberately rummaged Lady Macnaghten's baggage, from which he took shawls to the value of 5000l. He next demanded her jewels, which she was obliged reluctantly to give up, their value being estimated at 10,000l., or a lack of rupees. Not satisfied even with this rich plunder, he helped himself freely out of Capt. Lawrence's boxes to every thing that took his fancy; after which, being well aware of the poverty of the rest, he departed. Fortunately my own riding horse was spared, through the kind interference of the Meerza who accompanied the Khan. This characteristic little drama having been acted, the signal was given for our departure, the European soldiers being left behind, with a promise of release on the payment of a ransom.

It was a treat to get free of the dismal high walls, within which we had been so long immured; and as we had arrived in the depth of winter, when all was bleak and desolate to the eye, the universal verdure with which returning spring had now clothed the valley struck us with all the force of magic. We had proceeded about four miles on the road towards Alishung, when our progress was arrested by a few horsemen, who galloped up waving their hands joyfully, and crying out "Shabash!" "Bravo!"

"All is over! the Feringhee army has been cut up in the Khyber Pass, and all their guns taken by Sultan Jan!" The mutual joy of the Afghans seemed so perfectly sincere, that, notwithstanding the improbable story, we felt almost compelled to believe it, especially when the order was given to return forthwith to our old quarters at Buddeeaab. On the way back the new-comers entered into full-length particulars regarding the alleged defeat of our army. The Ensofyzees, they said, had agreed to take three lacks of rupees for the free passage of our troops through the Khyber, of which half was paid in advance. They had no sooner fingered the cash, than they laid a trap with Sultan Jan for the simultaneous attack of the front and rear of the army in the narrowest part of the pass, which had proved entirely successful. We found the poor soldiers delighted to see us again; for, having heard several shots fired after our departure, they imagined we had all been killed. We were not long in discovering that the story we had heard was all a hoax, the real cause of our sudden return being some dispute among the chiefs, in consequence of which an attack on our party was anticipated; but we were told to hold ourselves in readiness for a fresh start on the following morning.

The whole population of the valley are in the greatest consternation for fear of an attack from the English force, and are bundling their families up to the hills for safety.

April 11th.—We were off again at 12 a.m. The first three miles were along the Tirghurree road, after which we struck off to the hills to the right. Our course now became westerly, and skirting the base of the hills for four or five miles, we crossed a low ridge into the cultivated valley of Alishung; where, after crossing a rapid, we passed close by Mahomed Akber Khan on the opposite bank, seated in a nalkoo on a knoll by the road-side. He looked ill and careworn, but returned our salutes politely. A little further on we found three tents pitched for our reception, in which we had scarcely time to take shelter ere the rain fell in torrents, and continued all night. A very indifferent dish of tough mutton constituted our meal for the day. In the course of the evening Sultan Jan arrived in the camp, with only about thirty horsemen left of the thousand with whom he went forth to battle; the rest had all fled. He seemed grievously crestfallen, and, unlike the Sirdar, exhibited his malice and spleen by cutting our acquaintance. Mahomed Akber, with the liberality which always marks the really brave, invariably attributes his own defeat to the fortune of war, and loudly extols the bravery exhibited by our troops led on by the gallant Sale. The guard around our camp consisted entirely of Seiks, under a Muselman Rajah, who, having been banished many years ago by Runjeet Sing, was befriended by Dost Mahomed Khan, the then ruler of Cabul, to whose family he has ever since attached himself. He was a splendid-looking fellow, with very prepossessing manners, and expressed himself much disgusted with the Afghans, who took advantage of his going out to fight at Char Bagh to plunder his camp. Altogether, he seemed well disposed towards us, which, under our present circumstances, was cheering.

April 12th.—At our first starting this morning the bachelors were separated from the married families and ladies, and we went off by different roads. This sudden separation being very disagreeable to us all, Capt. Lawrence besought the Sirdar to permit us to proceed together as before. He also remonstrated with him for dragging the ladies and children with him all over the country, when they were so ill able to bear up against fatigue and exposure, representing that it would redound more to his honour to release them at once. Mahomed Shah Khan, who was present, upon this flew into a rage, and declared that "wherever he went we must all follow; that if our horses failed, we must trudge on foot; and that if we lagged behind, he would drag us along by force." He is the greatest enemy we have, and seems at present to govern the Sirdar completely. He was, however, taken to task by Mahomed Akber for his rudeness, and we were allowed to proceed all together, as heretofore. The road lay along low hills over a sandy soil, with several slight ascents and descents, one ascent being rather steep and long. About half way we crossed a small stream, and, after travelling about twelve miles, found the camp pitched in a narrow ravine, through which flowed a rivulet, the ground being covered with bunches of tall reeds, to which the Afghans set fire at
night. Two old goats were sent us for dinner, which, not being fit to eat, we returned, and were afterwards supplied with an awfully tough old sheep in exchange.

April 13th.—The road again lay over steeps. On the left we saw the pass of Udruk-badruk in the distance. We gathered quantities of a curious herbaceous plant, the under surface of whose leaves was covered with a beautiful crimson dewy-looking substance, which the Afghan ladies use as rouge. About twelve miles brought us to a small scantly-cultivated valley, in which were two small forts partially ruined by the earthquake. The inhabitants enjoy the credit of being the greatest thieves in the whole country, so they must be bad indeed. Our whole march was about fourteen miles.

April 14th.—At starting we crossed the pass of Bad-push, the ascent up which was not less than 1600 feet over a very steep and rocky road. The descent was less abrupt and comparatively short. On these hills grew the holly-ox, wild almond, and a teerbinthaceous tree called Khinjuck, yielding a fragrant medicinal gum, which I imagined might be the myrrh or balsam of commerce. It is, at all events, in great repute among the Afghans, who find it efficacious for sabre wounds. A species of mistletoe grew in great profusion on its branches; the flower somewhat resembled that of the mango, and the young leaves were oblong, lanceolate, opposite, and rather serrate. An evergreen shrub, with a jasmine-like flower, was very abundant.

Following the course of a stream about six miles, we reached the left bank of the Cabul river, which here issued from between some precipitous hills with an exceedingly rapid current. About a hundred yards from the bank stood a small fort. We crossed on a raft of inflated bullock-hides, the motion of which we found exceedingly pleasant. The horses crossed by a ford some distance higher up and about four miles round. On the right bank we found Mahomed Akber in his nalkee, to whom we paid our respects. The stream is about a hundred yards broad, and a few Afghans swim their horses over, though with some difficulty. The river is not navigable from this to Jellalabad, owing to the number of rapids and whirlpools.

April 15th.—We were kept waiting until noon for our horses, and in the mean time we amused by seeing a herd of cattle swim over the river; in attempting which they were all carried-violently down a rapid, and several, failing to effect a landing, were obliged to return along the bank and make a second effort. No camels were brought with kujawurs for the weak ladies and the sick, who were accordingly forced to ride on horseback. Poor Gen. Elphinstone, who left Baddeecabad in a most precarious state of health, was much shattered by the fatigues of travelling, and seemed to be gradually sinking to the grave. The road ran for a mile along the bank of the river, and then suddenly turned up a ravine to the right. Two miles more led to a valley communicating with that of Tezeen, about a mile up which we encamped outside the fort of Surroobee, where we had previously halted on the 12th of January. Here was one of the mountain-train guns which had been captured on the retreat. We found that our Hindoostanee servants, who remained behind here, had been well treated by Abdoolah Khan, but the majority had died from the effects of frost-bites.

April 16th.—Mahomed Akber fortunately found it convenient to halt here, which proved seasonable both to man and beast; but we were told to expect a long journey into the hills in the neighbourhood of Tezeen, where it is the Sirdar's intention to conceal us. An Afghan, lately arrived from Cabul, informed us that the city was divided into two great parties, of whom the Dooranees and Kuzzilbashess formed one, and the Barukszies and Gilyes the other.

April 17th.—Another halt enabled us to enjoy a quiet Sunday. The Sirdar and a portion of his followers paid a visit to some neighbouring chiefs, but his people were deserting him fast. The Gilyes have been trying hard to excite the fears of the peasantry against the English by tales of our cruelty and oppression.

April 18th.—Having been warned last night to be ready for a march at dawn of day, we were all on the alert; but, after waiting a long time for orders to mount, we received a message from Mahomed Akber that we should await his return.

April 19th.—It rained hard all night and continued to pour the whole day, but we were obliged, nevertheless, to march sixteen miles to Tezeen. The road was up a narrow valley the whole way, crossing a stream twice before reaching Seh Baba, which we passed half way, after which we crossed the stream continually. At Seh Baba we encountered a putrid smell from the decomposed bodies of those who fell on the retreat, which lined the whole road. In some places we passed high piles of human bodies still fresh, the remains probably of those unfortunate beings who, having escaped the knives of the Ghazees, had struggled for existence until they sunk under the combined miseries of famine and exposure. The Afghans informed us that many had been driven to the miserable expedient of supporting life by feeding off the flesh of their deceased comrades!—From Seh Baba to Tezeen is one continued rise, the valley being about half a mile broad and shut in by lofty heights on both sides. The stream is at this season a perfect torrent from the melting snow. We passed several encampments of the wandering Gilyes, whose flocks browsed on the neighbouring hills. We were all wet to the skin in spite of our postees, or sheepskin cloaks, and, on arriving at Mahomed Khan's fort at Tezeen, we found it so much dilapidated by the earthquake as to afford only the most scanty accommodation. The poor ladies were at first crammed into a small dirty room, filled with Afghan women, where they sat in their dripping clothes until, after much
delay and trouble, they were accommodated with a separate apartment. As for the gentlemen, they had to scramble for shelter in a dark confined hovel, Capt. Mackenzie and myself preferring to pass the night in a stable with our horses, the rain dripping over us until morning.

This day's exposure decided the fate of Gen. Elphinstone, who reached the fort in a dying state.

Captain Mackenzie received an intimation this night of the Sirdar's intention to send him on a mission to Gen. Pollock's camp at Jellalabad.

**April 20th.**—It rained the whole day, and, having nothing dry to put on, we were more uncomfortable than ever. Mrs. Waller was delivered of a daughter. This was the fourth addition to our number of captives; Mrs. Boyd, Mrs. Riley, and a soldier's wife named Byrne, having been confined during our sojourn at Budeenabad. A peculiar Providence seemed on all occasions to watch over the ladies, and nothing surprised us more than the slight nature of their sufferings on these occasions.

There was a severe shock of earthquake again to-day. These shocks have always appeared to me to be in some way connected with heavy rain beforehand.

**April 21st.**—Some tents having been pitched outside the fort, the whole of our party removed into them, with exception of the Wallers, ourselves, Gen. Elphinstone, Major Pottinger, Capt. Mackenzie, and Dr. Magrath, to all of whom permission was given to remain for the present in the fort. Atta Mahomed Khan, the owner of the place, expressed to us much annoyance at the conduct of his kinsman Mahomed Shah Khan in stirring up the rebellion, and hinted at his own desire to be on friendly terms with our government. It seems he was promised remuneration by Capt. Macgregor for the damage done to his property by Gen. Sale's force in October 1841, to the fulfilment of which pledge he still looked forward.

The Sirdar was holding a levée to-day, at which Major Pottinger was present, when he burst into a violent passion, and declared that his own countrymen had basely deserted and betrayed him, although he had all along acted entirely at the instigation of the chiefs at Cabul, especially in the murder of the Envoy and the destruction of our army; yet these very men now refused to support him; and he solemnly swore that, if ever he had the power, a severe example should be made of them.

A part of the outer wall fell to-day from the effects of yesterday's earthquake. At night the ladies of Mahomed Shah Khan, and other chiefs who were travelling in our company, invited Mrs. Eyre to dinner. She found them exceedingly kind in manner and prepossessing in outward appearance, being both well dressed and good looking. They asked her the old question as to the gender of the Company Sahib, and were greatly wonderstruck to learn that England was governed by a woman. They expressed the utmost dread of Capt. Macgregor, whom they regard in the same formidable light in which a child does the giant of a nursery tale.

**April 22d.**—A great bustle was created at an early hour this morning by the arrival of a messenger from the Sirdar to Dost Mahomed Khan, who was awakened from his slumber in the General's room and immediately hurried away. Our fellow-captives in camp marched shortly afterwards for the Zanduk valley, near the Aman Koh, about eight miles south of Tezeen. There was apparently some apprehension entertained of a surprise from Cabul, as we ourselves were hurried off at about 9 A.M. to a small fort two miles higher up the valley, whither the Sirdar had preceded us. This sudden movement was a deathstroke to the General, who, though so weak as to be unable to stand, was made to ride on horseback the whole way.

**April 23d.**—Mahomed Akber received about 6000 rupees from Cabul, probably sent by his uncle, Nuwab Jubbah Khan. Futty Jung, the eldest son of the murdered monarch, retained possession of the Bala Hisaar, and demanded from the Sirdar that all the European prisoners should be rendered up to him. The residents of Cabul, we learned, were deserting the city in great numbers, from dread of our army, and all efforts to induce the people to oppose Gen. Pollock's advance were fruitless. This information at once decided the Sirdar to send Capt. Mackenzie to treat with Gen. Pollock without further delay, and that officer was warned to be in readiness to start at a moment's notice.

Some one having told the Sirdar that I could draw faces, he sent for me on that pretence; but to my surprise pumped me for half an hour on artillery matters, being very inquisitive as to the manufacture of fuses and port-fires, the mode of throwing shells from mortars and howitzers, and the mode of regulating the length of fuse for different distances, on all which subjects I enlightened him just enough to render his darkness visible. Before I went, he requested me to take the likeness of one of his followers, and of a favourite Arab horse; and, though my performance was very indifferent, he expressed himself pleased. I was afterwards called to examine a sextant which had been just brought to him; it was greatly damaged, but I explained its use; after which, finding he could make no better use of it, he made me remove the coloured glasses, which he proposed to convert into spectacles to preserve his eyes from the glare.

About 7 P.M. Major-General Elphinstone breathed his last,—a happy release for him from suffering of mind and body. Deeply he felt his humiliation, and bitterly regretted the day when he resigned the home-born pleasures of his native land, to hazard the high reputation of a proud name in a climate and station, for which he was constitutionally unfit. Of his merits I have already spoken at large in another place; but it is due no less to the memory of the dead than to the large circle of living friends and
relatives, who, I feel assured will mourn his loss, that I should record how, to the very last moment of his being, he exhibited a measure of Christian benevolence, patience, and high-souled fortitude, which gained him the affectionate regard and admiring esteem of all who witnessed his prolonged sufferings and his dying struggles, and who regarded him as the victim less of his own faults, than of the errors of others, and the unfathomed designs of a mysterious Providence, by whom the means are always adapted to the end. The Sirdar seemed to have been unconscious of the General's extreme danger until this morning, when he offered, too late, to grant him his release. Had he listened to the advice of those who wished him well, he would have adopted this generous course at Buddeena-
bad; but his chief supporters were interested in keeping him in the dark, and in frustrating every scheme that tended to reconcile him to the British nation; so the timely counsel was unheeded. His eyes at last were opened to the truth; and he now endeavoured to make all the amends in his power by offering to send the remains for honourable internment at Jella-
labad. At 8 a.m. Capt. Mackenzie departed on his mission, which related principally to the release of the ladies and children.

April 23d.—A rude framework having been constructed by an Afghan carpenter, the Gene-
ral's body, after being well covered up in felt blankets, was packed in it, and the vacant spaces filled with the highly-scented leaves of wormwood. At 2 p.m., all being ready, it was swung across the back of a camel, and sent off under a small guard of Giljyes, accompanied by one of the European soldiers who attended the deceased, whom the Sirdar thought likely to pass unnoticed in the common costume of the country. The Sirdar afterwards invited us all to sit with him outside the fort. Whilst we were engaged in conversation, a messenger arrived with letters from Loodianah, informing him that his family had been starved for a whole week. On being told the contents, we all im-
mediately pronounced the whole a mischievous fabrication; upon which the Sirdar somewhat bombastically proclaimed his disregard whether it were true or false, for that the destruction of his whole family should not alter his resolutions. He then resumed the previous conversation as if nothing had occurred, in the course of which he told me that the daily loss of life, by the fire of the cantonment guns during the siege, was between thirty and forty, but he declared that the shells fired from the Bala Hisar into the city did little or no damage to life or property.

April 26th.—Sad to say, the poor General's body was interrupted on its journey near Jug-
duluk. It seems that the party in charge, on approaching the camp of some wandering Gil-
jyes, were challenged, and thought that the best way to avoid discovery would be to assume confidence, and to come to a halt there for the night. The European soldier was covered up with blankets, and warned to remain quiet until morning. About 10 p.m., however, he was rousted by a tumult of angry voices, in which the words "Feringhee" and "Kafir" were frequently repeated. A rush was shortly after made to where he was lying, and the covering being snatched from off his head, he was im-
mediately attacked, and wounded in the arm with a sword, nothing saving his life but the thick blanket of felt which covered his body, and the interposition of a chief, who hurried him off to his tent. The bigoted savages next stripped the body of the General, which they pelted with stones, and would have burned, but for the remonstrances of the Sirdar's men, who threatened them with the vengeance of their master. Mahomed Akber's annoyance was great on receiving these awkward tidings, but he lost no time in despatching as large a party as he could spare, to rescue the European and repack the body.

In the course of conversation with Major Pottinger, the Sirdar asked him whether he would take his oath that he had never written any thing to Jellalabad, but what had come to his (the Sirdar's) knowledge. The Major main-
tained a significant silence, but shortly after-
wards, having occasion to remark that, if the treaty had been fulfilled, not a British soldier would now have remained in Afghanistan, the Sirdar emphatically asked him if he would swear to the truth of what he uttered, to which the Major readily consenting, the Sirdar seemed now for the first time to believe what he had before utterly discredited, and looked around upon his followers with an expression of face which seemed to say, "What a miserable fool then have I been!"

April 27th.—The Sirdar started with Major Pottinger to visit our fellow-prisoners in the Zanduh valley. Lieut. Waller and myself, in the course of our evening stroll, amused our-
selves in observing some Juzzailies firing at a mark about 100 yards distant: almost every shot was well directed, but they were all so dilatory in loading, that a British soldier could have fired four or five shots to their one. The European soldier who accompanied the General's body returned this evening, having been rescued by the Sirdar's men from the savages who detained him, and who now pro-
fessed great contrition for having offended the Sirdar. The body, after being repacked, had been forwarded on its way to Jellalabad.

April 28th.—A cossid, bearing a letter from Capt. Conolly to Gen. Pollock, was intercepted and severely beaten by the Sirdar's men, and detained a prisoner until his return.

April 29th.—A wild sheep was brought in, having been shot in the neighbouring hills. Its horns resembled those of a common ram, but its face and general outline were not unlike an antelope, though more coarse and clumsy.

April 30th.—The Sirdar and Major Pottinger returned from their excursion. Whilst at Zan-
duh, Ameenoolah Khan and other chiefs sent to demand that Major Pottinger should be delivered
up to him, or twelve lacks of rupees in his stead. The bills given by the Major on the Indian Government, payable on the safe arrival of the Kabul force at Jellalabad, having been dis Honour, the chiefs have been endeavouring to extort the money from the Hindoo shroffs.

May 1st.—To-night the Sirdar sent us a large supply of English letters and newspapers which had just come from Jellalabad, where Capt. Mackenzie had arrived safe. These were the first letters we had received for eight months, and we sat up the greater part of the night devouring their contents.

May 2d.—I was sent for by the Sirdar to examine a cavalry saddle, as he was anxious to know whether it was made of hog's skin. I told him it was a difficult question to decide, as both hog and cow skins were used, and could not easily be distinguished. As he gave me some knowing winks, and was evidently most unwilling that a good saddle should be sacrificed to the religious scruples of his moolah, who was scented in the room, I voted in favour of the cow; and, as Lieut. Waller afterwards declared himself on the same side, the Sirdar, considering that two witnesses decided the point, determined to hold his own; and I believe in his heart he cared little about the natural history of the hide, so long as it suited his purposes.

Late at night I was roused from bed by a message from the Sirdar, who pressed me hard to go and fight for him at Cabul against Ameenoollah Khan and Futty Jung. He was perfectly aware, he said, that no Englishman would serve against his own countrymen, but that in this case his enemies were equally hostile to the British; so that, in fighting for him, I should be serving my own country. I replied that I was already badly wounded and tired of fighting for the present; that I was quite incompetent, from my ignorance of Afghan politics, to form an opinion as to the rights and merits of the case; and that, even were I ever so much disposed to embrace his cause, no English officer or soldier could legally take arms under a sovereign power, without having first obtained the consent of his own sovereign. My refusal apparently annoyed him a good deal, and I was obliged to repeat it several times before he would allow me to return to rest.

May 3d.—The Wallers and ourselves started for the Zanduh valley after breakfast, and had just mounted our horses, when Capt. Mackenzie made his appearance on his return from Jellalabad. His mission had not opened any immediate prospect of release for us, though the negotiation was, on the whole, of a friendly nature. After the exchange of a few words he was hurried off to the Sirdar, and we pursued our way to Zanduh. The road ascended the hills in a southeasterly direction, and was very steep and undulating for about three miles, when it descended into the narrow bed of a stream, one of the ramifications of the Tezen valley, up which our course was southerly for the rest of the march. Four or five miles further brought us to camp, where the valley was a little wider, with cultivated steppes of land, on which the tents were pitched. Snow was still lying on the neighbouring heights, and about four miles further south the lofty mountain peak of Aman Koh reared its pine-clad crest. On our way we noticed the juniper, which universally prevails in these hills, attaining in some spots the size of a goodly tree. Here and there we passed a few stunted pines, which might be considered as mere stragglers from the neighbouring forests of Suffed Koh. The wild almond, a showy and fragrant species of Edwardsia; a shrubby craspedum-looking plant, covered with blossoms; the yellow dog-rose, the sweet-briar, the artemisia, the white tulip, and a very pretty iris, constituted the prominent botanical features of the road over which we travelled. We found our friends enjoying themselves during the heat of the day, in shady bowers formed of juniper: the climate seemed delightful.

May 4th.—The Sirdar sent for Capt. Troup to accompany him and Major Pottinger to Cabul. Capt. Mackenzie was to start immediately on a second mission to Jellalabad.

May 5th.—The English hostages at Cabul were said to be under the protection of a Syud, son of the chief moolah; and Ameenoollah Khan, having endeavoured to seize them, had been driven into the Bala Hisar by Nuwb Zeman Khan, and his house in Cabul burned to the ground.

May 7th.—A hard frost this morning! the shrubs and herbs within reach of the spray of the stream being covered with large icicles. Our keeper now was Mahomed Rafeeq, whose family resides at Candahar. From his pleasing manners, and constant civility and kindness, he soon became a general favourite. I took a long walk with him to-day among the hills south of camp; we saw nothing but juniper trees, anemones, and wild geraniums, the spring having only just commenced in that elevated region. The rocks were chiefly of limestone, with vertical strata.

May 8th.—This morning I was agreeably surprised by an Afghan bringing some of my own books and sketches for sale, of which I immediately possessed myself. In the forenoon a few drops of snow fell! The last three days were bitterly cold, and we enjoyed a blazing fire at night.

May 9th.—Enjoyed another walk in the hills, with a fine bracing air, and a magnificent view in the direction of Hindoo Khoosh, whose everlasting snows and jagged peaks bounded the scene. On our return we heard the cheerful note of the cuckoo. I found a curious parasite on the juniper.

May 10th.—Capt. and Mrs. Anderson were agreeably surprised by the arrival of their eldest girl from Cabul. It will be remembered that she was lost in the Khoord-Cabul pass during the retreat on the 8th of January; since which
she had been an inmate of Nuwab Zeman Khan's family, where she was treated with the greatest possible kindness. She had been taught to say "My father and mother are infidels, but I am a Mussulman." Capt. Troup, who had obtained her release, wrote word that he and Major Pottinger were in Nuwab Jubbar Khan's house at Cabul; that the city was in a most unquiet state, and the opposite parties fighting every day, the Cabulees siding alternately with whichever side paid them best. At night, a note was received from Major Pottinger, who had just witnessed an engagement between the Barulkzyes and Dooranees, in which the former were victorious; but he described the affair as more ludicrous than tragical, having been a forcible representation of the "battle of spurs."

May 12th.—Catts. Boyd, Waller, and myself, accompanied by two Afghans, ascended some lofty hills to the west. Some Giljyes of the Jubbar Khail overtook us, and offered to escort us to Jellalabad. Our attendants, instantly taking alarm, hurried us away homewards. We had a fine view of Hindoo Koosh to the north, and Suffeed Koh to the south. At the height of 2000 feet above our camp, the husbandmen were only now ploughing the ground, whilst in the Zandhu valley, immediately below, the crops were green. We descended by the bed of a stream, on whose steep sides a species of wild onion grew abundantly. A beautiful festillaria was also common; and an asphodelous plant bearing a gigantic spadix of yellow flowers, which I took for an ornithogalum. On our return, Dost Mahomed Khan, who was encamped near us, rated Mahomed Rufeek severely for allowing us to stray so far. This chief is a thorough boor in his ideas and manners, and is always exhibiting some mean and silly suspicion of our intentions: had it depended on him, we should all have been shut up in dark cells or narrow cages long ago.

May 16th.—Capt. Mackenzie returned from his second trip to Jellalabad, where Gen. Elphinstone's body had arrived safe and had been interred with due military honour. It does not appear that much was done towards effecting our release. The terms the Sirdar proposed to Gen. Pollock for our release were,—that he should be made governor of the Lughman province, and be exempted from attendance at court, and uncontrolled by our political officers. Of this proposal Gen. Pollock very properly took not the smallest notice. It seems that a despatch from the Sirdar, in which an offer was made to release the ladies and children unconditionally, which was sent after Capt. Mackenzie, did not reach him, having been intercepted, as was supposed, by Mahomed Shah Khan. Gen. Nott was expected to march for Cabul from Candahar on the 17th instant.

May 17th.—Capt. Mackenzie left for Cabul, to communicate the result of his mission to the Sirdar.

May 18th.—Dost Mahomed Khan was much struck by hearing Mahomed Rufeek read a Persian translation of the "Sermon on the Mount" out of Gladwin's "Moonshoe." He was fervent in his admiration of the Lord's Prayer, as well as of several other passages; and the injunction to pray in private seemed to throw light on our apparent neglect of outward observances. Corporal Lewis of H. M. 44th, who had been kept a prisoner at Tezeen in the fort of Khooda Bux Khan, was allowed to visit our camp to-day. The poor fellow had been starved and ill-treated by his savage captors, until he made an outward profession of Mahomedanism, when he received the name of Deen Mahomed, and was made to attend prayers with the faithful.

May 20th.—A beacon-light was burning all night on the hill above us, and pickets were thrown out in all directions. It was supposed that a chuffao, or night surprise, was expected.

May 22d.—Our horses arrived from Cabul, for which city we received notice to march next morning.

May 23d.—Marched about 9 a.m. Three of us obliged to walk for want of horses. Ladies travelled in kujawurs, laden on mules. We retraced our former track down the bed of the stream, and across the hills, to the fort where Gen. Elphinstone died. A few miles of descent made a great difference in the climate and the progress of vegetation; the wild roses were everywhere in full bloom, and, with other gay flowers, scented the air and enlivened the scene. We crossed a branch of the Tezeen valley; a short cut over the hills led us to the foot of the Huff Kotul, or hill of seven ascents. Here we once more encountered the putrid bodies of our soldiery, which thenceforward stove the road as far as Khoord Cabul, poisoning the whole atmosphere. A little beyond Kubbur-Ljuubar we passed two caves, on opposite sides of the road, full as they could hold of rotten carcasses. Thence to Tungee Tureekee the sight became worse and worse. Mahomed Rufeek asked me whether all this would not excite the fury of Gen. Pollock's army; I told him he need not be surprised if every house in Cabul were levelled to the ground. From the last-mentioned spot we turned off the high road to the left, and, passing a large ruined village, arrived at the fort of Khoord Cabul,—where we had previously lodged on the 9th of January,—after a fatiguing march of twenty-two miles. The contrast between the summer and winter aspect of the valley immediately below the fort was striking: the whole now presenting one red field of cultivation.

May 24th.—Again on the move at 9 a.m. The Khoord Cabul pass being now absolutely impassable from the stench of dead bodies, we took the direct road towards Cabul, having Alexander the Great's column in view nearly the whole day. The first three or four miles were over a barren plain, when the road entered among hills crossing a ghat of moderate height into a valley about three miles in width, in the
middle of which we halted for half an hour at a deliciously cool and clear spring, which supplied a small tank or pond; just above this, crowning the hill to the left, stood a ruined Grecian tope. Resuming our way, we again entered some hills, the road making a continuous ascent for about a couple of miles to Alexander's pillar, one of the most ancient relics of antiquity in the East, and conspicuously situated on the crest of a mountain range which bounds the plain of Cabul on the southeast. It stands about seventy feet high; the shaft is of the Doric order, standing on a cubic pedestal, and surmounted by a sort of urn. As we reached this classic spot, a view of almost unrivalled magnificence burst suddenly upon our sight. At the distance of some two thousand feet below, the whole picturesque and highly cultivated valley of Cabul was spread before us like a map; the towering mountain ranges of Kohistan and Hindoo Khoosh, clad in a pure vesture of snow, bounded the horizon, at the distance of nearly a hundred miles. The Bala Hissar was dimly discernible in the distance, from whose battlements the roar of cannon broke ever and anon upon the ear, betokening the prolongation of the strife between hostile tribes and ambitious chiefs. The descent was very long and tedious, and the road about midway very steep and bad. On the way down another Grecian tope was discernible among the hills on the left. The rocks were chiefly of micaceous schist, and a dark stone resembling basalt. The gum-ammoniac plant grew here; the young flower was clustered together not unlike a small cauliflower. It is an umbelliferous plant, growing to the height of six feet, and its general appearance and mode of growth resembling an herbaceous. It has a strong disagreeable scent, which reminded me slightly of assa-foetida. The gum exudes plentifully, and is at first milky, but afterwards turns to yellow, and has a bitter nauseous taste. The plant is called by the Afghans gundelte, and the gum is sold in the Cabul bazar under the name of feshook.

At the foot of the hill we rested at a tank or pond supplied by a large spring which gushes from under the rock; another ruined Grecian tope crowned a small eminence at a few hundred yards' distance. The road now skirted the base of the hills to the left for about four miles, when we reached the fort of Ali Mahomed, Kuzzilbash, distant three miles from Cabul, and close to the Logur river, where we were accommodated for the night, having marched altogether about twenty miles.

May 25th.—The ladies of Ali Mahomed having removed to a neighbouring fort, we occupied their apartments, which lined two sides of an inclosed square, and were very commodious, and decidedly the best quarters we have yet enjoyed. The valley about here is thickly studded with forts, and very highly cultivated.

May 26th.—Captain Troup paid us a visit. He told us the Sirdar was living in the outskirts of the city about two miles from us, that Amoonullah Khan joined him, but that Putty Jung still held out in the Bala Hissar, in hopes of being soon relieved by the arrival of our army. Mahomed Akber is desirous to obtain possession of the citadel principally on account of the treasure within it, as he never professed to dream of resisting our arms. He earnestly desired to be on friendly terms with the British government, and often said that he wished he had been so fortunate as to become acquainted with the English in early life, as he had been filled with prejudices against them which had greatly influenced his conduct, but which he now saw to be unfounded. It seems that Gen. Pollock offered on his own responsibility to release the ladies and children of his family from their confinement, but in his present precarious state of life the Sirdar has declined the offer.

Hundreds of Hindostanees crowded the streets of Cabul begging for bread, which was daily served out to them by Nuwab Jubbah Khan and Zeman Khan. The civility of all classes to the European hostages and prisoners in and about Cabul was remarkable.

May 27th.—We all received permission to walk in the adjacent garden, and the gentlemen were allowed to bathe in a running canal near the fort, which, now that the weather had become sultry, were real luxuries.

May 29th.—Shuja Dowlah, the assassin of Shah Shoojah, paid us a visit. He was a hand-some quiet-looking man, whom few would have guessed to be the perpetrator of such a deed. He tried hard to persuade us that the Shah had played us false, and that he had committed a praiseworthy action in getting rid of him. The murder was committed at the instigation of Dost Mahomed Khan, Gillye, by way of retribution for the attempt on Mahomed Akber's life at Charbagh by an agent of Shah Shoojah; but the act is much rebuked by all classes at Cabul, and by no one more than the Nuwab Zuman Khan, who has banished Shuja Dowlah from his house ever since.

May 30th.—Shah Dowla, another son of Nuwab Zuman Khan, paid us a visit, and inquired particularly if we were well treated by the Sirdar. We were informed that, in consequence of the Sirdar having demanded the persons of the Naib Shereef Mohun Loll and the late wuzeeer, the Kuzzilbash had risen in a body against him, and declared their intention to hold their part of the city until the arrival of our troops. We heard a great deal of firing tonight, and the extreme vigilance of our guard led us to suppose that the Sirdar's affairs were not prospering. Dost Mahomed Khan arrived in the fort at night.

May 31st.—Guns were heard all night, and we were refused permission to leave the fort, as usual, to-day. Mahomed Rufeek, we were sorry to learn, had incurred suspicion, from his family having aided Gen. Nott at Candahar. He determined to throw up the Sirdar's service in consequence.

June 1st.—Dost Mahomed Khan departed for the city accompanied by Mahomed Rufeek.
Permission was again given us to go into the garden, and to bathe in the canal as before.

June 2d.—Intelligence was brought us that Gen. Nott had obtained a victory at Kelat-i-Giljye, in which 2000 of the enemy were killed.

June 3d.—It was reported that Futty Jung had offered a large reward to any one who would seize and escort us all to the Bala Hissar. The Sirdar made a fierce attack on the Bala Hissar in the evening, and a brisk cannonade was kept up on both sides for several hours, but without any decisive result.

June 4th.—Capt. Troup paid us a visit, bringing with him several necessaries, for which we had previously written to the Sirdar. It was believed in the city that one of the bastions of the Bala Hissar had been mined, but that the Sirdar was deferring its explosion in the hope that he might succeed without it, being unwilling to injure the defences of the place. But this report was probably set abroad for the purpose of intimidating the defenders, of whom only two men had been wounded during the whole siege up to this date.

A messenger arrived this morning from Jellalabad with letters for Futty Jung and Lady Sale. From the latter we learned that Gen. Pollock had written to Mahomed Akber, declaring it to be contrary to the laws of nations to make war against women and children, which it was hoped might shame him into the release of that portion of his prisoners, who came under the benefit of the rule.

Hopes began to be entertained of the safety of Dr. Grant of the Goorkha regiment, who was supposed to be concealed in Cabul. A shock of earthquake felt to-day.

June 6th.—About 5 p. m. a good deal of firing was heard, and our garrison was in a state of great excitement. Futty Jung said to have sallied from the Bala Hissar and carried off a quantity of Mahomed Akber's military stores and camels. At night we heard that the Sirdar had seized Ameenoolah Khan, whom he suspected of intriguing with Futty Jung, probably with good foundation. The Khan said to be worth 18 lacks of rupees, which it was the Sirdar's intention to make him disgorge. Ameenoolah Khan was originally the son of a camel-driver, but by dint of his talents, bravery, and cunning, rose to be one of the most powerful nobles in the country. The late Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan feared and suspected him so much as to forbid him to enter Cabul. He possessed the whole of the Logur valley, and could bring 10,000 men into the field. The accession of such a man to his cause was of much importance to Mahomed Akber, and his seizure was a dangerous step, being likely to provoke the hostility of his son. Ameenoolah Khan was the chief instigator of the rebellion, and of the murder of Sir Alexander Barnes; after which he lent the weight of his influence to each party alternately, as it suited his purpose. Such a vacillating wretch was not long likely to escape retributive justice.

June 7th.—Contradictory reports were in circulation all day. Some affirm the Bala Hissar to have been taken; others that the Sirdar had sustained a ruinous defeat, and that he was engaged in plundering the city, prior to taking flight. That something extraordinary had occurred was evident from the mysterious deportment of the Afghans, and their anxiety to prevent our receiving any communication from without. A parcel of useful articles arrived for us from our good friends at Jellalabad, but every thing was opened by the guard at the gate, who gave us only what they chose, and seized all the letters, to send to the Sirdar. There was no firing from the Bala Hissar today as usual. The climate in this part of the valley we found delightfully cool and pleasant, which may have arisen in part from the luxuriant cultivation round about. The most common trees are the poplar, willow, mulberry, and oleaster, or sinjut, the bright silvery foliage of the latter contrasting strikingly with the deep green of the rest, and its flowers scattering a powerful and delicious perfume through the surrounding air. Purple centaurias adorned the corn fields, and a handsome species of hedsarum, with a lupin-like flower, enlivened the border of every field and water-course; whilst a delicate kind of tamarisk ornamented the banks of the neighbouring river. In the garden I found a very beautiful orobanche growing parasitically from the roots of the melon.

June 9th.—Capt. Mackenzie paid us a visit. From him we learned positively that the Sirdar sprung a mine under one of the towers of the Bala Hissar, near the Shah Bazar, on the 6th; that the storming party was driven back with a loss of sixty men killed, and that much damage was done in the adjacent part of the town by the explosion. On the following day, Futty Jung, finding his people disinclined to support him any longer, made terms with Mahomed Akber and the other chiefs, giving up a tower in the Balar Hissar to each, and himself retaining possession of the royal residence. Thus the citadel was now divided between the Doo-rances, Barakzyes, Giljyes, and Kuzzilbashesses, represented by Futty Jung, Mahomed Akber, Nuwab Zeman Khan, Mahomed Shah Khan, and Khan Shereen Khan. A curious arrangement, truly! and calculated to facilitate the union of parties already jealous of each other, and each of whom had, doubtless, an eye to the rich treasure of money and jewels still in Futty Jung's possession. The story of Ameenoolah Khan's seizure turned out to be untrue. There was a violent quarrel a few days back between the two old Nuwabs, Zeman Khan and Jubbar Khan, when the former seized hold of the latter's beard exclaiming, "You are the fellow who first brought the Feringhees into the country, and to whom, therefore, all our troubles may be attributed." Abdool Glujas Khan, the son of Jubbar Khan, being present, drew a pistol and threatened to shoot Zeman Khan for the indignity offered to his father. Mahomed-Ak-
her sat by the whole time, laughing heartily at the scene.

June 10th.—A smart shock of earthquake during the night.

June 11th.—Capt. Mackenzie returned to the city. It was supposed he would start in a day or two on a fresh mission to Jellalabad.

June 20th.—Heard from Capt. Mackenzie that Mahomed Akber was waging war with Nuwab Zeman Khan; also that Gen. Nott had seized the person of Suffer Jung, the rebel son of Shah Shojoa-ool-moolk. All Mahomed assured us that it was the Sirdar's intention shortly to march to Jellalabad, to pay his respects to Gen. Pollock! From other quarters we heard that he meditated carrying us all off to the banks of the Oxus.

June 21st.—We were told by Ali-Mahomed that the Sirdar had taken Nuwab Zeman Khan and his two sons prisoners, and, after seizing all his guns, treasure, and ammunition, had released them again.

June 25th.—Camps. Mackenzie and Troup paid us a visit. Mahomed Akber's late successful conflict with Nuwab Zeman Khan had rendered him, for the time being, supreme in Cabul. The Kuzzilbashes had tendered their unwilling submission, and had delivered up Mohun Loll, who was immediately put to the torture. Jan Fishan Khan, the laird of Purghman, a staunch friend of the British, had been obliged to fly for his life, his two sons having been slain in the fight. Khoda Bux Khan, and Atta Mahomed Khan, Giljyes, fought against Mahomed Akber on this occasion. Both Capt. Troup and Capt. Mackenzie had since been allowed to visit the hostages, whom they found in the house of the Meer Wyze, the chief muollah of the city, to whose protection they had been committed by Zeman Khan, in consequence of the desperate efforts of the Ghazees to slay them. During their stay in the good Nuwab's house, their lives were in constant danger from those fanatics, who on one occasion actually forced their way into the building to accomplish their purpose, and were only hindered by the Nuwab falling on his knees, casting his turban on the ground, and entreat ing them not to dishonour his roof by committing violence to those under its protection. Before sending them to the Meer Wyze, which was done at night, he took the precaution to line the streets with his own followers, with strict orders to fire upon every one who should so much as poke his head out of a window; and he not only accompanied them himself, but sent his own family on ahead. Capt. Conolly had obtained convincing proof that Shah Shojojah originated the rebellion with a view to get rid of Burns, whom he detested, and of several chiefs, whom he hoped to see fall a sacrifice to our vengeance; little anticipating the ruinous result to himself and to us. Poor Burns had made but few friends among the chiefs, who now never mention his name but in terms of the bitterest hatred and scorn. He seems to have kept too much aloof from them; thus they had no opportunity of appreciating his many valuable qualities, and saw in him only the traveller, who had come to spy the nakedness of the land, in order that he might betray it to his countrymen. The King considered him as a personal enemy, and dreaded his probable succession to the post of Envoy on the departure of Sir W. Macnaghten.

Of Mahomed Akber Khan, I have been told from an authentic source that, on the morning of the departure of the army from Cabul on the 6th of January, he and Sultan Jan made their appearance bootied and spurred before the assembly of chiefs, and being asked by Nuwab Zeman Shah where they were going, Mahomed Akber replied, "I am going to slay all the Feringhee dogs, to be sure." Again: on the passage of our troops through the Khoord-Cabul pass on the 8th, he followed with some chiefs in the rear, and in the same breath called to the Giljyes in Persian to desist from, and in Pushtoo to continue, firing. This explains the whole mystery of the massacre, and clears up every doubt regarding Mahomed Akber's treachery.

June 27th.—To our surprise, the European soldiers whom we left in the fort at Buddeecabad, and whom we believed to have been ransomed, made their appearance. They all agreed in stating that they had been ill-treated and starved ever since our departure, which they mainly attributed to the evil influence of their own countrywoman, Mrs. Wade, who had disgraced her country and religion by turning Mahomedan, and, having forsaken her husband, had become the concubine of an Affghaan in Mahomed Shah Khan's service, and had taken every occasion to excite prejudice and hostility against the English captives, who were plundered of the little money and the few clothes they possessed, and exposed to continual insult and savage threats. She actually was so base as to betray her own husband, in whose boot two pieces of gold had been sewn up with her own hands, of which he was deprived at her suggestion. On their arrival at Cabul, she had gone off to Mahomed Shah Khan's fort, taking with her a little orphan child named Staker, of which she had charge.

June 28th.—Capt. Mackenzie having been taken ill, Capt. Troup returned to the city without him. The Sirdar, we learned, had made preparation for a flight to Bameean, in anticipation of the advance of our troops; whether, of course, the prisoners would accompany him. His ultimate place of refuge, it was supposed, would be Herat.

June 29th.—A shock of earthquake. Capt. Troup came to see us again before starting to Jellalabad on a mission from the Sirdar. Fuddy Jung was this day proclaimed king by Mahomed Akber, who contented himself for the present with the title of wuzeer. Capt. Mac kenzie still very ill. * * *
The Author's autograph manuscript breaks off here; but, as there remain still to be noted the events of three months, including those critical movements by which Mahomed Akber's captives were so nearly hurried beyond the hope of freedom, it is hoped that he will yet tell, in his own words, the remainder of the tale. In the mean time his private letters will make the conclusion less abrupt.

"Our real foe is Mahomed Shah Khan, but for whose baneful influence the Sirdar would have released the ladies long ago. The latter has many good points, and, but for one act, would be more worthy of clemency than the chiefs at whose instigation he did every thing, and who would fain make him their scapegoat." ** **

"July 29th.—We have had a good deal of sickness amongst us, and Mackenzie had a narrow escape of his life from a malignant fever. All the invalids are, however, recovering, thank God! I fear, however, that our prospects are blacker than ever. We had hopes, a few days ago, that a fair exchange would be agreed upon between Mahomed Akber and Gen. Pollock, of the Ameer and all the other Afghan prisoners for us poor wretches. But the General has since received instructions to advance on Cabul; and Mahomed Akber declared to-day to Troup, with an expression of savage determination in his countenance, that so surely as Pollock advances, he will take us all into Toorkistan, and make presents of us to the different chiefs. And depend upon it he will carry his threats into execution, for he is not a man to be trifled with." ** **

The public are aware how well Mahomed Akber would have kept this pleasant promise; but the next and last communication is from Cabul, announcing the happy deliverance of the whole party, whose varied fortunes have for the last twelve months excited such universal interest.

"Camp, Cabul, 22d Sept. 1842.

"Cabul, Sept. 22d.—Heaven be praised! we are once more free. Our deliverance was effected on the 20th, and we arrived safe in Gen. Pollock's camp yesterday evening. On the 25th of August we were hurried off towards Toorkistan, and reached Bameean on the 3d of September, every indignity being heaped upon us by the way. There we awaited fresh orders from Mahomed Akber. Meanwhile Pollock's army advanced on Cabul, carrying all before them. About the 10th of September an order came to carry us off to Koorkoom, and to butcher all the sick, and those for whom there was no conveyance. Fortunately discontent prevailed among the soldiers of our guard, and their commandant began to intrigue with Major Pottinger for our release. A large reward was held out to him, and he swallowed the bait. The Huzarah chiefs were gained over; and on the 16th we commenced our return towards Cabul, expecting to encounter the defeated and now furious Akber on the way. On the 17th we were reinforced by Sir R. Shakespeare who had ridden out from Cabul with 600 Kuzzibash horsemen to our assistance. His aid was most timely; for Sultan Mahomed Khan, with 1000 men, was hastening to intercept us. On the 20th, after forced marches, we met a brigade of our troops, and our deliverance was complete."

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**LIST OF PRISONERS RELEASED ON GENERAL POLLOCK'S ARRIVAL AT CABUL.**

Major-Gen. Shelton, Her Majesty's 44th foot.
Major Griffiths, 37th Bengal native infantry.
Capt. Troup, Shah's service.
- Anderson, ditto.
- Bygrave, paymaster.
- Boyd, commissariat.
- Johnson, ditto S. S. F., 26th native infantry.
- Burnett, 54th native infantry.
- Sonter, Her Majesty's 44th foot.
- Walker, Bengal horse artillery.
- Alston, *27th native infantry.
- Poett, * ditto.
- Walsh, 52d Madras native infantry.
- Drummond, 3d Bengal light cavalry.

LIEUT. EYRE, BENGAL ARTILLERY.
- Airey, Her Majesty's 3d buffs.
- Warburton, Bengal artillery, S. S. F.
- Webb, 38th Madras native infantry, S. S. F.
- Crawford, Bengal 3d native infantry, S. S. F.
- Mein, Her Majesty's 13th light infantry.
- Harris, *27th Bengal native infantry.
- Melville, 54th Bengal native infantry.
- Evans, Her Majesty's 44th foot.

ENSIGN HAUGHTON, 31ST BENGAL NATIVE INFANTRY.
- Williams, 37th Bengal native infantry.
- Nicholson, ditto.

CONDUCTOR RYLEY, ORDINANCE COMMISSARIAT.

DOCTOR CAMPBELL.

SURGEON MAGRATH.

ASSISTANT-SURGEON BERWICK, LEFT IN CHARGE.

- Thomson.

LADIES.

LADY MACNAUGHTEN.
- Sale.

MRS. TREVOR, 8 CHILDREN.
- ANDERSON, 3 DITTO.
- STURT AND 1 CHILD.
- MAINWARING, DITTO.
- BOYD, 3 CHILDREN.
- EYRE, 1 CHILD.
- WALLER, 2 CHILDREN.

CONDUCTOR RYLEY'S WIFE, MRS. RYLEY, 3 CHILDREN.

PRIVATE BOURNE'S (13TH LIGHT INFANTRY) WIFE, MRS. BOURNE.

MRS. WADE, WIFE OF SERGEANT WADE.

* Those marked thus * were of the Ghuznee garrison.
IMPRISONMENT IN AFFGHANISTAN.

Major Pottinger, Bombay artillery.
Captain Lawrence, 11th light cavalry.
— Mackenzie, 48th Madras native infantry.
Mr. Fallon, clerk { not in the service.
— Blewitt, do. { not in the service.

HER MAJESTY'S 44TH FOOT.

Sergeant Wedlock. Private M'CCarthy.
— Weir. — M'Cabe.
— Fair. — Nowlan.

Corporal Sumpter. Gunner A. Hearn.
— Bevan. — Keane, (Signed)

— Lovell. — Cleland. Sergeant Wade, bag-
— Branagan. — Magary. —gage-sergeant to the
— Wilson. — Cuff.

Private Burns. Drummer Higgins.
— Cresham. — Cleland.
— Arch. — Monks.
— Driscoll. — Magary.
— Moore. — Seyburne.
— Deroney. — Robson.
— Miller. — Sumpter.
— Duffy. — Wedlock.
— Murphy. — Weir.
— Matthew. — Fair.
— M'Dade. — Mackenzie.
— Cox. — Major.
— Marron. — Pottinger.

Private Brady. Boys Grier.
— M'Glyn. — Milwood.

HER MAJESTY'S 13TH LIGHT INFANTRY.

Private Binding. Private Maccullar.
— Murray. — M'Connell.
— Magary. — Cuff.
— Monks.

BENGAL HORSE ARTILLERY.

Sergeant M'Nee. Gunner Dalton.
— Cresham. Sergeant Wade, bag-
— Arch. —gage-sergeant to the
— Moore. — Keane.
— Driscoll. — Cleland.
— Miller. — Monks.
— Deroney. — Magary.
— Murray. — Seyburne.
— Cresham. — Robson.
— Arch. — Sumpter.

(Signed) G. PONSONBY, Captain,
Assistant-Adjutant-General.

(True copy.) (Signed) R. C. SHAKESPEARE,
Military Secretary.

(True copies.) (Signed) T. H. MADDOCK,
Secretary to the Government of India
with the Governor-General.

(True copies.) J. P. WILLOUGHBY,
Secretary to the Government.
**APPENDIX.**

**LIST OF CIVIL AND MILITARY OFFICERS KILLED DURING THE REBELLION, AT AND NEAR CABUL,**

*Between 12th October, 1841, and 6th January, 1842, the day of leaving Cabul.*

**Political.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Death</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sir W. H. Macnaghten, Bart.</td>
<td>23 Dec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Alexander Burnes</td>
<td>2d Nov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Broadfoot, 1st Eng. Regt.</td>
<td>2d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieut. Burns, Bombay Infty.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieut. Rattray</td>
<td>3d &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**H. M. 44th.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Death</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieut. Col. Mackerell</td>
<td>10th Nov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Swayne</td>
<td>4th &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. M'Crea</td>
<td>10th &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Robinson</td>
<td>4th &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieut. Raban</td>
<td>6th &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**5th N. I.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Death</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieut. Col. Oliver</td>
<td>23d Nov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Mackintosh</td>
<td>23d &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**37th N. I.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Death</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Westmacott</td>
<td>10th Nov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensign Gordon</td>
<td>4th &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**35th N. I.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Death</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Wyndham</td>
<td>12th &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**H. M. 13th Light Infantry.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Death</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieut. King</td>
<td>12th Oct.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Local Horse.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Death</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Walker, 1st N. I.</td>
<td>23d Nov.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**27th N. I.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Death</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieut. Laing</td>
<td>23d Nov.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Shah's Service.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Death</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Woodburn, 44th N. I.</td>
<td>23d Nov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Codrington, 49th N. I.</td>
<td>23d &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensign Salisbury, 1st V. Regt.</td>
<td>23d &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensign Rose, 54th N. I.</td>
<td>23d &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctor Grant, Bombay Estab.</td>
<td>3d &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Trevor, 3d Light Cav.</td>
<td>23d Dec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Lieut. Wheeler</td>
<td>3d Nov.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From 6th January up to the 12th January 1842 inclusive on the retreat.

**Staff.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Duff, Superin.-Surgeon</td>
<td>Killed between Tezeen and Seh Baba</td>
<td>10th Jan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Paton,* 58th N. I.</td>
<td>at Khoord-Cabul pass</td>
<td>8th Jan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieut. Sturt,* Engineers</td>
<td></td>
<td>8th Jan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Horse Artillery.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Bryce</td>
<td>on march to Tezeen</td>
<td>10th Jan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**5th Light Cavalry.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieut. Hardyman</td>
<td>outside the cantonment</td>
<td>6th Jan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**H. M. 44th.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Scott</td>
<td>on march to Tezeen</td>
<td>10th Jan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Leighton</td>
<td></td>
<td>10th Jan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieut. White</td>
<td>at Junga Fareekee</td>
<td>10th Jan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieut. Fortye*</td>
<td>at Jugdulluk</td>
<td>10th Jan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**5th N. I.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Swayne*</td>
<td>at Junga Fareekee</td>
<td>10th Jan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Miles</td>
<td></td>
<td>10th Jan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieut. Deas*</td>
<td></td>
<td>10th Jan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieut. Alexander</td>
<td></td>
<td>10th Jan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieut. Warren</td>
<td></td>
<td>10th Jan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**54th N. I.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Ewert</td>
<td>on march to Tezeen</td>
<td>10th Jan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Shaw*</td>
<td></td>
<td>10th Jan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieut. Kirby</td>
<td></td>
<td>10th Jan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**37th N. I.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**H. M. 44th.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieut. Wade</td>
<td>Jugdulluk</td>
<td>12th Jan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**27th N. I.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Cardew*</td>
<td>Tezeen</td>
<td>10th Jan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After leaving Jugdulluk on the 12th to the final massacre.

**Staff.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Mackay, Assist. P. M.†</td>
<td>Doubtful</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Horse Artillery.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieut. Stewart</td>
<td>Gundamuk</td>
<td>13th Jan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**5th Light Cavalry.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Blair</td>
<td></td>
<td>12th Jan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Bott</td>
<td></td>
<td>12th Jan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Hamilton</td>
<td></td>
<td>13th Jan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Collyer</td>
<td>Near Jellalabad</td>
<td>14th Jan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Harpur</td>
<td>Near Jellalabad</td>
<td>14th Jan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinary Surgeon Willis</td>
<td>Doubtful</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These officers had been previously wounded at Cabul. Captain Paton’s left arm had been amputated.
† Capt. Mackay, Assist. P. M. Shah’s Staff, being mentioned in the text twice (pp. 51, 52.), I insert his name thus. It is not in the original list.—Editor.
APPENDIX.

H. M. 44th.
Capt. Dodgin - - - Jugdulluk Pass - - - - 12th Jan.
Capt. Collins - - - Gundamuk - - - - 13th "
Lieut. Hogg - - - - - - 13th "
Lieut. Cumberland - - - Soorakab - - - - 12th "
Lieut. Cadett - - - Gundamuk - - - - 13th "
Lieut. Swinton - - - - - - 13th "
Ensign Gray - - - Doubtful.
Paymaster Bourke - - - Jugdulluk - - - - 12th "
Qr.-Master Halaban* - - - Jugdulluk Pass - - - - 12th "
Surgeon Harcourt - - - - - - 12th "
Assist. Surgeon Balfour - - - Gundamuk - - - - 13th "
Assist. Surgeon Primrose - - - Gundamuk - - - - 13th "

5th N. I.
Capt. Haig - - - Doubtful.
Lieut. Horsbrough - - - Gundamuk - - - - 13th Jan.
Lieut. Tombs - - - Doubtful.
Ensign Potenger - - - - - -
Lient. Burkinyoung - - - - - -
Dr. Metcalfe - - - Gundamuk - - - - 13th Jan.

31st N. I.
Capt. Rind - - - Gundamuk - - - - 13th Jan.
Lieut. Steer - - - Jugdulluk Pass - - - - 12th "
Lieut. Vanrenen - - - Near Soorakab - - - - 12th "
Lieut. Hawtrey - - - Gundamuk - - - - 13th "
Lieut. Carlyon - - - Doubtful.

54th N. I.
Capt. Anstruther - - - Doubtful.
Capt. Corrie - - - - - -
Capt. Palmer - - - - - -
Lieut. Weaver - - - Gundamuk - - - - 13th Jan.
Lieut. Cunningham - - - - - - 13th "
Lieut. Pottinger - - - Neemla - - - - 13th "
Lieut. Morrison - - - Gundamuk - - - - 13th "

H. M. 13th Lt. Inf.
Major Kershaw - - - Doubtful.
Lieut. Hobhouse - - - Gundamuk - - - - 13th Jan.

Shah’s Service.
Brigadier Anquetil - - - Jugdulluk Pass - - - - 12th Jan.
Capt. Hay, 35th N. I. - - - Gundamuk - - - - 13th "
Capt. Hopkins, 27th N. I. - - - Near Jellalabad - - - - 13th "
Capt. Marshall, 61st N. I. - - - Jugdulluk Pass - - - - 12th "
Lieut. Le Geyt, Bombay Cav. - - - Neemla - - - - 13th "
Lieut. Green, Artillery - - - Gundamuk - - - - 13th "
Lieut. Bird, Madras Estab. - - - Futtehbad - - - - 13th "
Lieut. Macartney - - - Gundamuk - - - - 13th "

LIST OF OFFICERS SAVED OF THE CABUL FORCE.

In imprisonment in Afghanistan.

Political.
Major Pottinger, C. B. - - Wounded at Charakar on - - - - 6th Nov.
Capt. Lawrence.
Capt. Mackenzie, Madras Estab. - - in action at Cabul on - - - - 23d "

Staff.
Major-Gen. Elphinstone, C. B. - - on retreat at Jugdulluk - - - - 12th Jan.
(Died at Tezeen on April 23d.)

Brigadier Shelton.

* This officer had been previously wounded at Cabul.
Lieut. Eyre, Arty. D. C. O.  
Horse Artillery.  
Wounded in action at Cabul  
-  
-  
22d Nov.  

Lieut. Waller  
H. M. 44th.  
"  
"  
4th Nov.  

Capt. Souter  
H. M. 13th.  
" on retreat at Gundamuk  
-  
-  
13th Jan.  

Lieut. Mein  
37th N. I.  
" in action under General Sale at  
Khoord-Cabul Pass  
-  
Oct.  

Major Griffiths  
Dr. Magrath.  
" on retreat in Khoord-Cabul Pass  
-  
8th Jan.  

Shah's Service.  
Capt. Troup  
Capt. Johnson.  
Capt. Anderson.  
Paymaster.  
The toes of one foot nipped off by frost on re- 
treat.  

Mr. Ryley, conductor of Ordnance.  
54th N. I.  
Lieut. Melville.  
Shah's Service.  
" on retreat near Huft Kotul  
-  
10th Jan.  

Dr. Brydon  
Escaped to Jellalabad.  

THE END.
Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide
Treatment Date: Jan. 2003

Preservation Technologies
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